Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-057
Thursday
24 March 1994

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FBIS-EEU-94-057 *24 March 1994*

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Talks on Dividing Yugoslav Assets 'Deadlocked'

AU1803142594 Paris AFP in English 1410 GMT 18 Mar 94

[Text] Geneva, March 18 (AFP)—The latest round of talks on the division of former Yugoslavia's assets were deadlocked Friday [18 March] due to Belgrade's failure to provide realistic figures, diplomatic sources said.

Talks reopened Thursday and were continuing Friday between the rump state of Yugoslavia, made up of Serbia and Montenegro, and the other former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Geneva peace conference spokesman John Mills said.

But non-Serb sources said the talks were as unproductive as earlier sessions because the Serbian authorities refused to provide documents needed for a realistic evaluation of the former state's assets.

Mills said talks by the working group, headed by Danish ambassador to Berne Els Johansson, would be "a drawn-out process."

Another ex-Yugoslav working group, on hur anitarian issues, was due to meet Friday afternoon in Geneva headed by Sadako Ogata of the UN High Commission for Refugees who returned recently from a visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Berisha Addresses Union Movement as Split Looms

AU2303141094 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 22 Mar 94 p 5

[Unattributed report: "The Independent Trade Unions Face a Big Riddle"]

[Text] The Union of Independent Trade Unions [BSPSh] started its first congress on Monday [21 March]. Although scheduled to start at 0930, this, the highest trade union forum, began its proceedings after a 45-minute delay. This was because of the late arrival of President Berisha, guest of honor at the congress. Berisha, whose office is a few yards from the Palace of Congresses where the BSPSh were meeting, entered the hall to applause, creating the kind of image we had long forgotten—that of a political leader attending a trade union meeting. Berisha made his presence all the more strongly felt when he announced to the floor that he "had followed developments within the BSPSh with close attention." It is not known whether this phrase of the president may constitute a warning to the fractionist group within Xheka's "anticommunist" trade union. It could be the reason for the head of state's attendance at the BSPSh Congress. None of the separatists figured in the list of members of the Presidium who were to chair the plenary sessions.

Three years after its foundation, the BSPSh finds itself on the verge of a split. Not even the opening speech made by veteran trade unionist Llukan Prifti could evoke the old days of ferment and struggle against communist governments. There were harsh words about "attempts at division" even in the report on the BSPSh's three years of work, delivered by BSPSh Secretary Vilson Qendro. According to Qendro, divisive individuals within the ranks of the trade union are incited by political parties who wish to take over the uncompromising struggle that the BSPSh is waging in the interests of workers. Qendro called them "the spawn of the dictatorship," and accused them of using "gangster methods" in their activities. Nevertheless, he did not mention any names in his speech. According to the report as delivered, the struggle of the BSPSh is now moving into a new phase. Its coalition with right-wing parties led to their assumption of power. The government has now reduced to a minimum its dialogue with the trade unions and parts of the legislation now approved can be considered antidemocratic. Meanwhile, according to Vilson Qendro, the BSPSh now demands wages linked to the inflation index, an end to lay-offs, and the distribution of national assets in the form of vouchers.

The first sessions of the BSPSh Congress showed no signs of these conflicts, which will not, apparently, be made public this time either. The atmosphere in the hall and Berisha's greeting encouraging Xheka may finally have tilted the scales in favor of the present Presidium. The congress will continue its proceedings today, its second and final day.

Appeals Court Sentences Journalists

AU2303152294 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 22 Mar 94 pp 3,6

[Lorenc Vangjeli report: "Appeal Court Sentences Journalists Frangaj and Leka and Officers Licaj and Feta"]

[Text] Journalism is without a doubt the most dangerous profession in Albania. The second act of the drama of the journalists Aleksander Frangaj and Martin Leka, staged this time at the Tirana Appeals Court, has convincingly proved this once again. Arrested on 31 January this year on charges preferred by the Defense Ministry and on a warrant signed by Prosecutor Qeleshi, the two journalists tasted the bitterness of detention on remand for one month. The charge they faced was of revealing a state secret in collusion with officers Licaj and Feta, while Leka also faced the charge of public slander against Defense Minister Zhulali. At the four-day trial at the Tirana District Court, Leka's charge of slander was not proved, and the collusion "thought to have been" entered into by the four turned out to involve only Leka and Licaj. Frangaj, editor in chief of the independent newspaper KOHA JONE, was acquitted, while his colleague Leka was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for "colluding to reveal a state secret." One month later all hopes of overturning this verdict in the Appeals Court turned out to be illusory. After the appeal lodged by the three defendants Leka, Licaj, and Feta and the protest made by Prosecutor Qeleshi over Frangaj's acquittal, it was the turn of Appeals Court Judge Prel Martini to dispense justice. Of course, Mr. Martini will have been aware of the dozens of protests by European and world journalists' organizations for the release of the two Albanian journalists. However, he and the modern Albanian state that he serves showed once again that the bell tolls only for those who want to listen. After a judicial hearing of five hours, Judge Martini pronounced both journalists guilty and sentenced Martin Leka to 18 months imprisonment and Aleksander Frangaj to five months.

How did the trial go?

It started at 0900 yesterday with the reading of the defendants' appeals, in which they asked for the initial court verdict to be overturned, for an acquittal, and for the application of justice. It was the Appeals Court's task to examine the legitimacy of the earlier court verdict. Leka's lawyer Agim Tirana announced that he wanted an end to "this illegal sham," and demanded his client's acquittal. He argued that there was no legal basis for the crime committed by Leka and Licaj and claimed that no such thing had been proved by the earlier court, which had even based its conclusions not on the documents of the case but on guesswork. Moreover, as a journalist, Leka could not be held liable to a charge of revealing a

state secret and therefore could not be punished for such a crime. However, surprises were not long in coming. Although Leka had been arrested under the signature of Prosecutor Qeleshi for public slander against Defense Minister Zhulali, no such accusation had arrived at the Prosecutor's Office. Indeed, the first trial had been unable to prove that Leka had commited slander. However, Prosecutor Mosko produced from among the papers in the file a charge preferred by the Defense Ministry that lacked a couple of minor features, i.e. a rubber stamp and a protocol number.

The Tirana Court's declaration of Frangaj's innocence turned out to be premature for District Prosecutor Qeleshi. Qeleshi protested and called for Frangaj's conviction on the basis of Article 20 of the Press Law. It was the turn of Prosecutor Mosko to write the speech that was successfully to bury the public's hopes that the state would this time sign a peace treaty with the press. In the one hour that Mosko demanded he managed to pull to shreds the one month's investigation of the journalists made while they were on remand and also the courts questioning of them. This prosecutor, who in 1990 warned defendants who had blown up Uncle Stalin with dynamite that he would not allow them to insult the power of the people, and who often sweated during the public defense of Hoxha's widow, concluded that the crimes of the four defendants should be legally reclassified. In his speech, he believed he had proved that Martin Leka had commited slander and had offended against Article 20 of the Press Law, that Aleksander Frangaj must be considered guilty because he allowed the article to be published, and that Licaj and Feta had abused their positions.

The dissatisfaction in the courtroom reached new heights at 1400, when the presiding judge read out the verdict, this time open to appeal only at the Higher Appeals Court.

The word "guilty" uttered by Martini buried once and for all the hopes of the most optimistic. Martini called for 18 months for Martin Leka for his "sin" of having slandered the defense minister and violating Article 20 of the Press Law, four years for officer Licaj, and a suspended sentence of six months for officer Feta.

Thus, the second act of this drama ended without providing an answer to the question that was at the focus of this trial. Was Defense Minister Zhulali's order a secret? It was so for the court, but not for the defendants and their lawyers, who asserted that "a secret ceases to be a secret when it emerges from government offices into the streets and becomes known to thousands of people." However, "you need a stone to crack walnuts," and in Albania journalists have nothing but their ballpoints and a Press Law that states that the press is free.

Zhelev Against Balkan Troops in UNPROFOR

AU2403104494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Text] President Zhelyu Zhelev has written to UN General Secretary Butrus Butrus-Ghali pointing out that the Balkan countries are burdened by their past, and that any military intervention by a Balkan country in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even as part of the Blue Helmet forces and even when prompted by the noblest of motives, could evoke old suspicions and animosity.

While the president expresses understanding for the growing need to increase the number of Blue Helmets, without which the agreements that have been reached could not be implemented, he points out that there is an even greater risk if soldiers from any Balkan country participate in the Blue Helmets.

President Zhelev expresses confidence that the UN general secretary is aware of this danger and will continue his efforts to seek an appropriate solution on the part of the world organization.

The Bulgarian president recalls that since the beginning of the crisis Bulgaria has repeatedly declared that it will not take advantage of the situation and will not participate in any military way in the events in former Yugoslavia. Bulgaria also appealed to the other neighboring Balkan states to do the same.

The president also recalls the strict observance of the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro, and stresses that, despite its great losses and difficulties, Bulgaria will continue to follow this policy.

Gatsinski Views Khan Kubrat Hijacking Affair

AU2303135694 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 17 Mar 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with First Deputy Foreign Minister Valentin Gatsinski by Plamen Tsvetkov; place and date not given: "The Investigation Will Reveal the Truth"]

[Text] [Tsvetkov] Was the hijacking of the Khan Kubrat vessel proven in the final analysis?

[[Gatsinski] The investigation will clarify the circumstances under which the vessel left the Bulgarian section of the Danube.

[Tsvetkov] Have any hijackers been identified?

[Gatsinski] The names of the crew members and the others on board are known. The investigation will determine whether some of them could be described in the way your question implies.

[Tsvetkov] Will the incident affect relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)?

[Gatsinski] Unfortunately, in contrast with their initially declared readiness, the Serbian authorities did not cooperate in returning not only the crew, but only the vessel's cargo. Despite all this, I believe that after the comprehensive crisis in Yugoslavia ends the new states that have emerged there will find the place they deserve in Europe. I am convinced that in the process of normalizing the status of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the international community our relations will develop actively as good neighbors, on the basis of mutual economic benefit.

[Tsvetkov] Would you like to forecast a new development, or do you consider the case closed?

[Gatsinski] The case will be closed after the investigation ends and the culprits are punished.

Romanian Embassy Accuses Press of 'Provocations'

AU2303140894 Sofia NOVINI 5 in Bulgarian 17 Mar 94 p 3

[Diyan Krasimirov report: "Romanian Embassy Accuses Bulgarian Press of 'Crude Provocations'"]

[Text] In connection with the letter of the "Great Romania" Legion, which was published by several dailies and also received by the editorial board of NOVINI 5, we asked the Romanian Embassy in Sofia and Lyuben Beshkov, chairman of the Dobrudzha All-Bulgarian Union, to comment.

Beshkov expressed alarm with the "recent statements of the 'Great Romania' Legion, which considers Dobrudzha a native Romanian land." "We expect the Bulgarian authorities not to keep silent any longer regarding those 'innocent jokes' on the part of certain nationalistic circles in Romania."

For his part Teodor Tolea, press secretary of the Romanian Embassy, expressed indignation with those "attempts to artificially exacerbate tension in bilateral relations," while Mr. Gherceanu, first secretary of the Romanian Embassy, said over the telephone:

"What was published in the Bulgarian press about certain territorial claims, Greater Romania, and so forth, is not only falsehood but also a crude provocation. Our country has repeatedly declared that it has no territorial claims vis-a-vis Bulgaria. We have always adhered to good-neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. However, we encountered already on several occasions such publications in certain Bulgarian newspapers. It appears that TRUD uses a double standard. If the Bulgarian minority in Romania has its organization, newspaper, and representatives in the parliament, does that mean that it also has separatist intentions?"

Nuclear Accident Exchange Accord With Turkey

AU2403122194 Sofia NOVINI 5 in Bulgarian 21 Mar 94 pp 1, 3

[Staff report: "Bulgaria, Turkey To Mutually Inform Each Other About Nuclear Accidents"]

[Text] An agreement on exchanging operational information regarding nuclear installations is to be signed between Bulgaria and Turkey. The negotiations related to the agreement have been completed. The draft agreement was approved by the Council of Ministers in 1991. It will positively affect bilateral relations with Turkey and will serve as the basis of cooperating in utilizing nuclear energy, the experts of the Committee on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy think.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Environment Ministry, the National Electricity Company, and the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant have already conveyed their recommendations and have approved the agreement. It will be identical to the agreement with Greece, which has been signed and ratified.

The agreement does not relate to admissible concentrations of radioactive substances according to the national norms. Once a year the sides will exchange information about radioactive particles which have found their way into the environment. There will be a one-time exchange of information regarding the nuclear installations. However, the validity of this information will be confirmed every January.

Rakovski Legion Officers Said Facing Purge

AU2403130494 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 21 Mar 94 p 1

[Stiliyan Ivanov report: "Purge in Army Begins With Rakovski Legion"]

[Text] The list of Rakovski Officer Legion members who are to be cut from the army have already been added as an appendix to Minister Valentin Aleksandrov's decree on optimizing army personnel. DUMA has learned from a well-informed Rakovski Legion source that the Defense Ministry and the General Staff are behind these cuts.

The massive cuts were expected to take place on the eve of the Rakovski Legion Second Congress, which will take place at the beginning of June. The Legion's officers assume that Minister Valentin Aleksandrov and high-ranking officers from the General Staff, among them, P. Petkov, Z. Iliev, P. Shushkov, and others, were behind the attack against the legion. The first announcements of the cuts are expected any day now. Major General Denev, commander of the 2d Army, has personally banned the distribution of Rakovski Legion documents.

It is assumed that the settling of accounts between the chiefs of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff began after the meeting of the dismissed Rakovski Legion spokesman, Captain Second Rank Vasil Danov, and President Zhelev, at which Danov reportedly expressed the Legion's indignation with the fact that the General Staff payroll was inflated, viewed against the background of the meager Armed Forces' budget.

According to Rakovski Legion sources, the General Staff is trying to split their organization through persons the General Staff planted in the Legion's leadership. It is expected that in the next few days the Legion will convene an extraordinary confederative council, at which it will formulate its tactics regarding behavior in contacts with the ministry and General Staff. The Legion will also inform EUROMIL, of which it is a member, about developments. High-ranking active service and reserve officers assume that persecution of the Legion will exacerbate relations between junior officers and high-ranking commanders, and between the various army branches. Major General Mikho Mikhov, Air Force and Air Defense commander, has already said he objects to the envisaged cuts.

Despite the announcement of the Defense Ministry Press Center that there will be no cuts as an end in itself, the officers complain that Ground Forces Commander General Totomirov has not intervened in favor of any Rakovski Legion officer who has been cut.

In response to a National Assembly member's question on 11 March Minister Aleksandrov said that the Legion members who had been dismissed had violated the regulations and the principle of one-man command, and therefore their penalties were totally justified. He pointed out that he will preserve the spirit of partnership between the ministry and the Legion.

After his return from Brussels, Army General Lyuben Petrov, commander of the General Staff, expressed almost the same position to DUMA. According to him the dismissals were a correct sanction, and that personally, he has nothing against the Rakovski Legion officers, as long as they observe the regulations. The officers have the right to present their social claims, but they must do so through established procedures and not through petitions, the General Staff commander said.

Commentator Urges Caution on Army Cuts

AU2303140694 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 17 Mar 94 p 6

[Pencho Kovachev commentary: "Tension Under Shoulder Strap"]

[Text] Recently President Zhelev's pen has been working overtime because of the military.

From one side the commander in chief receives a decree on releasing generals and admirals from the military service, while from the other lists of officers who covet the general rank.

In such situations it is very important whether one hand knows what the other is doing.

It is not a tragedy for the Army if four generals retire simultaneously. Anyway, there are more generals on the payroll than our Army needs. Furthermore, in the General Staff and in the Ground Troops Command there are more generals than desks.

The problem with eventual cuts in the Army is more complicated. In this sphere the commander in chief, [Defense] Minister Valentin Aleksandrov, and the head of the General Staff are between the hammer and the anvil. On the one side there is the budget plight that hovers over the officers, and on the other the war that rages only 500 km from our border. Even King Solomon himself would have difficulties in resolving this problem, but this is no justification for either staying idle or adopting hasty decisions.

Obviously, the problem could only be resolved by experts, who would objectively consider all arguments for and against the cuts, without being interested at all in the political manipulations of parties, leaders, legions, and alliances, which utilize the national security problems for promoting their own interests.

Any other decision regarding the Army's fate could have unpredictable consequences.

Army-Defense Ministry Coordination Criticized

AU2403103294 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 19 Mar 94 p 6

[Editorial commentary: "Our Army Looks Toward Russia, Our Generals Toward the United States"]

[Text] In sending three delegations to the United States at the same time our military chiefs have broken a record.

Ostensibly, our arms are Russian, we cry out for spare parts from Moscow and Kiev, the army does not have a penny to its name, and yet our generals constantly look toward the West.

The chief of General Staff returned from Brussels and left immediately for NATO's Atlantic headquarters in Norfolk. All right, in Belgium we at least have certain interests—we are about to send our representatives to NATO headquarters—but what business do we have with the Atlantic?

In addition, the fact that three delegations are heading for the United States shows that there is apparently no coordination between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense in anything related to the Army cuts and visits abroad.

Army Training of Ethnic Turks Cited

AU2403102194 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 21 Mar 94 p 32

[Untitled commentary by Georgi Mantarov]

[Text] Formally, our army is more independent than even the North Korean Army, and yet its international activity becomes ever more obvious. We could even claim that we contribute to world military science.

Chiefs of departments, staffs, and regiments compete with each other to visit foreign countries, and at the same time our Turkish neighbors prefer to train their soldiers in our country. Naturally, at our expense. First, it is cheaper, and second, if anything happens, they will be one step ahead.

The so-called lower-ranking commanders of the Bulgarian Army cannot refuse to train people who will later join the reserve troops of the Turkish rather than the Bulgarian Army. Here and there it has been suggested that the recruits from across the border have a suspiciously great interest in our arms and army structures, but all this remains within the realm of specualtion.

The National Assembly members, ostensibly concerned with the well-being of our motherland, are in no hurry to adopt the armed forces bill. For the time being, the bill has a loophole that allows even our officers to have dual citizenship. True, people who are torn between two countries cannot become officers, but no one can prevent active officers from acquiring another passport if they so wish.

Under these circumstances why should the army officers be angry because the army does not have enough money? There is no reason to be, if our army can train the cadres of our traditional rivals free of charge.

Belgian Foreign Minister Arrives on Visit

LD2003113794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 20 Mar 94

[Text] Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes arrived in Prague about an hour ago. More from our reporter Milar. Repka at the airport:

[Repka] Willy Claes, vice prime minister of the Belgian Government, foreign minister, and a member of the Flemish Socialist Party, said in an interview for Czech Radio that this is his first visit to the Czech Republic and that the main points of his agenda will deal with matters related to the Czech Republic's incorporation into the European Union as well as the crisis situation in former Yugoslavia and bilateral cooperation. Claes is paying a two-day official visit to Prague.

Supports Czech EU Membership

LD2103193894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 21 Mar 94

[Text] In Prague today, Belgian Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Willy Claes, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, and Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec discussed relations between the Czech Republic and the Kingdom of Belgium. Mutual multilateral relations in connection with the Czech Republic's effort aimed at joining the European Union were also discussed. Klara Stejskalova reports:

[Stejskalova] All of the representatives jointly praised the good and intensive relations between the two countries, evidence of which is the unusual interest of Belgian entrepreneurs in our country, Josef Zieleniec said. Over the past year alone, the Belgians have invested more than $150 million in our country. Thus, they rank fourth among foreign investors.

Regarding Czech membership in the European Union, Claes expressed complete support for the Czech Republic. At the same time, he praised the democratization of politics in our country and the path toward a very strong economy that we have embarked upon. In conclusion, he said that those West Europeans who think they live on an isolated island are naive. He said that support for the process of integration is in the interest of the European Union. Integration should take place gradually and not in blocks. It should be based solely on the fulfillment of the necessary conditions by individual countries. It cannot be expected, however, that European Union enlargement could take place before the intergovernmental conference of the European Union states, scheduled to take place in 1996.

Soros Stake in RFE Would Jeopardize Move

AU2403082894 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 22 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by "jik": "Radio Free Europe Can Come to Prague, but Only Without Soros"]

[Text] Should the U.S. Administration, which finances Radio Free Europe [RFE], agree to U.S. businessman George Soros's investing millions of dollars in the station, negotiations with the Czech Government about the RFE's relocation to the building of the former Federal Assembly in Prague would be seriously jeopardized. This was declared by Minister [of Control] Igor Nemec yesterday.

THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote on Sunday [20 March] that the RFE was expected to reach an agreement with Soros within one month about the privatization of its research center and archives and their relocation from Munich to Prague.

The government is determined to finance the operation of the currently unoccupied building of the Federal Assembly until the end of this month. Should RFE move into the building, it ought to finance the operation of the building as of April. The building is to be leased to it for only a symbolic sum. Should Soros become involved in the radio as an investor, however, the Czech Government would have no reason, according to Nemec, not to lease the Federal Assembly building to someone else at a market price. "There are hundreds of interested parties," Nemec said.

Dutch Soldiers Prefer Czech Submachine Guns

AU2403102894 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 22 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by "luv": "The Czech Submachine Guns Used in the Exercises Suit the Dutch Soldiers Just Fine"]

[Text] Cesky Krumlov—The first joint exercises of the Czech Republic Army and the Armed Forces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands continue in Boletice in the Cesky Krumlov region [southern Bohemia].

The joint exercises of 120 members of the Chrudim rapid-deployment battalion of the Czech Republic Army and 32 Dutch marines are based on the closest possible contact and mutual exchange of information. In addition to shooting practice, a part of the exercises consists of tactical drills in the siege of areas occupied by terrorist units. Spikerman von Weezelenburg, commander of the Dutch marines, is currently on an inspection visit of the exercises. "It is the first specific action stemming from the Partnership for Peace plan," Major Ales Vodehnal, commander of the exercises, told CESKY DENIK. He added that, despite the Dutch being a professional unit with a high standard of training, they consider the Czech submachine guns, for instance, to be of better quality than their own.

February Consumer Price Figures Released

AU2303174894 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 17 Mar 94 p 7

[Czech Statistical Office report: "Consumer Prices and Cost of Living in February"]

[Text] Consumer prices rose in February, in comparison with January, by only 0.2 percent. This was caused by the moderate decline in prices of food (0.2 percent) and a marginal price increase in the other groups, which amounted to 0.3 percent in public catering and in both nonfood items and services equal to 0.4 percent.

The moderate decline in food prices was caused, above all, by the decline of prices of meat and meat products (by 1.3 percent) and eggs (by 16.9 percent). The largest increase was registered in the price of coffee (4.2 percent) and beverages (0.7 percent). In public catering, the prices of restaurant catering rose by only 0.1 percent, while company food services went up 1.2 percent. Only a moderate increase was registered in the prices of nonfood items, and that in practically all groups of goods—prices of footwear and leather haberdashery rose most (0.9 percent), followed by household appliances (0.8 percent). Fuel prices remained at the level of January 1994, and tobacco prices declined by 0.2 percent. In services, prices of water and sewage rose most of all (7.0 percent), followed by garbage removal (4.7 percent).

Over the first two months of the year (February in comparison with December 1993), the prices rose overall by 2.1 percent, of which services increased most (8.4 percent—the result of the increased rents, heating, and hot water in January), while the prices of nonfood items rose substantially less, as did public catering (1.4 and 1.1 percent, respectively). The prices of food remained at the level of December 1993.

The prorated annual rate of inflation (the average for the past 12 months in comparison with the 12 preceding months) amounted to 18.7 percent in February.

In connection with the consumer price development, the household expenditures of white-color workers rose in February—from January—by 0.2 percent, and expenditures of farmers by 0.3 percent. Because of the largest share of food in the overall household expenditures of pensioners, their cost of living did not change in February (in comparison with January 1994).

Parliament Recalls National Bank Vice Governor

LD2303171494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Our parliamentary correspondents, Jarmila Tosecka and Dagmar Bazlikova, have details on the parliament's deliberations.

[Bazlikova] The first point on the agenda was the proposal of the former government, the government of Vladimir Meciar, on 8 March to recall Marian Tkac from his post of vice governor of the National Bank of Slovakia. One of the reasons stated was the fact that Tkac had been positively vetted—that is, that he was accused of having cooperated with the StB [the former secret police].

The noteworthy fact about this proposal to recall the vice governor is that the former opposition had presented similar, or maybe the same, reasons approximately a year ago, when the government proposed that parliament elect Tkac to the post of vice governor. According to some deputies from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party, some facts that prevent Tkac from staying on in this post have only gradually become known. [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] [passage omitted] The results of the public vote were as follows: 119 deputies voted in favor of Tkac's recall, one deputy was against it, and six abstained from voting. The final decision on recalling will be made by the president of the Slovak Republic.

For the time being, this is all from the parliament, where there is a lunch break now.

Filkus Outlines Economic Policy Priorities

AU2303162594 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 17 Mar 94 pp 1, 12

[Interview with Finance Minister Rudolf Filkus by Ivo Slavik in Bratislava on 16 March: "The Third Way Is a Chimera"]

[Text] [Slavik] What kind of economic policies does your government intend to give priority to?

[Filkus] We need to swiftly stabilize the macrosphere. We have to abandon the idea that there is a third way toward the market. We have slowed down privatization in Slovakia by our speculations about a third way. Because we have already taken steps associated with a restrictive macroeconomic policy of a budgetary and monetary character, we cannot fall back. We have to continue to liberalize prices and to maintain our currency's internal convertibility. It is also necessary to speed up and depoliticize privatization, mainly because it was used as a means of concentrating political power. We have to prepare the second wave of coupon privatization by fall, at the latest. The economic microsphere appears to be the most risky area. The enterprises are surviving on their equity and not from the fact that they are efficient. The necessary changes are again associated with speeding up privatization.

We will try to establish and develop the, to date, small capital market. That is, we should improve the microsphere by means of the capital market. Of course, there are also matter-of-fact problems that can be resolved by restructuring, but not the kind that would be undertaken by the center. The microsphere must also be supported, to a substantial degree, by the influx of foreign capital.

[Slavik] Was the recently introduced import surcharge really necessary?

[Filkus] This is a normal instrument of a market economy. It is intended to protect the domestic market. The market left open, however, should be filled by domestic products. Other systemic measures also have to be put into effect for this, though. If they are not put into effect, the consumer would pay more and more for goods, regardless of the surcharge.

[Slavik] There are rumors about state property being looted by the previous government. Is this true?

[Filkus] Many privatization projects were approved with unusual speed during the past three government sessions.

[Slavik] According to some deputies, they were on the verge of legality. Is the successor government going to investigate them?

[Filkus] Yes. Such a proposal has already been made in parliament. Before we address the citizens, we have to take inventory and tell them under what conditions we are taking over the economy.

[Slavik] Could the split within the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] continue?

[Filkus] Everything suggests that the process of dissolution is continuing. It was recently announced that the leadership of the HZDS Deputies' Club is again being changed.

[Slavik] Do you think Vladimir Meciar will win again in the early elections?

[Filkus] No. I am convinced of this.

[Slavik] What do you think of the reactions by the police following the assault on certain journalists by demonstrators?

[Filkus] I condemn them. If this was intended as a test of the police officers and their commanders, it was a complete failure.

REPUBLIKA Debts, New Publisher Viewed

AU2303164594 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 19 Mar 94 p 2

[Aarticle by Arteria-REPUBLIKA-mad: "We Are Going To Be Ltd."]

[Text] Bratislava—Dusan Kleiman, director general of the Press Agency of the Slovak Republic [TA SR] confirmed to the ARTERIA-STA [Slovak Press Agency] that the REPUBLIKA daily is in debt and, by extension, the TA SR is in debt to Danubiaprint. He refused to specify the size of the debt. According to our source, however, who does not wish to be named but comes directly from the TA SR, this debt exceeds 18 million korunas. He says that the debt exists because the daily has not used any funds from the government subsidy for its operation. "Everybody reproaches us for publishing REPUBLIKA for government money, but it has financed itself," he emphasized. So far, however, circulation has not been large enough, he says, to cover all of the expenditure.

As Kleiman also said, the TA SR management reached an agreement with certain entities to pay all of the outstanding debts by surrendering the REPUBLIKA banner and all concomitant rights. "They are prominent entities, with a certain political position on the Slovak political scene," he said. He categorically refused the idea that state treasury funds would be used to pay the debt. According to Jan Comaj, deputy chief editor of REPUBLIKA, the new publisher of the daily will be REPUBLIKA Ltd.

Dusan Kleiman said that REPUBLIKA, which was supposed to be a news-oriented daily, has gradually become an opinion-forming popular daily, and, thereby, it transgressed the publisher's original concept. "We meant to make it into a newspaper version of CNN, but it ended the way it did," the TA SR director said.

Dailies View VSZ 'Purges,' Sale of Stock

AU2303133194

[Editorial Report] Slovak and Czech newspapers on 19 and 21 March publish a number of items dealing with the "political background" to recent "purges" in the management of the East Slovak Ironworks [VSZ], Slovakia's largest company, and the suspicious circumstances of the sale of a major package of VSZ shares by Vladimir Meciar's Cabinet shortly before it was dismissed on 14 March. According to a report in Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak on 14 March on page 5, VSZ is "the flagship of Slovak industry," which employs 27,000 people, exports 80 percent of its annual turnover of over $1 billion, and generates 25 percent of Slovakia's hard-currency earnings.

Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech on 21 March on page 5 carries a 1,000-word article by Peter Schutz, the newspaper's Kosice correspondent, entitled "Privatization in the Style of Vladimir Meciar: I Scratch Your Back, You Scratch Mine." The article deals with the decision made by the Slovak Government on 11 March at night, a few hours after the Slovak parliament passed the vote of no-confidence in Vladimir Meciar, to sell 1.5 million VSZ shares, 9.52 percent of the total, to "VSZ Manager Ltd.," a company established by the ironworks' recently installed new management. According to Schutz, the package has been sold for 200 Slovak korunas [Sk] per share, although the shares' nominal value is Sk1,000 and their market value (that is, the price at which they are currently being traded on the Bratislava Stock Exchange) Sk500.

Commenting on the decision, Schutz says: "What is involved is a transparent and simple 'I scratch your back, you scratch mine' system. VSZ Manager Ltd. was entered in the company register at a municipal district court in Kosice on Friday, 11 March—that is, on the day when the no-confidence vote in the government was passed. The decision on the transaction was made Friday night. The most interesting thing about the transaction is that participants in VSZ Manager Ltd., whose capital stock is Sk100,000, are five members of the VSZ Board of Directors, who had been installed in their posts by a decision of the National Property Fund [FNM] Supervisory Board at the end of December 1993. The FNM Supervisory Board was chaired at that time by Finance Minister Julius Toth." As Schutz goes on to say, while it was chaired by Julius Toth, the FNM Supervisory Board also convened an extraordinary general meeting of VSZ shareholders. This meeting, which was held on 17 March, elected Julius Toth to be chairman of the VSZ Supervisory Board. "But this is not all," Schutz says in conclusion: "The entire transaction was made possible by Banka Slovakia, whose capital is covered fully by FNM property, in the form of a credit extended to Priemyselna Banka [Industrial Bank] in Kosice. Priemyselna Banka promptly granted a loan to VSZ Manager Ltd. so that it could pay the first 15 percent installment. It will no longer come as a surprise that, on Thursday [17 March], Julius Toth was elected deputy chairman of the Priemyselna Banka Board of Directors."

Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 19 March on page 1 carries a 600-word interview with Zsolt Komlosi, a member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Privatization Committee, by Alena Gottweisova, entitled "The FNM Damaged Itself." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Komlosi discusses the circumstances of the sale of 9.53 percent of VSZ shares to five members of the VSZ top management. Komlosi confirms that the transaction was made possible by a loan provided by Banka Slovakia, whose financial resources come from the FNM, to Priemyselna Banka in Kosice, which, in turn, lent the money to the five members of the VSZ management. He also confirms that Priemyselna Banka "is linked to the former minister of finance." According to Komlosi, through this transaction, the FNM "caused itself damage of Sk1 billion," which is the difference between the price at which the VSZ shares were sold to the managers and the price they would fetch on the stock exchange.

Komlosi also points out that the capital stock of VSZ Manager Ltd. represents only Sk100,000 (with each of the five partners contributing Sk20,000) and wonders "how a limited liability company that is accountable for sums up to Sk100,000 can realize in only five days a transaction through which it acquires Sk1 billion or property to this value." He announces that, on Tuesday, 22 March, the NRSR Privatization Committee "will start reexamining the documentation of privatization projects at the FNM."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 21 March on pages 1 and 2 carries a 1,300-word "eb"-signed report entitled "Purges in VSZ, but Not Only in VSZ, Had a Political Background." The report cites a statement issued by four former members of the VSZ Board of Directors—Zoltan Berghauer, Dionyz Kunder, Stanislav Polak, and Marian Sarissky—who were dismissed in December 1993. In the statement, the four managers explain their decision to lodge a complaint against what they regard as their "unlawful dismissal." The complaint was lodged with the Kosice Regional Court on 17 March. The four managers' statement is also the subject of a 1,000-word "er"-signed report entitled "What Was Going On Behind the Metallurgical Curtain," in Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 21 March on pages 1 and 2.

In the first part of their statement, the four managers discuss the economic results achieved by the VSZ under their management. They point out that, even though the company set aside Sk800 million as a "strategic reserve" and Sk124 million as a "bad debt reserve" in 1993, it exceeded the projected pretax profit for that year by 26 percent. They note that the value of VSZ assets went up from Sk32 to Sk46.8 billion, that the price of VSZ shares increased by 240 percent, that the number of VSZ employees did not decline, despite the high average monthly wages of Sk9,500, and that a dividend was expected to be paid to shareholders. Therefore, they express their conviction that "the personnel purges" of December 1993 did not have economic motives but "a political background."

The managers' statement goes on to say that, shortly after the Kosice mayoral elections in the fall of 1992, in which the candidate of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] did not win, "our former colleague Julius Toth, who was then minister of finance, conveyed to us the great dissatisfaction of the HZDS's leading representatives with the VSZ management" and "reproached the VSZ top management for having done little or nothing for the HZDS candidate to get elected." Toth's criticism reportedly culminated in the proposal that Zoltan Berghauer, then chairman of the VSZ Board of Directors, dismiss Marian Sarissky and Dionyz Kunder from the Board of Directors "because Sarissky had signed a statement of the Forum of Slovak Intelligentsia and Kunder was a sympathizer of the Christian Democratic Movement." According to the four managers' statement, Berghauer "rejected Toth's demands as unfounded and unprecedented." In conclusion, the managers say: "We suppose that this rejection prompted Julius Toth to seek other forms and instruments to bring about changes in the VSZ Board of Directors, which he implemented through certain members of the VSZ Supervisory Board and the FNM. Not just two, but four members of the Board of Directors were recalled in this way, this time without citing any reasons or objections."

FNM Chief Installed, Property Transfers Halted

AU2303175094

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SME in Slovak on 22 March publishes articles on personnel changes in the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic (FNM SR) and on the first steps taken by the new leadership.

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 22 March on page 1 carries a 400-word "asa"-signed report entitled "M. Knit: I Expect Changes in the FNM Presidium and Executive Committee." The report notes that "on Friday, 18 March, the FNM SR Presidium withdrew from Jan Kato the authorization to hold the post of chairman of the FNM SR Executive Committee. It charged Karol Danys, a member of the FNM Executive Committee, with the provisional management of the FNM Executive Committee." The report then quotes M. Knitl, a member of the FNM Presidium, as having told SME that "he expects parliament to devote itself in the very near future to the election of new members of the FNM Presidium and assumes that changes in the FNM Executive Committee will follow suit." Asked whether he believes that "political criteria prevailed over professional criteria in the election of current members of the FNM Executive Committee," Knitl concedes that "in some cases, the two criteria were not in conformity." Confronted with "claims casting doubt on some privatization projects" that were approved by Vladimir Meciar's Cabinet shortly before its dismissal, Knitl says that "the FNM has been only the implementor of government resolutions" and can be made responsible only for the technical realization of projects.

On the same page, Bratislava SME in Slovak carries a 100-word interview with Karol Danys, "a member of the FNM SR Executive Committee charged with its management," by an "asa"-attributed SME reporter. The interview, the place and date of which are not given, is published under the headline "We Have Agreed To Freeze FNM Accounts." In the interview, Danys announces that "we have agreed with the minister of privatization to ban trading in FNM securities and to freeze its accounts. To prevent the situation regarding privatization, around which there is plenty of confusion, from deteriorating, we have agreed to halt all property transfers."

Arms Maker To Produce Modernized Tank Turret

AU2303201494 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Mar 94 p 2

[CTK report: "ZTS Dubnica Will Launch the Production of a Modernized Tank Turret"]

[Text] Dubnica nad Vahom—The ZTS [Zavody Tazkeho Strojarstva, Heavy Engineering Works] Dubnica state enterprise is preparing the production of a modernized turret for tanks of the T-72 type. The production should be launched this year. In this context, it is also advancing the offer of cooperation to the RDP [Research, Development, Production] Group, the association of Czech arms manufacturers. This transpired from an interview given by Peter Koncier, director of ZTS Dubnica nad Vahom, to a CTK correspondent yesterday. According to information provided by Koncier, ZTS Dubnica expects an overall increase of its special production this year. The increase will be secured by the production of a trial run of the 155-mm howitzer code-named "Zuzana," which conforms to NATO specifications. It will come, in part, also from the expected growth in sales of spare parts and from the modernized tank turret. The modernization of the tank turret, which has been virtually completed, concerns the control systems, the night-vision system, the firing-control system, and the like, Koncier said.

Official Outlines Draft Law on Organized Crime

AU2403121594 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Mar 94 p 5

[Interview with Ivan Seges, director of the Criminal Law Department at the General Prosecutor's Office of the Slovak Republic, by Juraj Handzo; place and date not given: "Will We Be Able To Cope With Mafias?; Law on Combating Organized Crime Being Drafted"]

[Text] A few days ago, the government's Legislative Council approved with comments the draft of a law on uncovering and punishing the most serious, especially organized, forms of crime. The draft has been prepared by the General Prosecutor's Office of the Slovak Republic. We discussed the purpose and the contents of the new law with one of its authors, Ivan Seges, LL.D., director of the Criminal Law Department at the General Prosecutor's Office of the Slovak Republic.

[Handzo] Could you briefly characterize the contents of the law under preparation?

[Seges] In drafting the law, we strove to have it contain, on the greatest scale possible, such elements as would make it possible to vigorously crack down on manifestations of organized crime. The draft consists, in fact, of two parts. The first concerns legal means that make it possible to uncover attempts at an unlawful legalization of income stemming from serious criminal activity—that is, the so-called laundering of dirty money. The second part defines legal means and procedures that would make it possible to expose and document serious criminal activity in a way that could be used as evidence in court [s procesnou posobnostou]. The course of action by the bodies involved in criminal proceedings has until now been formal, in a certain way, so that findings by the criminal police that were not obtained by the set procedures could not be used as evidence in court.

[Handzo] What is the purpose of the proposed legal means?

[Seges] We would like to break through the principle that is valid now, according to which it is possible to start collecting evidence, for it to be recognized in court, only after criminal prosecution has been formally initiated. In the case of listed criminal acts (which are enumerated in the draft law), the bodies involved in criminal proceedings should be permitted to collect evidence that will be recognized in court before the initiation of criminal prosecution. These bodies should be endowed with such powers as would allow them to investigate effectively, in a way that will be recognized in court, when their crime-solving experience and other indications suggest that they are confronted with organized crime, even if they do not avail themselves of findings signaling a specific criminal act.

[Handzo] Could the application of legal means permitting the start of investigations in the event of a mere suspicion not constitute encroachment upon basic human rights in certain cases?

[Seges] The draft law makes it possible for bodies involved in criminal proceedings to secure evidence, in the case of listed (enumerated) criminal acts, without there being a formal resolution on the initiation of criminal prosecution. Therefore, should a charge be raised, the effects of the start of criminal prosecution would retroactively authorize even the deployment of operational technical devices [operativno-technickych prostriedkov], telephone tapping, or the use of a secret agent operating under an assumed identity (alias), who would penetrate into the criminal environment with the aim of obtaining evidence.

It is self-evident that, in view of this being a very serious encroachment upon citizens' civil rights and liberties, all of these means could be used only with the consent of the judge or prosecutor. Opponents of this regulation argue that it is anticonstitutional or that it restricts basic human rights. However, the Constitution expressly states that these rights can be restricted by law if the interest of society so requires. And it is in the interest of society that the relevant bodies be provided with the possibility to crack down effectively on organized crime. No one is going to restrict the rights of decent people....

[Handzo] The specific criminal acts authorizing the application of the aforesaid legal means are listed in the draft law. Which criminal acts are involved?

[Seges] This would apply, for example, to the criminal acts of terrorism, sabotage, counterfeiting and altering money and securities, general endangerment, endangering the safety of an aircraft or a civilian vessel, unauthorized armament, and other grievous criminal acts. Apart from this, we propose a provision under which, in certain cases and with the prosecutor's consent, the law would also apply to deliberate criminal acts, for which the minimum sentence is five years of deprivation of freedom, provided the circumstances of the case

justify the assumption that the act had been committed by an organized group, as defined by this law.

[Handzo] Let us return to the issue of "dirty-money laundering." What will the adoption of the law mean in practice, from that point of view?

[Seges] The draft provides for several basic principles, the application of which would help expose attempts at the unlawful legalization of income stemming from serious criminal activity. First of all, it lays down the obligation for juridical persons and entrepreneurs to report facts suggesting the existence of such activities. At the same time, the anonymity in relation to financial institutions should be eliminated in a certain way, to make it possible to identify people carrying out suspicious banking operations. Financial institutions should be placed under the obligation to report to the Prosecutor's Office or to the Slovak Republic Police Corps not only instances of suspected legalization of income stemming from organized criminal activity but also cash deposits and withdrawals exceeding a certain sum (for example, 100,000 Slovak korunas). The second principle is that juridical persons and entrepreneurs are obliged to refuse to perform acts (such as the conclusion of a contract) that could, without doubt, be conducive to the legalization of income stemming from serious criminal activity. Furthermore, the draft law sets out the right, in the event of any suspicious transactions, to ascertain the origin of the property that these transactions concern. The last proposed provision is that a citizen or an organization that helps uncover attempts at the legalization of income stemming from organized criminal activity is entitled to a reward in the amount of 10 percent of the uncovered sum. Naturally, all of these provisions would be applied also to machinations associated with the privatization process.

[Handzo] Does the draft law also provide for manifestations of organized crime associated with the criminal act of the unauthorized production and possession of narcotic and psychotropic substances and toxins—that is, drug-trafficking?

[Seges] As we know, existing legislation did not make it possible, in fact, to combat more effectively these expressions of organized crime. If a person was found to carry such a substance and wanted to avoid criminal prosecution, often this person only had to say that it was for his or her own need. The draft law contains provisions under which it would be possible to prosecute criminally everyone possessing these substances, regardless of whether he keeps them for his own needs or for someone else. Of course, it is up to the relevant specialized bodies to assess in each specific case, considering the quantity of the seized addictive substance, whether the person in question could keep it for his or her own use.

[Handzo] What makes the struggle against organized crime exceptionally difficult is the inadequate protection of witnesses. Does the proposed law provide for any changes in this regard?

[Seges] The provision of essential protection to witnesses is one of the pillars of the draft we propose. Intimidation of potential witnesses is one of the common practices of organized crime. The protection of witnesses should be secured in three ways. First, under strictly defined conditions, the law will make it possible for them to remain anonymous; second, on the basis of a provision in the law, it will be possible to question them during court proceedings with the public excluded; and, finally, when agents are concerned, their true identity will not be revealed even during criminal proceedings.

Defense Minister Leaves for Visit to Israel

LD2303151994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Of all of the new Cabinet ministers, Defense Minister Pavel Kanis is so far the most active on the international scene. He was on a lightning visit to Hungary on Monday [21 March], and this morning he left for a scheduled visit to Israel.

This country, which was not accessible to us until recently, is becoming an interesting partner for Slovakia. Besides economic cooperation, we are also interested in cooperation in the military sphere. Our editor Jan Baranek interviewed Defense Minister Kanis before his departure.

[Begin recording] [Baranek] Minister, you will be leaving for Israel in a few hours. What will be the main themes of your talks with the Israeli partner?

[Kanis] This visit has been under preparation for a fairly long time. I was thinking whether it would serve any purpose to go on this visit so soon after taking office. After consultations, my colleagues and I gained the impression that the visit was well prepared and that we should go because these relations with Israel are interesting and important to us.

The objective of the visit will be, first of all, an exchange of experience in the field of the arms industry and arms systems. We are small countries that can complement each other in some areas of this type of production. Meetings with the prime minister and the foreign minister are scheduled, and, therefore, foreign policy issues and the international situation will also be on the agenda.

I will be accompanied by several people from the economic sector and from Slovak arms factories. I assume that they and their partners will discuss the opportunities for cooperation or for trade.

[Baranek] What will be the Slovak delegations's stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Would you like to link it to the policy of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic?

[Kanis] Probably not. Our opinion on Israeli-Arab relations is guided by the relevant UN resolutions, including the latest resolution made on the issue. I think our

country is far away from this territory, and, therefore, we have to keep a certain overview of Israeli-Arab relations. In my opinion, Slovakia's foreign policy on this conflict and on these relations is well balanced and meets the preconditions and the criterion of a certain overview on the matter. [end recording]

Poll Shows More Trust in UN Than NATO

AU2303144294 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 19 Mar 94 p 3

[TA SR report: "Slovaks Trust the United Nations"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Public Opinion Research Center at the Slovak Defense Ministry has conducted a survey. From the point of view of the security of Slovakia, 25.6 percent of the respondents trust the UN most, 12.4 percent the European security system, and 11.4 percent NATO membership. The citizens showed most trust in the UN—53.9 percent—while 23.1 percent trust NATO. Of the respondents, 44.7 percent were in favor of Slovakia's joining NATO, while 20.2 percent opposed it. The remaining 35.1 percent could not decide. NATO was described as more or less the only guarantor of European security by 55.4 percent, while 25.2 percent disagreed with this.

Boross on Election Chances, Possible Coalition

LD2403112394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0545 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Yesterday [23 March] voters had an opportunity to meet Peter Boross at the University of Economics. Agnes Papp interviewed the prime minister there.

[Begin recording] [Papp] What is your opinion about the result of the latest survey, which shows that 40 percent of the population is vacillating about going to the ballot boxes at all?

[Boross] I hope that at least half of them will decide to go.

[Papp] What turnout do you expect?

[Boross] It is impossible to estimate. [passage omitted]

[Papp] What sort of campaign do you expect, regarding the tone?

[Boross] I am not very optimistic. If the tone of the campaign is to remain fair and clean, both the press and political players should make some sort of pledge.

[Papp] Prime Minister, very many people are concerned that the extremists will get too loud and the style of the campaign will deteriorate because of this. To what extent do you share these worries?

[Boross] If there are less provocative voices and less inciting protestations to keep up tension, than less extremism will occur. For extremism is often a reaction to something.

[Papp] What sort of protests do you mean?

[Boross] All kinds of protests, petitions, in writing, in articles. [passage omitted] At this moment extremists do not constitute any political danger and their upsetting the political balance is inconceivable.

[Papp] Let me quote to you another opinion poll result: The MDF's [Hungarian Democratic Forum] election chances of a victory are declining, while at the same time, the HSP's [Hungarian Socialist Party] chances of a victory are increasing. How do you see this?

[Boross] It cannot be denied that the HSP's position at the moment is better than four years ago. [passage omitted] I think that the Democratic Forum will achieve a better result at the elections than its rivals expect.

[Papp] You warned about a kind of left-wing danger. How should one interpret this?

[Boross] I observe with regret that the HSP seems to be drifting to the left. In the countryside, the old boys are reappearing among the ranks of the party. [passage omitted] Hungarian political life could very well do without this. That is, that a structure already removed from the agenda—in some sort of new form—should be revived. It is not even in the interest of the HSP, but the party probably cannot resist the temptation.

[Papp] What is your party's relationship with the other two opposition parties?

[Boross] I cannot envisage a coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] as long as it is led by the hard core. In my mind, more and more, the SZDSZ represents two parties: That particular hard core, which is of left-wing tradition and left-wing ideology converging toward the HSP, and another bourgeois-middle trend, which I cannot imagine embracing the HSP at any time. I think that the hard core is stronger, but this other trend has a larger number.

Looking at the Fidesz [Alliance of Young Democrats] transformation from the start, it has taken on a national-liberal profile, which is taken seriously by them, it seems. Naturally, the national-liberal trend is a lot more to my taste than the liberal trend without the national adjective.

Fidesz Official on Relations With Other Parties

AU2303161294 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Mar 94 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats, by Attila Gy. Fekete; place and date not given: "Banana, Orange, and Tie—Viktor Orban on the Fidesz's Chances"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Fekete] In spite of the cooperation agreement between the parties of the liberal bloc, serious tensions are straining relations between these parties. Some people believe to know that the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] has given up on the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz] as an ally and it is opening toward the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] that appears to have more chance at the elections. According to some politicians, the two biggest liberal parties are now only trying to find an excuse to terminate the liberal bloc's agreement.

[Orban] We will never have perfect tranquillity in the liberal bloc, after all, we are also rivals of each other at the elections. The question is whether the parties' chairmen will have enough wisdom and strength to convince their membership about the significance and importance of the cooperation. If the parties' chairmen do not find the right proportion between competition and cooperation then the liberal bloc might fall apart. In my view, similar debates and tensions exist between the conservative parties, and they will probably also happen in the left-wing bloc.

As for the other half of the question, namely that the SZDSZ has "given up" the Fidesz and is seeking cooperation with the Socialists, I do not believe this. For the SZDSZ, a break with the SZDSZ and cooperation with the MSZP at the same time would result in a party split. Considering the SZDSZ's membership in the provinces,

this would lead to the party's disintegration. This is not in the interest of either the Fidesz or the SZDSZ.

[Fekete] Although the party leaders do not like to enter into coalition speculations, the voters are interested in which parties would be willing to govern together. At the same time, your statements indicate that, apart from the parties of the liberal bloc, namely the SZDSZ, the Agrarian Federation, and the Entrepreneurs Party, the Fidesz does not have any other possible coalition partners.

[Orban] A strange situation has arisen because almost all parties—including the MSZP and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]—claim that the Fidesz is a possible coalition partner for them while we emphasize our distance from both these parties. With the approach of the elections, it is unwise to enter into coalition speculations, but I believe that we can and must talk about moral dilemmas. It is obvious that a significant number of the electors want to replace the current coalition. In view of this, the thought that we would still have to work together with one or other party of the current coalition after the elections can expect to meet with serious resistance within our party and among the electors, too. On the other hand, our membership would resist it just as much if we had to cooperate and work together with those who are the legal successors of the party that is responsible for the economic destruction of the country. When we know the final results of the elections, if this question is still valid then, we will convene the Fidesz's appropriate decision-making bodies, the national committee or the congress, and we will discuss the future. One thing is certain: The Fidesz cannot participate in a coalition in which it cannot implement the most important elements of its program. On the other hand, all politicians have delicate points. On 16 June 1989, at the burial of Imre Nagy, I made a speech and I cannot deviate from the spirit of this, whether I am thinking about the Fidesz's coalition possibilities or my own role.

[Fekete] Does this mean that you exclude the possibility of a Fidesz-MSZP coalition or that you personally would not participate in this government?

[Orban] I have formulated principles. The consequences of these in a given situation will be made public when we are facing this given situation.

[Fekete] Do you have similar commitments as regards cooperation with the MDF? During the blockade of the taxi drivers, you publicly called the government a liar.

[Orban] The speech I have mentioned before was about the future, rather than on relations with the MDF, the MSZP, or any other party.

[Fekete] Earlier, the Fidesz indicated that, from the Fidesz's point of view, the assessment of the MSZP partly depends on whether Sandor Nagy [chairman of the National Federation of Trade Unions in Hungary] or Laszlo Bekesi [economic expert] is higher up on their national list. However, according to economic observers, the Fidesz's economic policy, the half turn, is closer to Sandor Nagy's views than to Bekesi's....

[Orban] The Fidesz's program lays the main emphasis on economic growth, therefore, it is a program that creates workplaces. On this point, Nagy's goals certainly coincide with those of the Fidesz. Therefore, we would have a good chance to coordinate our goals with the trade unions. However, we have significant differences on how this goal can be achieved. As early as 1990, the Fidesz suggested that the parliamentary parties and the interest groups of the employers and employees should sit down at a negotiating table and agree on the rules to be followed during the period of economic transition. We have not given up this idea and, if we are given the opportunity to govern after the elections, we intend to make a Hungarian Moncloa pact. Without this, and without cooperation with the trade unions, it would be much more difficult to put the Hungarian economy on a growth course.

Peto Views Elections, Relations With Fidesz

AU2303131294 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Mar 94 p 11

[Interview with Ivan Peto, chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "We Are Speaking to Those Who Are Expecting Deeds"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Pinter] Have the Hungarian political front lines become final in recent weeks? Are these front lines also dividing the liberals?

[Peto] These lines are borders increasingly dividing parties and groups of parties, and not trenches. The government coalition, namely the national conservative camp, is united even though, clearly in view of the election campaign, the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] is trying to distance itself from the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] but it is quite cautious in this endeavor: one step forward and one step back. However, these two parties will nevertheless take voters away from each other. On the other side, we find the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] in a nonparty cooperation with the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ], while the group of liberal parties is a separate camp. Although the SZDSZ and the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz] have similar positions on basic issues, the liberal parties are also rivals in the elections. We have always started from the premise that an SZDSZ-Fidesz cooperation is in our mutual interest. The SZDSZ thinks that the positions would be weakened if the two liberal parties sought possible coalition parties separately or if the SZDSZ and the Fidesz were not in the same government or opposition camp after the elections. The present coalition parties are trying to split the liberal forces. For example, we can hear almost daily that, unlike the SZDSZ, the Fidesz could be an acceptable coalition partner for the MDF. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] In your opinion, to what extent will the issue of Hungarians living beyond our borders and the religious issue affect voters' decisions?

[Peto] In discussing this issue from the viewpoint of political competition, people try to present the SZDSZ in a bad light, as an insensitive and indifferent party. However, this attempt will not affect the election results. Obviously, those who continue to regard symbolic gestures as a major way of treating the issue of Hungarian minorities will not vote for the SZDSZ. We are speaking to those who are expecting deeds and who are not taken in by empty rhetoric. Obviously, those who believe that the SZDSZ is an atheist and anti-clerical party will not be SZDSZ voters. The SZDSZ attributes great importance to religious life and an important social role to the churches; at the same time, as a liberal party, the SZDSZ wants a complete separation of church and state, and does not find a possible state ideological role of the church desirable. [passage omitted]

Our views regarding the national minorities have not changed. The SZDSZ is fostering close contacts with the political organizations of Hungarians living beyond our borders, and this is advantageous for everyone. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Are new elements emerging in the election campaign?

[Peto] From the beginning, I have noticed manifestations of discrimination or manipulation and the abuse of government power, which violate the rules of honest political competition. However, such attempts are almost always doomed to failure, and this is reassuring. This does not harm the SZDSZ; on the contrary! However, this does harm the entire Hungarian democracy and political style. The control of the mass media, and the drama of firing journalists from Hungarian Radio are causing such serious damage to Hungarian democracy that it goes far beyond the election campaign. If a country can get into the world's press with reports of a Csurka essay or the firing of 129 radio journalists mostly for political reasons, that country becomes part of the Balkans in Western public opinion. This should draw the attention of those who constantly lecture us on national interests while they fail to consider this nation's most elementary interests. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] In which areas does the SZDSZ intend to cooperate with the government and the coalition in order to maintain the ability to function?

[Peto] When people were fired from the Hungarian Radio for political reasons in a deliberate violation of the law, some people in the SZDSZ proposed that we express our indignation by limiting our parliamentary activity. However, the dominant position in the SZDSZ is that we should not endanger the ability of the country and Parliament to function. Parliament should work as long as it can, because its activity is needed, and the government should also function to the last minute of its mandate. If it becomes a government party, the SZDSZ will follow the customs of developed democracies, and it will not question the obligations deriving from accepted laws, no matter what position we took in the course of the legislation. Compensation and the return of church properties will also be the task of the new government, and we will guarantee continuity in this. Of course, there are laws that we will want to change, but these changes will not make everyday life unpredictable. The SZDSZ does not want a government change accompanied by tabula rasa every four years. We have confidence in the members of the public administration, and we will not initiate any purge for political reasons. [passage omitted]

Horn: MSZP Phones Tapped, Officials Watched

AU2303140094 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 22 Mar 94 p 5

[Interview with Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP, by Pal Szombathy; place and date not given: "The MSZP Will Not Put a Wedge Between the Forces of the Liberal Bloc"]

[Text] If we want to implement a real governmental change, then the Socialists cannot be left out of the next government, Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], told MAGYAR HIRLAP. Talking about worrying phenomena, Horn indicated that they have become aware of telephone tapping, and certain people are watching the movements of socialist politicians in the vicinity of their party offices from cars.

[Szombathy] Recently, you have stated a number of times that the opposition does not know anything about the country's economic situation. If this is true then how is it possible to draw up an action program for governing?

[Horn] We know the size of the budget deficit, the state debt, and we have information on the continuous deterioration of the balance of payments. No one has denied that in the first two months of 1994 the government spent the entire budget reserve. Before the extension of the deadline, the state is facing a 230-billion-forint obligation in connection with compensation. However, the opposition is not aware of what kind of domestic, or perhaps international, payment obligations the government has undertaken in the period before the elections. We asked the government to inform Parliament about the country's true financial and economic balance but this was refused. Parallel with the coalition talks, an expert team should draw up a true picture that will largely influence the next coalition's room for maneuver.

[Szombathy] What can you say about the arguments that are used by the government to prove that the economic situation is much better than is claimed by the opposition?

[Horn] Positive results must also have been achieved in the past four years, but we cannot see even any traces of the defined concept on the change of the economic structure. It is futile to argue with a government that

claims that agriculture is a successful branch of the economy and privatization has only positive results. In the course of this propaganda of success, I find it unacceptable that the government has frightened people with the colorful brochures that have been sent out in 1 million copies. Personal data was used here that gives people the impression that they are on file. We experienced this while we were collecting the candidate nomination forms.

[Szombathy] In what areas can the new government expect some surprises?

[Horn] In finding out what actually happened in the course of privatization decisions. We do not know what kind of asset distribution will take place in the remaining time. For me, giving away headquarters buildings for nominal prices is appalling; I am mainly thinking of the provisions to do with the World Federation of Hungarians. As far as we know, most of the asset distributions were legal, but unethical, which is a different matter.

[Szombathy] What have you experienced of the oft-mentioned fears of the population in the provinces?

[Horn] Fear can mainly be seen among the intelligentsia. In other social groups, the determination for change is rather strong. I am afraid that the campaign will become even rougher. We are experiencing virtually inexplicable phenomena almost every day: We see telephone tappings, and various cars are waiting around our party premises, observing the movements of MSZP officials. We receive many threats. Some television programs also contribute to inciting hatred. The radio dismissals can also increase the hatred. The new government will have to implement political rehabilitation in connection with these journalists, and this actually has a legal basis.

[Szombathy] Do you consider an opening toward the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] in opposition to the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz], and toward the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] in opposition to the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] possible? Otherwise, would the establishment of various blocs result in a new isolation of the MSZP?

[Horn] It is impossible for the liberal bloc to gain an absolute majority; therefore, they will need a coalition partner. If we want to achieve a real governmental change then the Socialists cannot be left out of executive power. The decisive factor is whether the current opposition parties—this mainly applies to the Fidesz—will take the need for change seriously. However, this does not permit making an alliance now with the MDF. The Fidesz has to decide what kind of politics it wants to see implemented. We have normal relations with the Free Democrats because their politics are more predictable than those of their partner. In my view, a social-liberal government is a real possibility. However, the MSZP does not intend to drive a wedge between the forces of the liberal bloc. The liberals are struggling with the situation that they would definitely like to get into government in 1994 and, partly because of their supporters, it is difficult to envisage them in opposition for another four years.

[Szombathy] Are we not threatened by the danger of the country becoming ungovernable?

[Horn] From the country's point of view, it would be most desirable if the Socialists and the possible liberal partners acquired a two-third majority. This has a small chance but a 58 to 60 percent majority will definitely be needed. A two-third majority would only have been possible if a social-liberal election alliance had been formed months ago. The Fidesz's behavior was the main obstacle to this. But I do not think that the country will become ungovernable.

Survey on Popularity of Party List Leaders

AU2303200694 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Mar 94 p 8

[Unattributed report: "The Median's Survey Commissioned by MAGYAR HIRLAP—Popularity of Party List Leaders"]

[Text] Commissioned by MAGYAR HIRLAP, the Median Public Opinion and Market Research Institute regularly examines the popularity of the parties' list leaders and people's familiarity with them.

The change at the top of the popularity of list leaders "only" affects the order: The three-point decrease of Gyula Horn's [chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP] popularity is not statistically significant, but it is enough for Janos Palotas [chairman of the Republic Party], who continues to enjoy broad popularity, to get into the first position.

Since the Median's previous survey, familiarity with Gabor Kuncze [parliamentary group leader and prime ministerial candidate of the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ] has increased significantly (from 64 to 70 percent). In addition to being more familiar with people, he has also become more popular during the time between the two surveys. In addition to him, the views on Tamas Nagy [chairman of the Agrarian Federation], Jozsef Torgyan [chairman of the Independent Smallholders Party, FKGP], and Istvan Csurka [cochairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIEP] improved more than the accidental deviations.

The election campaign that has now started is making an impact because, between January and February, the electors have become more informed about which party the various politicians belong to. The change can be observed in the case of list leaders whose party affiliation is still not well known (the proportion of people who correctly named the party affiliation of Csurka increased from 35 percent to 40 percent, Zoltan Kiraly [chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary] from 19 to 24 percent, Kuncze from 36 to 45 percent, and Tamas Nagy from 17 to 21 percent). The proportion did not

change in the case of list leaders whose party affiliation is well known and of Laszlo Surjan [chairman of the Christian Democratic People's Party, KDNP] and Palotas, therefore, the data also indicate, what proportion of the population takes party aspects into consideration when assessing the politicians.

The popularity averages naturally mainly depend on the electors' party sympathies. Out of the list leaders of parties that have a significant voting basis, Horn has the highest appreciation by his party's supporters: Horn's popularity index is 91 points among these people, while it is 45 points among the smallholders who like him the least. Surjan was given 87 points by his party's supporters and the MSZP supporters gave him 49 points. Viktor Orban's [chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats, Fidesz] popularity with the Fidesz camp is 84 points and 46 points with the smallholder supporters. Torgyan is only really acceptable for the FKGP's supporters: They gave him 84 points while he reached the second highest rating (30 points) with the Hungarian Democratic Forum's [MDF] supporters. [Prime Minister] Peter Boross is more popular with the government supproters and the opposition feels antipathy toward him (MDF: 79 points, KDNP: 69 points, FKGP: 55 points, Fidesz: 47 points, SZDSZ: 45 points, and MSZP: 40 points). Increasing familiarity with Kuncze is also indicated by the fact that while his popularity index was only 71 points within his own party's supporters in January, the SZDSZ's supporters gave him 79 points in February. Kuncze was able to improve his rating mainly with those people who have not yet decided which party they will vote for: His popularity index improved by 11 percent among these people.

Boross, Csurka, Surjan, Torgyan, Palotas, and Orban have better ratings in the villages than with Budapest people. Horn is most popular with people in provincial towns while the popularity of Kiraly, Kuncze, and Nagy do not show much difference according to the living place of people.

Surjan, Palotas, Orban, Nagy, Kiraly, and Boross are more popular with women, while Torgyan is rejected less by men than by women. Surjan (and his party) is most popular with women over the age of 60: In this age group, women rate him 16 points higher than men.

Boross's and Surjan's popularity increases parallel with the age increase of the voters while Orban's decreases. Horn's popularity among people between the ages of 50 and 58 is 18 points higher than in other age groups. Kiraly, Kuncze, and Palotas are somewhat less popular among the youngest and oldest generation than otherwise.

The popularity index of the list leaders is also connected to the educational level of the voters. The educational level fundamentally influences people's habits of acquiring information: University graduates gain their information from many and diverse sources while less well educated people mainly do this from the electronic media. Therefore, it is not surprising that politicians who have often and extensively appeared on television and radio are more popular among people with a low educational level, while the relatively less well-known Kuncze who can be found more in the written media is more popular among people with high qualifications. This is made more complicated by the fact that the popularity of left-wing politicians (Horn and Kiraly) does not depend on the educational level of the electors.

The proportion of those who would welcome the various list leaders at the head of the new government after the elections has not changed significantly, except in the case of Palotas because—although he took over leadership of the popularity list—fewer people wanted to see him as prime minister in February than in January.

Walesa: Cooperation With Hungary 'Indispensable'

LD2403123794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1104 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Text] Warsaw, 24 Mar—President Lech Walesa said today that Polish-Hungarian cooperation in opening the borders and introducing a market economy was "logical and indispensable." Assessing relations between both states, Walesa said that "it is not so good that it could not be better."

The president granted an interview to representatives of the Hungarian media in connection with an official visit to Poland by Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, which starts on Monday [28 March].

"I am going to call for jointly encouraging our governments and businessmen for greater cooperation; this has to be strengthened, and the visit is to serve this purpose," the president said when asked what he expected from Goncz's visit.

Walesa did not rule out an increase in military cooperation between Poland and Hungary. "We cannot build any kind of third structure because neither the West nor Russia would be happy about it, but we have to say that, if our freedom and sovereignty are in danger, we will fight. There is no free Poland without a free Hungary," the president said.

Asked to comment on his conflicts with parliament and on prospects of the present Sejm, the president said: "Such conflicts will always exist until we stabilize our political systems. The previous parliaments did not live through their full terms of office. If the public is satisfied with the present parliament, it will survive."

Pawlak Delays Nomination of Rosati

WS2403114594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by E.K., Ma.S., and K.B.: "Officially, Nothing Happened"]

[Text] Contrary to earlier statements by politicians of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak did not forward on Wednesday [23 March] a motion to the president requesting the appointment of Dariusz Rosati to the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister. In a morning radio program, the prime minister stated that he must meet with the candidate once again.

"One or two days are not a problem," he said.

"The agreements reached on Tuesday with the prime minister are still binding, and they will be acted upon until the end of the week." This was how Zbigniew Siemiatkowski summed up the events of the entire day. "The issue is very serious, and haste is not very advisable."

According to the prime minister, it should be explained once again "whether Mr. Rosati shares our views on structural issues." Since Professor Rosati is in Geneva, the organization of such a meeting will take some time, stated the Prime Minister's Press Secretary, Ewa Wachowicz.

After the evening meeting of coalition authorities on Tuesday, Aleksander Kwasniewski reported that the prime minister had given assurances to the participants of the meeting that he would forward the motion concerning Rosati to the Belweder on Wednesday.

"Some people tell me what I should do, as well as what I say and what I should say," the prime minister commented on this on Wednesday morning.

He also added that the procedure of the appointment of Rosati had been complicated by some statements of politicians; the advancing of the date of forwarding the appointment motion was termed "slightly humorous" by him.

SLD leaders, obviously taken aback and angry, tried to minimize in their official statements the absence of a decision by the prime minister.

"Well, just a slight delay that will soon be explained," said Zbigniew Siemiatkowski in the afternoon. The situation was similarly assessed by Speaker Jozef Oleksy. The issue of forwarding the appointment motion was discussed at a session of the SLD Club, which was closed to the press (the date of the session was agreed upon earlier; the deputies were supposed to sum up the activities of the government and the coalition).

"The decision has already been made, and there is no reason that there should be any delay in forwarding the motion to the Belweder," said Aleksander Kwasniewski before the session of the club, thus maintaining his earlier stand. He added that "everything in this issue will be explained." During that time, Jerzy Szmajdzinski tried to reach the prime minister on the phone. At a break in the session, at approximately 1900, Kwasniewski began phoning the prime minister; he refused to make any comments until that talk. As Siemiatkowski said, in the evening, Kwasniewski was in constant contact with the government leadership. The SLD leader, however, still refused to issue any information.

The press spokesman gave assurances that the motion requesting Rosati's appointment was a matter of days. He said that the prime minister's delay had been caused by the desire to meet the president personally. However, SLD politicians do not see a reason that any further talks with the SLD candidate should be conducted.

Yesterday's reactions by SLD politicians and the atmosphere in the club were very similar to the days of the greatest government crisis and the Borowski-Pawlak dispute.

Strak: Decision After Easter

Michal Strak, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], stated at a meeting with journalists of the regional press that there is no need to turn the appointment of Dariusz Rosati into a sensation. "There is no reason for taking any violent steps," he argued and added that the delay in appointing the new finance minister does not threaten the Polish economy with any catastrophe. "We have not had the head of this ministry for a few weeks now, and there is nothing bad happening with the economy."

The statement by Minister Strak suggested that Dariusz Rosati will be appointed finance minister, but it will be after Easter. "It is better to wait a while than make hasty decisions," the URM head explained. Asked by RZECZPOSPOLITA whether he believes there are reasons to believe that the president will reject Rosati's candidacy, he gave a negative answer.

Finance Deputy Minister Henryk Chmielak stated that "the main theses and directions of the program presented by Prof. Rosati are in accordance with what the present government is doing." However, there are no details concerning the rate of the changes, and this is where differences of opinions may appear.

Even though he was awaited by journalists of the regional press on Wednesday, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak did not show up at the meeting. He stayed longer than expected in Siedlce, where he took part in the funeral of his office chief, Andrzej Piwowarczyk. On the previous day, at the session of the coalition, he announced, however, that he would organize a press conference on Wednesday. This was the only piece of information he passed to journalists after the coalition talks on the candidacy of Rosati.

What Does the Candidate Say?

A few Wednesday statements concerning the candidacy of Prof. Dariusz Rosati: Prime Minister Pawlak for "Sygnaly Dnia" ["The Signals of the Day"]—about the need of several days for additional contact; by representatives of voivodship authorities of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], who are afraid of the continuation of the state's financial policy that has been conducted so far; and by Acting Finance Minister Henryk Chmielak, who stated that the program presented by Rosati does not contain any details and methods of implementation of its goals—suggest that the candidate is still controversial, despite the PSL-SLD coalition meeting. Therefore, RZECZPOSPOLITA asked the candidate himself whether he still wants to become deputy prime minister and finance minister.

"Prime Minister Pawlak and I have agreed that I will receive the final answer by the end of last week. I treat this situation quietly, even though I am considering various possibilities, including the one that I may resign. I am waiting for a signal because that was the agreement," we were told by Prof. Rosati.

As of Wednesday afternoon, no one from the prime minister's entourage had gotten in touch with the candidate. The question whether the delaying of the decision may be related to the Senate debate over the budget, in which also the issue of financing the Food Industry Bank and the restructurization of the sugar industry are discussed, were left by Prof. Rosati without a comment. "However, there is certainly some reason for the delay," he said.

Balcerowicz Views Rosati, Economic Reform

AU2303134394 Poznan WPROST in Polish 20 Mar 94 pp 13-14

[Interview with former Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz by Mariola Balicka and Marek Zieleniewski; place and date not given: "An Attack on the Future"]

[Text] [WPROST] The Democratic Left Alliance candidate for the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister is Dariusz Rosati, who once dissociated himself from the so-called Balcerowicz line toward the end of the Bielecki government but today claims he supports your views. What can one expect from Rosati?

[Balcerowicz] I know Dariusz Rosati. He is an ambitious and capable man, with quite a good economic education, by Polish standards. The fact that he admits to having changed his mind puts him in a good light because not many people have the courage to do that. I think his change of heart was caused by the fact that Poland has experienced the biggest economic success out of all of the postsocialist countries, some of which were in a similar situation to ours and others in an even better one. Rosati is certainly intellectually qualified to lead the Polish economy in the right direction. Much depends on whether he will want to maintain Poland on the rapid development path, or whether he will do anything just to maintain his post. The political circumstances accompanying his mission are another issue. I think the experience with his predecessor, Marek Borowski [fired by Pawlak for exceeding his authority], strengthens his chances rather than weakens them.

[WPROST] What is the chief danger to the economic reforms? Is it the striking Solidarity's attitude of making demands, or is it the Polish Peasant Party's [PSL] bid to win comfortable jobs for its members?

[Balcerowicz] The danger is whether Poland can continue its fast economic development. This depends on political stability, a strong convertible zloty, and far-reaching institutional changes, especially an acceleration of privatization. Solidarity's postulates clash with all of the rules of accelerated economic development. This is not the first time this has happened. In 1993, the union upset the political situation and overthrew the Suchocka government without realizing the consequences of this action. However, in today's Solidarity, which has not much in common with the Solidarity of the past, I detect a clear group of union activists who are little more than politicians in a trade union disguise. They once tried to

enter the Sejm as trade unionists, not as members of a party. Therefore, their current protests are an extraparliamentary attempt to remain on the political scene. But I hope their activity will bear little fruit. As far as the PSL is concerned, this is a unified party, but not as far as its program is concerned. There are major differences within the PSL concerning the program. How else can one explain the fact that the PSL's most vociferous members, who prided themselves on supporting private farming under the People's Republic, are now reluctant about privatization? For the sake of Poland, one hopes that the PSL becomes unified in every single respect and that it joins the right side.

[WPROST] If you were in the opposition, would you vote for the budget?

[Balcerowicz] Being a political "outsider" [previous word in English], I have the luxury of not having to bother with such thoughts. But I can tell you I would be happier if the budget deficit were smaller.

[WPROST] Speaking on behalf of the Democratic Union, Hanna Suchocka has accused the government of "lacking a long-term economic concept," a description she also applied to the present budget. But can a budget that is so heavily burdened with expenditures on social security and the servicing of public debts have any room for an "economic concept"?

[Balcerowicz] One should remember that Poland and the other countries of this region emerged from socialism with a very high proportion of budget incomes and expenditures out of the national income. In capitalist countries with a similar level of development as Poland's, this proportion is not so high, although it has been gradually rising since the 1930's, resulting in the spread of social-democratic trends in economic policy. On the other hand, the Asian tigers have a very low proportion of budget incomes and expenditures out of their national income, as a result of which these tigers are becoming richer; the rich capitalism of the West cannot bear this burden, and, under the influence of the economic crisis, the social democratic model undergoes revisions. The conclusion for us, who still have a long way to go before we attain developed capitalism, is that the implementation of a social-democratic type of policy, aimed not at increasing the distribution of global incomes and expenditures but at maintaining them at their present levels, would be a harmful anachronism. By pursuing that path, we would quickly waste the chance of rapid development.

[WPROST] But Professor Stanislaw Gomulka has accused you, as former finance minister, of having social democratic leanings, illustrated by your preference to spend budget funds on the social services.

[Balcerowicz] I have no deliberate inclinations like that. I merely failed to stop certain moves in pensions policy in time, as a result of which budget spending exploded, the budget deficit increased, and investment outlay was reduced, all in 1991. This also had unfavorable political consequences because, when one increases spending and then decreases it, one ends up with a politically undesirable "give and take" image. We failed to push through the adjustments we undertook in 1991 because of the election campaign. It is paradoxical that, despite the fact that pensions in Poland have risen faster than in any other country in Europe, the opposition of 1991 succeeded in convincing society that the pensioners were the most economically threatened sector of society.

[WPROST] Do you agree that today's Cabinet is footing the bill incurred by the previous governments, which permitted a huge budget deficit to arise and failed to reform the social security system?

[Balcerowicz] Definitely not. After all, in the previous Sejm, the political grouping from which the present government stems tried to block changes to the pensions system and demanded even further spending. This grouping tried to compel the government to print an extra 20 trillion zlotys in 1993 to finance this extra spending. President Walesa put a stop to it just in time, after he had received a warning letter from a group of economists to which I belonged. So this group has no right whatsoever to complain.

[WPROST] You once appeared on television in a program on agricultural policy, and you mentioned social justice. I must admit it sounded rather funny coming from you.

[Balcerowicz] That just shows how strong the stereotypes about me are. Indeed, I do not use the term "social justice," which is abused so often for political purposes. But that does not mean I do not appreciate the problem of social justice. In that program, I said that the EEC's agrarian policy, which most of our peasant parties wish to emulate, is wasteful and socially unjust because it involves raising the prices of agricultural produce above market levels by means of state intervention. To do this, first of all so-called intervention prices, called minimum prices in Poland, are introduced, and. later on, mechanisms are introduced that make it impossible to reduce these prices. The purpose behind all of this is to block imports, with the aim of equalizing payments. As a result, the prices of food rise, resulting in a fall in the demand for food, especially on the part of the poorest sectors of society. At the same time, the increase in prices causes an increase in production costs and the emergence of food surpluses. To get rid of these surpluses, one must subsidize exports, in this way wasting money that could be better spent on other things, such as filling the culture gaps in rural areas. This system is socially unjust because, first, the high prices affect the poorest consumers, and, second, the advantages fall mainly to rich farmers because a farmer with, say, 50 hectares gets 10 times more than a farmer with just 5 hectares. Therefore, the increase in prices has to be divided by the size of production. For these very reasons, the West is trying to abandon the policy of antimarket agricultural protectionism and is warning us against getting involved in it.

[WPROST] According to the press, you might run for the chairmanship of the new party that is due to be formed as a result of the merger between the Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Congress. How far can your political ambitions go if you claim to be a political "outsider"?

[Balcerowicz] My greatest ambition is the success of the Polish economic reforms. I have a very personal interest in that. That is why I have been trying to influence public opinion since 1991, because I think that a reduction in society's susceptibility to demagoguery is vital to the success of democracy and the market reforms. Unfortunately, our Polish society is considerably susceptible to demagoguery because of the mass of negative experience and its exposure in recent years to a barrage of extremist populism.

Government, Solidarity Meet; Unions Comment

WS2403102494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Aleksandra Fandrejewska and Pawel Reszka: "Government—Solidarity—OPZZ; Fax War"]

[Text] "Solidarity—'S'—has sent a fax to the prime minister. In the fax, we wrote that this was not what we had expected from the experts' talks," we learned from the spokesman of the National Section of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union [NSZZ] "S." On the previous day, a fax was sent to the prime minister by the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ]. Ewa Spychalska wants to know whether the experts of the government and "S," who have been holding talks since Tuesday [23 March], are to present the Council of Ministers with drafts of new legal solutions that would satisfy the union's demands. The OPZZ does not agree to such a procedure. During a demonstration in Krakow yesterday, "S" Chairman Marian Krzaklewski stated that he had not received any "good information" on the experts' talks: "The first agreements are already being violated."

The decision to set up a team of experts was made by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and "S" Chairman Marian Krzaklewski at a meeting on 18 March.

Doubts arose almost immediately after this first meeting. Pawlak and Krzaklewski did not leave the conference room together to meet with journalists. At a press conference, the "S" leader stated that the team of government and trade union experts is supposed to translate the union's demands into the language of legal solutions. The Council of Ministers is supposed to make a political decision: either approve or reject these solutions. In a statement to journalists, the prime minister stressed that problems concerning all employees should be resolved in a "multilateral agreement, representing all milieus and unions." He believes that the experts of the government and "S" should work out a "mechanism for forwarding problems to the Trilateral Committee and to multilateral teams so that they can be further discussed."

The OPZZ felt alarmed at this "information noise," said Ewa Spychalska on Tuesday. She sent a fax to the prime minister; she wants the prime minister to explain what the team of experts should address. If the results of its work, in the form of drafts of new legal solutions, should be forwarded to the Council of Ministers for acceptance, the OPZZ will protest. "S" also expected something else from the talks of the experts, and it, too, sent a fax to the prime minister requesting explanations.

"We do not want a substantive discussion with government experts; we do not want them to teach us lessons about the reasons of the government. We merely want them to help our experts change the demands into concrete legal solutions. Then the Council of Ministers will make a political decision whether it accepts or rejects the proposed changes," explained National Committee Spokesman Piotr Zak. Referring to the statement by Ewa Spychalska about the necessity of multilateral negotiations, he added that "S" is not interested in talks in which one party, the Democratic Left Alliance, divides into two parties: the government and the OPZZ, and then it jointly makes decisions on behalf of the people.

The Government Press Office has avoided any comments on the "fax war" and the tasks of the experts' team. Its employees merely quote a sentence from the joint communique issued after the Pawlak- Krzaklewski talks.

"The results of the talks between the chairman of the NSZZ 'S' and other trade unions, not unlike the results of the work of the experts, will be presented and discussed at a session of the Council of Ministers." However, no one is willing to try to interpret this provision.

Yesterday, there were strikes at enterprises in the Warmia-Mazurian Region; for example, the Municipal Heat Energy Enterprise cut off the supply of heat to the buildings of self-governmental and state administration for four hours. The "S" of the Malopolska Region staged demonstrations. A few hundred people took part in these protests. "S" will make decisions on further forms of the protest after Easter.

Sejm Speaker on Meeting With Walesa, Budget

PM2403111294 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 16 Mar 94 p 3

[Interview with Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy by correspondent Jerzy Lesniak; place and date not given]

[Text] [Lesniak] What were the topics discussed at the private conference you recently held with President Lech Walesa?

[Oleksy] As the press is sure to know, the president said in public that he would never again set foot in the Sejm. So I asked him for an audience on the eve of his move to his new residence, and our conversation actually took place in the new premises at the Namiestnikowski

Palace. It lasted for an hour and a half, was most interesting and useful, and ended with a modest supper. However, I will not criticize the president's catering because I have heard that Lech Walesa is trying very hard to lose weight.

[Lesniak] Never mind the food. Could we discuss the more important aspects of your discussion?

[Oleksy] Among other things, we talked about the latest conflict between the Sejm and the president, the question of the candidate to the office of deputy prime minister, the recently approved state budget (as we know, the legislative process is not complete until sealed by the president's signature), the excitement in the police force generated by the Poznan affair (and by other things, too), the armed forces' role in the state security system, and the preparation of the president's legislative initiatives. The conversation would not have been complete without some gossip, but all details of that will remain with the interlocutors....

[Lesniak] Did the president like the budget?

[Oleksy] Neither the president nor I is pleased with this year's budget....

[Lesniak] So why did you vote for it, along with the rest of the coalition?

[Oleksy] Before I explain that point, let met assure you that I know perfectly well that old age and disability pensions are so low as to fall before subsistence levels, that the health service is deeply in the red, that education and science are underinvested, and that the police and the military are in drastic need of funds. Nor am I too blind to notice the high prices of, say, medicinal drugs, or services in the public sector. I know how much it costs to educate our children, and I know the social effects of unemployment, the curtailment of unemployment benefit, and reductions in the extent of social services available to the needy. I know the vast sizes of the sums needed by enterprises to break the vicious circle of debt liabilities and climbing out of the recession trough. Of course, when viewed from such a perspective, this year's budget cannot even hope to solve all of these problems because it is simply not in its power to do so, and we cannot hope for miracles. In that context, I am unhappy with the budget, just as the president is unhappy. However, this very same, much maligned budget is a good step in the direction of positive changes aimed at a a policy that will be oriented more toward social concerns. It brings with it a chance of galvanizing economic prospects and gives rise to the effective promotion of exports.

[Lesniak] Nevertheless, voters, including the left-oriented electorate, demonstrate their considerable disappointment with the budget....

[Oleksy] Individuals are not obliged to think in terms of state interests, history, or macroscale policies. Indeed, it is difficult to talk about any noticeable improvement in the situation of particular families. But—so help me—it is really most unfair to tear the government to pieces after it has been in office for only four months! Let me point out to all those eager fault-finders that we still guarantee the upgrading of old age and disability pensions and wages in the public sector. Will even that upgrading be enough to satisfy those interested? Of course not! And let me put it to you bluntly: A lot of water will have to pass under the bridge before we come to enjoy universal prosperity and adequate social welfare in Poland.

[Lesniak] But there were so many promises made during the election campaign....

[Oleksy] It is true that I often hear people say: "You promised, but there is no improvement." However, these grudges are not directed specifically at any concrete target. They are not followed by the second necessary element of the argument—the identification of an agency that would meet these public expectations more quickly and more efficiently. In any case, we are talking of Utopian visions here. It is certain that not all people in Poland will find their circumstances improving, and that is why the coalition must first and foremost protect the weakest. I am convinced that the majority of Poles do not expect to live the *dolce vita* from tomorrow onward; that they understand the restricting nature of the curb bit that is necessary if the country is to be led to development.

[Lesniak] So what are Solidarity's demands?

[Oleksy] I find the strikes imposed by Solidarity incomprehensible; furthermore, they do severe damage to the major branches of the economy as they impair the already weak tissue of economic life. Union activists call for a revision of the legally and democratically approved budget, unheard-of behavior in all civilized countries, but they fail to point out where the money is to be found, which section we should take it away from in order to give it to someone else. Nevertheless, I believe that the will to talk will prevail over the desire for political confrontation. The government, which had not concentrated much on the budget before, is now getting its second wind and setting briskly to work. Many program blueprints are already complete—for example, for combating unemployment, reforming the social insurance system, and extending wider protection to the weaker members of the public, who are particularly at risk from unbridled market forces.

[Lesniak] We hear rumors that family benefits will be taken away from people....

[Oleksy] They will not be taken away; they will be rationalized. Within the family benefit scheme, 20 trillion zlotys [Z] [per month] go to 10 million families. In global terms, this is a large sum of money, but, at the individual family level, it works out to a mere Z167,000 per child per month. In better-off families, such a sum makes no practical difference in the monthly budget. So perhaps it would be better to raise the benefit to

Z500,000 or Z600,000 per child, but then allocate it to only the most needy—for example, to the 3 million large families? The budget outgoings would remain the same, but the social gain would be greater. The more affluent will probably never even notice the loss of Z167,000, while the poorer families will receive more significant amounts of money with which to boost the family budget. Even so, I can already hear protesters shouting about unequal rights, just as I expect to hear them if and when we decide to change the real estate tax. It would be calculated on the basis of the value of the property rather than on its area, as is done now. At present, we pay the same tax on a palace as on a dilapidated slum.

[Lesniak] What danger areas should we fear most?

[Oleksy] First of all, the two major financial traps: structural—that is, lasting—balance-of-payments deficit (at present, imports outweigh exports to the tune of $2 billion), and uncontrollable growth of domestic debt. In 1989, this amounted to Z2.5 trillion; today it stands at Z83 trillion, which is exactly the amount of this year's budget deficit. There are many reasons for this state of affairs, and I do not intend to point a finger at culprits because some reasons would appear to be objective. However, I do try to point out to people that Pawlak's government has very little room for maneuver, as does the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party.

[Lesniak] Let us now return to the first question, concerning your visit to the Namiestnikowski Palace. What were your impressions of the place in terms of so-called esthetic values?

[Oleksy] To tell you the truth, I do not like the president's new residence. I do not envy him. I would not want to either live or work there....

[Lesniak] Thank you for talking with us.

Possible Presidential Candidates Profiled

WS2403113094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Before the Battle; Who Will Prevent the Left Wing From Victory in the Presidential Elections?"]

[Text] *The noncommunist camp, under a threat of left-wing domination, should select just one candidate to be the next president—so say politicians from the "Solidarity" movement. Aleksander Hall and Jaroslaw Kaczynski have spoken about it, while Bronislaw Geremek turned his attention to the fact that only candidates coming from broad camps have a chance in the elections, and not people put forward by individual parties. Pawel Laczkowski also made an appeal to the parliament members who formed the Citizens Parliamentary Club in 1989, to hold a meeting on the fifth anniversary of the June elections, with the goal, among others, of discussing a possible joint candidate for head of state.*

It is not yet known who could possibly be the "man of the moment" able to prevent the "communist camp" from taking over the highest post in the Republic of Poland. "Solidarity"-derived politicians, even though they have been declaring their will to nominate just one candidate, may face some serious problems with making it happen. A majority of the more than 10 potential candidates has quite big ambitions, and it is probable that it will be hard to convince at least a few of them that they should not run in the 1995 elections.

Prime Minister's Award

There has been talk for quite some time now in Democratic Union [UD] circles concerning Hanna Suchocka's candidacy. She, just like some other former prime ministers, has presidential ambitions. But the current period of left-wing domination in public life is a burden for the former prime minister. Until the presidential elections come, left-wing activists will be blaming the Suchocka government for the economic difficulties, which the Pawlak Cabinet will find it hard to overcome. At any rate, it seems that Hanna Suchocka's candidacy has become less and less likely. Even though UD politicians may think that accusations concerning Suchocka's having granted a 140-million-zloty award to herself are unjustified, it is doubtful that the view will be shared by the voters or by other post-Solidarity parties.

Under this situation, Tadeusz Mazowiecki may be UD's only "serious" candidate (or, actually, a candidate for the new party formed along with the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD]) who could be acceptable to at least some right-wing parties. He has probably not given up his presidential dreams entirely. The political time in Poland has been flying by very quickly since 1989, and the wounds are also healing fast.That is why Mazowiecki would like to just forget (and hope that this is what the voters have done, as well) about his disgraceful defeat of [presidential candidate in the previous elections] Tyminski, especially because right now he is the leader of one of the most powerful and most influential parties in Poland, which will be further strengthened by its merger with the KLD. Mazowiecki's departure for a "deserved rest" at the Belweder would be beneficial to his party because it would make him leave the post of party chairman, which could then be taken over by someone younger and more dynamic. Both Suchocka and Mazowiecki would like to be candidates of the entire Solidarity-derived camp. They would be approved by an overwhelming majority of UD and (as representatives of UD's right-wing faction) would also hope to be supported by at least a part of the extraparliamentary opposition. However, it does not seem very likely that the right wing, for which the presidential elections will be one of the last hopes for a political existence in Poland, will forgo coming up with their own candidate. And alas, it is very likely that it will not be just one candidate.

Dignitaries From the Right Wing

Jaroslaw Kaczynski (just like other parties' leaders) and other leaders of the Center Accord [PC], which is the

most dynamic right-wing party of all, have already mentioned a few possible candidates, while stressing that these would have to be candidates for the entire noncommunist camp. Some time ago, PC leaders seemed to think that a woman would be a good candidate for president. The names of Senator Alicja Grzeskowiak and former Sejm Deputy Teresa Liszcz were mentioned. But, in the final analysis, the right wing will most probably be looking for a candidate among its representatives or sympathizers who occupy high posts in the state hierarchy. Adam Strzembosz, chief justice of the Supreme Court, is the most serious candidate and the only one about whom there is talk currently in Kaczynski's bloc. Strzembosz is an unquestioned—and, importantly, a nonparty—authority on the right-wing side. If he agreed to run, Strzembosz could probably gather around himself the electorate of all of the parties that call themselves right-wing or center right-wing, and even the electorate of Solidarity. But, if he decides not to run after all, then, according to talk in the Christian-National Union [ZChN]-PC-Movement for the Republic-Peasant Accord bloc, Lech Kaczynski (who is also nonparty) would have to replace him. But Kaczynski is burdened with the odium of "being one of the Kaczynski brothers," and so the Supreme Chamber of Control chairman will be held accountable by the voters for real or fabricated deeds by himself and his brother. By the way, the latter categorically denies the possibility of Lech Kaczynski's candidacy.

Out of Solidarity

In the right-wing camp, the possibility of nominating Andrzej Stelmachowski (Senate speaker in the First Term and education minister in Jan Olszewski's government) continues to be considered. Olszewski himself, about whom there was talk after 4 June 1992 that he was the center right wing's main candidate for president, after the election defeat by the Coalition for the Republic and after his party was taken over by Romuald Szeremietiew, says (although recently in a less persistent manner) that he will not run in the presidential elections. Jan Olszewski could be a candidate for that part of the right wing that is associated with Solidarity. Jan Parys also made connections with the trade union. His enthusiasts presented him as a candidate for president even shortly after his dismissal in 1992.

There is a contest also within Solidarity itself on who will be the Solidarity-right-wing candidate for president. It seems that the trade union's chairman, Marian Krzaklewski, began displaying presidential ambitions. The success of the Warsaw demonstration by Solidarity, in which thousands of people took part, and also the initiation of a wave of strikes throughout Poland strengthened his position a great deal. But, on the other hand, some politicians associated with the trade union would gladly support Zbigniew Romaszewski, the man who is an anticommunist opposition legend, a senator, and chief of the Solidarity Parliamentary Club. At present, Romaszewski is in serious conflict with Krzaklewski. There is even talk that the setting up of a Warsaw Solidarity club marks the beginning of Romaszewski's election campaign.

From among the somewhat more exotic right-wing candidates, the chairman of the Union for Real Politics [UPR], Janusz Korwin-Mikke, will not run this time around. His party wants to come up with just one presidential candidate within the entire "Accord of 11 November" consisting of UPR, the Party of Christian Democrats [PChD], the Conservative Party, and the Peasant-Christian Party [SLCh]. Christian-democratic activists from Pawel Laczkowski's party would like to suggest somebody else to the alliance (and to the entire Solidarity-derived camp): Even though PChD leader Pawel Laczkowski denies that, there is unofficial talk about Ryszard Kaczorowski, Poland's former president-in-exile. SLCh's Artur Balazs would like Leszek Balcerowicz to run in the elections, but it is not very likely that other right-wing parties would support the former deputy prime minister; UD would also most probably prefer someone better associated with the party.

Fight With Walesa

Whoever from the Solidarity-derived camp runs in the elections will have to fight Lech Walesa for the support of noncommunist voters. The incumbent president is a candidate for the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR], which he himself established, even though he has not yet made a decision on whether to run in the elections. Officially, the reason for Walesa's hesitation is said to be uncertainty about the powers of the head of state under the new Constitution. If the powers were to be the same as now or even less, then, according to a close associate of his, Professor Lech Falandysz, Walesa might give up trying to win the office. But that scenario is not very likely. Falandysz himself admits that it is possible that Walesa will think that he has worked enough and can now afford to become a "president on the picture" and drink champaign during official functions. But, if the incumbent president cannot or does not want to run in the 1995 elections, the BBWR has a reserve candidate: Zbigniew Religa, a cardiologist and the BBWR's chairman, who is enjoying enormous popularity (recently, it has been even greater than Walesa's). So far, Religa has been stressing that Walesa is the BBWR's only candidate, but he will not refuse to face the responsibility if it comes to that.

Lech Walesa will be trying to build a presidential party before the elections, perhaps using the BBWR as its basis, although, recently, he has been leaning toward

Solidarity again, when he made it clear that he had proposed his "citizens' constitutional initiative" precisely as a gesture toward his old trade union. Walesa has already given up trying to win the support of the right-wing "bunglers," even though it is probable that he could have gained the support of some minor parties not so long ago, but the president's good relationship with the ZChN, the SLCh, the PChD, or part of UPR is already in the past.

Limited Market

All signs are that the "market" of presidential candidates is limited and that next year's battle for the supreme post in the country will take place precisely among those people on the "market"—they are well known to the political public, and they know each other well—perhaps with the participation of a few ambitious outsiders such as Andrzej Lepper snd Janusz Bryczkowski.

Interior Ministry Surveillance Activity Viewed

AU2103181794 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Mar 93 p 1, 2

[Article by Sorin Rosca-Stanescu: "The Interior Ministry's Hot News"]

[Text] A shocking element has emerged in the scandal of the generals: We finally have proof of the existence in Romania, beginning 26 March 1993, of an official (but illegal) and particularly well-organized surveillance network for political purposes of party and trade union leaders, public figures, journalists, foreign citizens, and Romanians traveling abroad, aimed at monitoring and reporting daily on the mood of the population and infiltrating the Diaspora.

The entire system characteristic of the political police has been organized by the UM 0215—the secret service of the Ministry of Interior [MI]. Under the leadership of the former interior minister, George Ion Danescu, and his close aide, General Dan Gheorghe, a few days ago still the chief of the UM 0215 Secret Service, a comprehensive and extremely precise work method was drafted, which is compulsory for all regional intelligence services. This method, which we possess, constitutes an indubitable proof that top officials in the Ministry of Interior have initiated the most flagrant violation of the Constitution and the country's laws, thus seriously jeopardizing our citizens' freedom. We want to specify that all information obtained from this extensive network of agents is entered on a daily basis in the computer of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI]. Then this information is used for political purposes. Thus, SRI is doing its dirty work with the help of the secret service of the Ministry of Interior. The astonishing thing is that a parliamentary commission (which checked unit 0215 some two months ago) discovered a number of irregularities, but failed to discover the essential thing. The secret of this monster within the Ministry of Interior has been carefully preserved so far.

The espionage affair in which Lieutenant General Marin Pancea, counselor to President Ion iliescu and secretary of the country's Defense Council, was allegedly involved and the dismissals of Major General Gh. Diaconescu, chief of the SRI Espionage Department, and of General Dan Gheorghe, chief of the UM-0215 within the Ministry of Interior, as well as the espionage affair made public by Traian Basescu, at the end of which is General Grylakis [involved in Romanian fleet sale scandal], seem to be linked by certain threads but also through mysterious rivalries at the top executive level.

Until the situation as a whole is clarified, we will reveal to the public the following details about the most serious political espionage case after 1989. If an earthquake will be triggered in the Ministry of Interior and the SRI, and in Romanian society on the whole, ending with the main protagonists on the accusation bench, then this means that Romania still has a chance to improve.

Secret Work Method

Here are the things with which the Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Interior—UM-0215—dealt beginning 26 March 1993 (when Circular No. 00608801 was officially and secretly disseminated). We will now summarize some of the compulsory objectives pursued by the agents at home and abroad:

"1. Actions against national security; 2. Nationalist, irredentist, separatist, and racial actions; 3. Actions regarding the physical life and security of Romanian and foreign citizens whose security falls within the competence of the Ministry of Interior (so far nothing abnormal, the above activities being legal); 4. Specific information about antiterrorist actions (a strange activity because there is a specialized antiterrorist unit attached to the SRI, while, through the nature of things, the Watch and Protection Service (SPP) performs such activities); 5. Foreign citizens' actions; 6. Romanian citizens actions (and in this connection we will reproduce and specify certain aspects of the secret work method clearly revealing what 0215 actually pursued: 'F. 63—attitudes, positions, assessments; F. 38—went abroad for specialization; F. 39—studied abroad; F. 40—went abroad for specialized assistance.'" Above I have outlined certain typical activities of the political police. And now further details). 7. Specific essentials regarding state and professional interests; 8. Specific essentials of the activity of information protection; 9. Essentials regarding antecedents; 10. Specific essentials regarding operative information about Romanians abroad. (And again some information about the method regarding these "essentials": "F. 12—employed at foreign missions or foreign branches in Romania; F. 81—temporarily resident abroad; F. 101—possession of funds; F. 107—people holding dual citizenship.")

We hope that our readers realize how extensive and dangerous this network is, which has been set up under the guidance of the generals from the secret unit of the Ministry of Interior. Circular No. 00608801 is signed by deputy directors—Colonel Marica, Colonel Condoiu, and Colonel Stan.

We also want to specify that following dispositions issued for all regional units in a secret radiogram in May 1993, the information obtained by this network is no longer passed on to regional chiefs, but is necessarily entered in the SRI computer. We doubt that the opposition parties have access to the data obtained in this way. Sealing the mechanism whereby the Ministry of Interior is gradually being subordinated to the SRI, a decision was made whereby no one can be employed in the Ministry of Interior, without the agreement of the institution headed by Virgil Magureanu.

We are waiting for the reaction of parliamentarians.

History of Secret Police Unit, Leaders Viewed

AU2303123894 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Mar 94 p 16

[Article by Sorin Rosca-Stanescu: "UM 0215—What It Is and What Its Business Is—The Founder: Gelu Voican Voiculescu"]

[Text] After the arrest of General Iulian Vlad, head of the Department of State Security, and Generals Geanu Bucurescu, Aristotel Stamatoiu, and Vasile Gheorghe on 31 December 1989, Gelu Voican Voiculescu was appointed commander of the Directorate of State Security. Beginning 2 January 1990, General Nicolae Militaru, [then] minister of national defense, and Gelu Voican led the takeover of the Securitate structures by the Ministry of National Defense. They elaborated a draft decree stipulating the establishment of the National Security Council [Consiliul Sigurantei Statului], but Ion Iliescu refused to sign it. Nicolae Militaru ordered the 566 officers working for the Bucharest Municipality Securitate and the majority of the officers of the former 4th Directorate for Military Counterespionage to be transferred to reserve duty. During the month of January [1990] Gelu Voican obtained the assent of the Provisional Government and Ion Iliescu to utilize the officers of the former Bucharest Municipality Securitate to set up a special directorate of the Ministry of Interior, which was done in maximum secrecy. They named that directorate UM [Military Unit] 0215. Its first commander was Admiral Cico Dumitrescu. However, the person that actually had command over the unit was Gelu Voican Voiculescu, who was also deputy prime minister. His first counselor was reserve General Nicolae Voican. One of his closest aides was Viorel Tache, formerly subordinate to General Doicaru at UM 0920, later officer of the "Inimical Writings" [Inscrisuri Dusmanoase] Bureau of the Bucharest Municipality Securitate, and currently owner of the Georgiana Ltd [company]. Later on the command [of UM 0215] was taken over successively by counterespionage Colonels Florin Calapod, Cristescu, and Harosa. An ample report that was broadcast on 11 February [1990] by Radio Free Europe revealed that during the time when Mihai Chitac was [interior] minister, the officers and noncommissioned officers of UM 0215 owned a number of false identification cards, each using various names, in the same way the Greek General Grylakis [involved in the Petromin scandal in Romania] and his men do, all of whom currently are under penal investigations in Athens. Following the 20 May 1990 general elections, UM 0215 was involved in every dirty affair: in the printing and circulating of the so-called Iron Guard fliers in Bacau and Bucharest, and the fabrication of false documents intended to discredit Corneliu Coposu, Radu Campeanu, and Marian Munteanu [opposition personalities]. On 18 February 1990 they staged the mob's forcing its way into the government headquarters, later on they acted to discredit the marathon rally in University Square, and in June 1990 they directed the moves of the miners in Bucharest. The Radio Free Europe report also mentions the fact that over that period of time the main opposition parties and the persons close to the significant opposition leaders were penetrated by officers of that unit. On 14 June 1990, Colonel Ion Nicolae and First Sergeant Corneliu Dumitrescu of UM 0215 supervised the stealing of documents and valuables from the home of [opposition leader] Ion Ratiu. Following the appointment of Doru Viorel Ursu as [interior] minister, they ceased to use false identification cards and manifold identities. The leadership of the unit was replaced by appointing Colonel Jenica Iosif as its commander and Colonel Ion Condoiu as deputy commander. That is when the rivalry began between UM 0215 and the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service]. It seems that as long as the portfolio of interior was held by Doru Viorel Ursu and Victor Babiuc, the actions against the political opposition ceased. About 100 officers of the unit were transferred to SRI. This was followed by the firing of Colonel Ion Rusu. The current official structure of the leadership of UM 0215 is as follows: The Counterespionage Division is headed by Colonel Gheorghe Stan, former deputy of General Emil Macri; the Intelligence Division headed by Colonel Ion Condoiu; the aforementioned division consists of three services: The Antihooligan Fighting and Protection Service, headed by Colonel Dumitru Ionel; the Delinquency and Parasitism Service, headed by Colonel Dumitru Constantin; and the Economic Intelligence Service, headed by Colonel Ion Mandrila.

Vacaroiu's Political Style, Governing Criticized

AU1803173894 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 16 Mar 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "The Nicolae Vacaroiu Style"]

[Text] Extended over two hours, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu's news conference did not yield anything new. The style is like the man, it seems, not only insofar as his handwriting is concerned, but also news conferences. Balzac is easy to recognize in his novels and Nicolae Vacaroiu in his news conferences. The way he appears in front of journalists betrays the style he has adopted in his position of prime minister. What could be noted, especially in his answers to the questions, was the incoherence characteristic of Nicolae Vacaroiu's activity as prime minister. To listen to a Nicolae Vacaroiu speech is a hard task for an intelligent person who is used to thinking on the basis of Aristotelian logic. Vacaroiu has the talent to contradict himself without batting an eyelid. Here is an example. The whole exercise on Monday, 14 March, was designed to present himself as a genuine reformist. At one point, however, he made an affirmation that clearly contradicted this: "Thus, as long as I hold this position, the economy has to function, come out of the crisis, and proceed to the restructuring and privatization process..." Thus Romania's prime minister views the period of his governance divided into two stages: First, he takes the economy out of the crisis, makes it function, and second, he restructures and privatizes it. As is known, the two elements of the

reform—privatization and restructuring—have been thought out by economists of greater caliber than Nicolae Vacaroiu and not as a purpose in itself, but as a means to take the economy out of the crisis caused by the centralized communist system. And this for a simple reason: Only privatization and restructuring—typical elements of market relations—may make the economy function within maximum parameters! Communism collapsed precisely because it failed at the economic level. The Romanian prime minister, however, thinks that we may make the economy function before privatization and restructuring. What is to be understood from this? That Nicolae Vacaroiu continues to believe in the efficiency of communist means at the economic level. Thus he betrays his centralist thinking. Without wanting to, he also betrays that he is a convinced antireformist. Thus he declared in front of the entire press and, through it, in front of the entire nation, that the means used by his government so far have been those of communist centralism. Understandably, this is harshly at variance with his emphasis throughout the news conference of being a convinced reformist. The incoherence typical of the Nicolae Vacaroiu government was also obvious during the news conference in the prime minister's talent to jump several times from one subject to another within the same sentence. He begins, for example, by referring to the machine-building industry only to find himself talking how to cultivate field flowers at the end of the sentence. The same news conference revealed another trait of the political style practiced by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu. This is what one could call aggressive bragging. Normally, braggarts earn sympathy. Nicolae Vacaroiu, however, is a braggart who gets on your nerves. When he says that the decline in material production has stopped, that the GNP and labor productivity per employee have increased, and that exports have considerably grown, Nicolae Vacaroiu simply does not brag. Actually, he polemizes with all those who hold that things are not going well. That is so with all Romanians. Had this been Stalin's time, Nicolae Vacaroiu would have sent everyone who did not utter praise of the way he governs to jail. Living in a democracy, he has to be content to brag. The aggressiveness behind his bragging betrays how he suffers that it is not Stalin's time. At first sight, Nicolae Vacaroiu seems a modest man minding his own business. If you study him closely, you will find that he is a man who has an unusually positive opinion about himself. The tone of both his introductory statement and his answers during the news conference was characterized by an irritating arrogance. On the basis of the fact that he is the prime minister, Nicolae Vacaroiu has decided that he is unquestionably superior to absolutely everything that moves in this country, especially since he believes that everything that moves stands on one side exchanging opinions, while he, Nicolae Vacaroiu, is working hard to govern the country.

PDSR President Views Party Goals

AU2103111294 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian 16-23 Mar 94 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Oliviu Gherman, president of the Senate and the Social Democracy Party of Romania, PDSR, by Ileana Lucaciu; place and date not given: "Stupidity Means To Be Frozen in Blueprints"]

[Text]

There Is No Contradiction Between Monarchy and Progress or Between Republic and Progress

[Lucaciu] I know from very reliable sources that you are a passionate and very good bridge player. When do you find the time to indulge in your hobby?

[Gherman] Unfortunately, I do not have too much time for it. After all these things quiet down—which make each week seem like the week in which the world was created, since we have so much to do each week that when we reach the seventh day we no longer feel like resting any more—that is, after we finish with these weekly remakes of the initial week of the world creation, I will find some time for bridge.

[Lucaciu] Do you think that this race against the clock will ever end?

[Gherman] It is not fully up to me to ensure that we reach such a normal working week; to a large extent, it is up to the wisdom of the political forces in Romania.

[Lucaciu] Your duties as Senate president have made you travel abroad quite a lot. If you were ever to return to those places as a simple tourist, which country would you choose?

[Gherman] First of all, I would like to specify that my function makes me do some traveling abroad, but not quite a lot, as you said. All these duties at the head of various delegations have meant that, with very few exceptions, I saw almost nothing of the countries I visited. If the schedule for the delegation members is somewhat more flexible and allows them to also tour a given city, my program is usually so heavy that I can hardly see anything of it at all. Let me give you an example. I attended a NATO meeting in Denmark and I did not even find the time to go out into Copenhagen's streets even once. If I were to return to one of these countries, I think I would choose one of the two Asian countries I visited, and not because they happen to be among the ones I visited recently. I would choose Japan because it managed to achieve a formidable blend of historical tradition and the people's spirit of sacrifice and devotion to work. I would also go back to India, the country I fell in love with when I was invited there in the 70's to give some lectures in physics at three or four university centers. India has instilled in me a certain philosophy of peace and nonaggression.

[Lucaciu] You have recently returned from Japan, where you had the honor of being received by Japan's emperor. At this point in history, Japan is one of the important economic forces of the world. It is an overdeveloped country headed by a traditional monarchy. How do you see the relationship between the monarchy and Japan's development?

[Gherman] There is no contradiction between the monarchy and the development of that country. Japan has built its political balance around the Imperial Court and around the structures that have led to the existence of the Imperial Court. I visited several homes of shoguns from the last century. There was a prevalent cult of power and of the master, and this has reached extraordinary dimensions in Japan. In 1868, the powers that be came up with the current solution of an imperial family, which took over the country's leadership, with all the shoguns accepting that solution. The life of the Japanese society, which first developed around the courts of the shoguns and later around the Imperial Court, has created a most respectable tradition. You must realize that there is no contradiction between monarchy and progress, as there is no contradiction between the republic and progress. They are accepted forms in various countries. One cannot say that the Nordic countries, which are all monarchies, are economically backward. That would be a formidable gaffe. I do not believe that a certain form of government, be it monarchy or republic, could be the key to success per se. It is more a matter of choice by the respective society and none of the aforementioned models of government can open the gates of paradise by themselves.

Politics Are Being Played by Ear

[Lucaciu] I know that you are a great lover of classic music. Could you make an analogy between our political life and a famous musical score?

[Gherman] Paradoxically, I would compare our political life to Bartok's orchestra concerto. There is a great sound potential, both in our life and in Bartok's music. Bartok managed to produce complete order in his music, although a superficial listening to his concerto might not reveal this complete order. There is a sensation of musical cacophony there, but if you listen carefully, you realize it is an extraordinary score. If you look at the political effervescence of our society, everything seems to be a political cacophony. However, I believe that there is a basic substance there which, if one watches carefully, can be discovered in our social and political life. However, we will have to create some order in our own backyard.

[Lucaciu] You mention the need for order. It does not seem to exist in many parties. Let us take for example the liberal movement, which is almost entirely crippled.

[Gherman] The liberal movement in Romania—just as the other political orientations in our country—is substantially influenced by the people that head it. The liberal movement only stands to gain a lot if the egos of the various figures belonging to the movement's subdivisions are put in the service of the movement. Our country needs a liberal movement. I have talked to older and more recent liberals and I can tell you that the distance between the older approach and the neoliberal concept is as from heaven to earth. They will have to clarify and substantiate their neoliberal arguments and solutions, because, right now, politics is being too much played by ear. But this applies not only to the liberals, it also applies to other parties, as well.

[Lucaciu] You are heading a social-democratic party. In its turn, the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD(FSN)] also considers itself to be a social-democratic party. Then, there is also Sergiu Cunescu's Social Democratic Party [PSDR]. Therefore, it is not only the liberal trend that has several directions, but also the social-democratic one. Do you see the likelihood of a unification of the social-democratic movement?

[Gherman] Not only that it is possible, but, over the medium term, that it is also an obligation of the social-democratic movement in Romania. One will have to establish the landmarks of social democracy, regardless of the figures that currently dominate the various social-democratic groupings. I believe that not enough has been done to clarify the content of the social-democratic concept. To this, one should add the confrontation of egos, which is quite apparent both in the case of the social democracy and in the case of the liberal movement, something which hampers the movement's natural regrouping. It is like a typical childhood illness at the beginning of Romania's political life. Within a reasonable period of two, three, or four years, we will eventually reach a balance in our political life with its basic components: neoliberalism, Christian democracy, and social democracy.

[Lucaciu] You are a politician of vast parliamentary experience. In your capacity as president of the Senate, you often have to quell your colleagues' outbursts of temper. In your opinion, how can one avoid such outbursts in the future, as they occasionally cast an unfavorable light upon our parliamentary life as a whole?

[Gherman] I would like to remind you that in 1926-1927, a great statesman who made an enormous contribution to Turkey's progress, namely Ataturk [Kemal Ataturk, founder of modern Turkey], was confronted by one of the ministers during a cabinet session he attended. Ataturk took out a pistol and shot the minister. In general, I do not carry guns and I do not plan to shoot anyone. To answer your question, I will cite to you a Japanese joke. Two students, one Japanese and one French, were sharing the same room in a students' hostel. Each day the French student used to punch the Japanese one, who did not reply at all. After a year, the French guy told the Japanese that he has had enough of hitting him without riposte. At which, the Japanese told him that was a wise decision, since he himself had gotten fed up spitting into the French student's tea....

I Do Not Consider Myself President of the Party

[Lucaciu] You are the president of the ruling party. However, many analysts claim that the true president of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] is Mr. Ion Iliescu, who is allegedly making the important decisions in your party.

[Gherman] The analysts are right, but only half way. They are right to the extent that I do not consider myself the party's president and that President Ion Iliescu has been our party's polarization factor. In this respect, they are right. However, as far as the taking of decisions is concerned, they are totally wrong there. President Iliescu—regardless of the way or the light in which some people want to present him—has a certain kind of delicacy and does not want to impose his viewpoints, not even in political matters. We often consult each other, out of a sense of being colleagues in our civic duties. It will soon be two years since I began—unfortunately for myself—to fulfill this task as PDSR president and I have never had the feeling that President Iliescu was imposing a certain viewpoint upon me. Usually, during the discussions we have, we reach a viewpoint that is the result of arguments and not of pressures coming from either side. Therefore, regarding your question and the assessments of political analysts, I can say that the truth is somewhere in the middle.

[Lucaciu] As your colleague Alexandru Popovici [senator of the Civic Alliance Party, PAC] very well expressed it, the recent governmental reshuffle was done in a conspiratorial manner. You were in the middle of negotiations with other parties when you brusquely proceeded to change four ministers. Will this reshuffle not affect the further negotiations with the opposition and the parties of the governmental coalition?

[Gherman] I would like to tell you that all reshuffles come rather brusquely in any society with a serious political life. Reshuffles that are announced with much ado weeks in advance do nothing but harm the political life. I must tell you a little secret. We are deliberately introducing viruses, that is, misleading information.

[Lucaciu] We call them intoxications.

[Gherman] We are causing such intoxications of the mass media so that we can be left alone to thoroughly examine the situation in peace. I believe that—if the political forces with which we are engaged in talks take a dispassionate look at the reshuffle and think of the country's future—the reshuffle should not only fail to negatively affect the negotiations, but on the contrary, it will become an argument in the hands of our partners in the future talks. If you read the press of recent years, you will note that it has insistently demanded the replacement of the ministers of defense and interior with civilians. Now that we have done just that, we are being accused for having done it! If you read the newspapers of April-June 1993, you will see with what satisfaction the papers wrote about the failure of the talks with the IMF; when the talks ended with the signing of the "Memorandum," the same newspapers began finding fault with the "Memorandum" as such. There is a kind of journalistic infancy at the level of our mass media, too. It does not bother or upset me. Anyhow, coming back to the substance of these reshuffles, they should not really upset anyone; on the contrary, they should be an additional proof of our openness.

The Ministry of Industry Is a Colossus

[Lucaciu] The appointment of civilians at the Ministry of Defense and Interior is a good chess move on the part of the ruling party, since it is in agreement with the requirements of the Council of Europe. However, I would like to remind you that both the government party and President Ion Iliescu admitted that we are going through a period of serious economic crisis. Therefore, it seems at least strange that, at a time of economic crisis, with its inherent blockages, you are changing the ministers of defense, interior, or justice. One would have rather expected a change in the sphere of industry or agriculture.

[Gherman] The timing you are suggesting does not always coincide with the timing one can politically accept. Apropos the productive spheres, since you were talking about industry and agriculture, it is up to the prime minister to replace the respective secretaries of state whenever he wants, since this is part of his prerogatives. On the other hand, such a change cannot be done without planning. I am against frivolous moves in the political life. I believe that one should proceed from the bottom to the top in the aforementioned areas. This does not mean that one cannot operate some changes at the top, too. One should first see what can be done to amend the situation where irregularities occur. Let us take for instance the Ministry of Industry, which is a colossus; it has 14 or 15 secretaries of state, in charge of various directorates. Decentralization could not be achieved here overnight. The ministry still suffers from the centralized economic coordination of certain industrial sectors. If anyone believes that Minister of Industry Dumitru Popescu can be blamed for various shortcomings in his ministry, he is wrong. This does not mean that there may not be some shortcomings in Dumitru Popescu's own activity; if we ever come to the conclusion that these shortcomings exceed his merits, then we will replace him at the right moment. For the time being, we do not intend to do so. Therefore, any attempt by you, no matter how able it is, to channel the discussion toward second-guessing our future approach to the government's activity is doomed to failure. You will not get any information out of me.

[Lucaciu] You said that a change does not necessarily mean to operate at the top, but rather to go from the bottom to the top. The PDSR, which has been in power for almost one and a half years, is accused of contributing to the phenomenon of restoration, through this concern with consolidating the basis.

[Gherman] In this respect, the opposition has been quite ingenious in using all the possible pejorative terms it could find against the PDSR. We thank it for this lesson, because it is also teaching us how to treat it when it has the pleasure of coming to power. The metaphors they are using are the most authentic proof of a typically dictatorial frame of mind, which they themselves criticize in another context. In the communist regime, everything

was placed in little boxes clearly labeled: leftism, opportunism, and so forth. Now we have more "ism"-endings than we could ever imagine. It looks like the mirror has turned the other way round, toward the opposition. We have become used to these invectives and each time we discover another one, we nurture a feeling of satisfaction, since we are confronted with yet another argument that unmasks the users of those metaphors for what they are—their way of thinking is an accusation against themselves.

[Lucaciu] Since you have talked about "ism"-endings, you are also being accused of centralism.

[Gherman] Well, it is incomparably easier to criticize than to do something. We are in the unpleasant position of people obliged to do something. It is very easy to see everything that is wrong or looks like being wrong. As a matter of fact, this is why I agreed to become involved in political life. I never liked to sit in judgment of others without doing anything. I prefer to be judged and cursed. It is a feature of my character.

Everybody Votes as He Deems Fit

[Lucaciu] There was much talk about the PDSR being a united and monolithic party. However, it has ceased to manifest itself as such for some time and speculations are now being made about the existence of two trends within the PDSR. For instance, on Monday 7 March we were taken by surprise when the former minister of justice, Mr. Petre Ninosu, did not obtain the necessary vote for his election to the position as vice president of the Senate from some of his own party colleagues. Mr. Ion Solcanu managed to obtain it, but with difficulty.

[Gherman] When you show me a united and monolithic party in Romania, then I will start being again afraid of a restoration and the revival of dictatorship. As for the incident you mentioned, well some people liked one solution, others another solution. The only thing they did not think of during the vote was that their gesture took place at a time when the people had already been taken by surprise by the governmental reshuffle. There has not been enough time to let things settle and quiet down; otherwise, that incident might have been avoided. From a human viewpoint, I am very upset with what happened to Mr. Ninosu, as I can well imagine what he must be feeling right now.

[Lucaciu] I gave an example that involved people, therefore, one could conceivably say that subjective considerations might have been at play here. However, one gets the same feeling of the existence of various trends within the PDSR when seeing the fate of the Law on Radio and Television Societies. After it passed through the Senate, it is now bogged down in the Chamber of Deputies. The PDSR deputies tried to introduce a lot of substantial amendments, after the PDSR senators passed it in a certain formula. We are talking here about different and even divergent concepts.

[Gherman] The law has been worked out by the Senate Culture Commission, which did not pay due attention to my observations during its discussion in the Senate. Some of these observations coincide with the amendments brought now in the Chamber. One should also take into consideration the fact that the Senate Culture and Mass-Media Commission is headed by Mr. Adrian Paunescu [vice president of the Socialist Party of Labor-PSM], who is a real volcano. Sometimes you can block a water overflow or you can put out a fire. But I have not yet heard of anyone managing to contain a volcanic eruption. Therefore, the law that has emerged from the Senate bears the imprint of Adrian Paunescu, with all its good and bad points. Generally speaking, all the cultural laws we promulgated bear his imprint. The rule of the game is that man creates history, not the other way round. Consequently, we are dealing here with a natural evolution within this legislative process.

[Lucaciu] I have to insist on another subject, namely the Law on Land Leasing. There are divergent opinions on this subject within the PDSR. Some party people, particularly the senators, favor leasing the land to AGROMECS [agricultural-mechanization stations], others, particularly the deputies in the Chamber are against this measure.

[Gherman] We fully observe a constitutional provision that forbids compulsory mandates. We put forth arguments and counterarguments, after which everybody votes as he deems fit. That famous Article Four of the law is hard to evaluate. It is like launching a cosmic missile from a 19th-century cannon. Maybe the leasing of some lands by the AGROMECS will prove beneficial. If the world were ideal, it would certainly have proved beneficial. But the world is not ideal, and here comes the doubting. I, for instance, doubt that an AGROMEC that is leasing land will resist the temptation to pass part of its expenditures onto the poor peasant, who has nobody to apply to for machinery but the AGROMEC. Others say that if we do not permit the leasing of the land, then the fields will remained untilled. Both are right in their way. As the famous rabbi of Buhusi said: "You are right and you are right." The political decision is not an easy thing and not absolutely univocal. Here lies, maybe, the unique appeal of the political life. Time will prove who better foresaw the effects of a certain deed. Let me give you an example: When the law on the legislative elections was discussed in Parliament, I foresaw some effects, which eventually proved right. My colleagues did not accept my conclusions at the respective time. I said that the proportional variant that was accepted can lead to aberrations. In a given county or constituency, one may not obtain enough votes to obtain a seat as senator, but may obtain two seats, through the redistribution of the votes. There are other aberrations, too. But they did not accept my arguments. We do not give "directives" or "precious recommendations" to our colleagues about how to compulsorily vote a certain law.

[Lucaciu] The curious thing is that, regardless of the law submitted to discussion, the same people are making up

the two groups. Hence, the conclusion of the analysts that there are two trends within the PDSR.

[Gherman] But it is only natural that it should be so. I can tell you that even I, of today, no longer coincide with the I of yesterday, and I hope not to coincide with the I of tomorrow.

[Lucaciu] But you must remain faithful to a certain belief.

[Gherman] If I come to the conclusion that this belief is detrimental to society, then I must accept that other beliefs are better. Despite the fact that I am not a great admirer of Liiceanu's [prominent member of the Civic Alliance] political opinions—actually, the reverse is true—I would like to quote a very good statement of his: "Stupidity means to be frozen in blueprints." We must realize that each one of us is duty bound to change, if we do not want to be frozen in a blueprint."

Early Elections—A Disastrous Solution

[Lucaciu] Apropos freezing, there is much talk about being "frozen" in the likely parliamentary blockage. This situation should inevitably lead to early elections.

[Gherman] I believe that the greatest tragedy for our country would be to interrupt the normal process of reform already started and enter a period of early elections. Whoever does not see this, should remember that he stood for this disastrous solution, when disaster strikes. Now, more than ever before, we need tranquillity so that all political forces can focus on implementing the process of reform. We also need a timetable of the reform, as implied by the "Memorandum" [with the IMF]. If somebody does not learn from experience, then he will have to break his own neck before he learns anything.

[Lucaciu] At the Cotroceni [presidential palace] meeting between the PDSR and Mr. Ion Iliescu—a meeting that launched the second round of negotiations with the political parties—Mr. Adrian Nastase, your party's executive president, said that if these negotiations yield no solutions, then the PDSR will call early elections. You were absent from that meeting.

[Gherman] We must first try to find all possible solutions! We are not against early elections because we are afraid of the results our political grouping will obtain. We are afraid of the eight to nine months that we will lose from the process of the reform, which will cost the country dearly. I am also afraid that some people's vote will not be for a political solution but rather a negative, protest vote against certain failures. Generally speaking, negative votes are detrimental to society in the long run. I repeat, we do not fear early elections, but we do not wish them, since they will delay the reform by eight to nine months. We are not only talking about a delay here, but also about a leap backward of Romanian society by more than one year. Moreover, it is also possible that the extremities of the political landscape will increase their numbers. If this is what some people want, then let us go for early elections. However, I repeat, they are against the country's interest.

[Lucaciu] Do you recognize that we have extremes in our political spectrum?

[Gherman] There are definitely extreme positions, particularly individual. From a programmatic viewpoint, I have seen so very few coherent programs, that I even got scared. Some of them cannot even be labeled. I have heard of a colossal program of some party, which I do not even want to name, only to ascertain that it was nothing but an enumeration of mediocre slogans. There is plenty of noise, but no programs. Consequently, the political landscape covers a whole spectrum, with individual presences in all zones, but with much fewer programmatic presences in some of these zones, except for certain programmatic presences that scare me and remind me of the horror years of the 40's.

I Have No Spirit of Adventure

[Lucaciu] It is usually lawyers who become involved in top politics. You are a scientist, a known physicist. How does physics go with politics?

[Gherman] You touched a sensitive cord here. Maybe my answer will be interpreted as a political gaffe, but, believe me, I do not consider myself a politician. I only consider myself as the owner of a floating bridge, that carries things from one bank to the other. Political life in our immediate past was totally anomalous. I am referring to the dictatorial period. I hope that a normal political life will prevail in our country over the medium term. I am only a raftsman, trying to transfer the Romanian society, with as little damage as possible, from the aberrant zone of the dictatorial past to a zone of normalcy. Consequently, I am now a kind of political clerk, who regrets that he cannot be a very good, as he would hope, physics professor. However, someone had to ensure the crossover of the Romanian society to the other bank of the river. I never liked to stay on the sidelines with my arms crossed.

[Lucaciu] Professor, I would like you to answer another question from the sphere of physics. What are microwaves?

[Gherman] There are all kinds of microwaves. It depends on where they are placed. Microwaves in the electromagnet field are placed in the extreme zone of mechanical access to electromagnetic waves. It is a kind of extreme zone of waves produced by normal oscillating circuits. Consequently, the zone of electromagnetic waves is pushed up to the remote infrared optical range. I would say that the microwaves are electromagnetic waves that are accessible through special means of production, not through the traditional oscillating circuits.

[Lucaciu] Please, stop this scientific explanation. I was never any good at physics. Actually, I wanted you to tell me whether these microwave devices are good in the

kitchen. I am referring to microwave ovens, which, even though they are not "accessible" to us—because of their stiff price—have conquered the world.

[Gherman] They are very good for heating up food without altering its vitamin content.

[Lucaciu] Are there any similarities in politics with the microwave phenomenon?

[Gherman] You cannot find similarities there. Politics is a step by step phenomenon. To find something similar to microwaves in politics, there must be a political continuum there. But then, there is no such thing as a political continuum, since only undulating phenomena are typical of such a continuum. One can talk about a hypothetical kind of communication, through suggestion or extrasensory means, in politics. Some believe in that, some do not. That is a sphere of adventure, and I have no spirit of adventure whatsoever.

German Defense Ministry Delegation Visits

AU2103205494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 21 Mar 94

[Text] At Senate headquarters today a delegation from Germany's Defense Ministry led by State Secretary for Defense Bernd Wilz was received by the chairmen of the defense councils of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, Radu Timofte and Petre Roman.

After briefly presenting the bills that have been already passed or that are still to be passed by parliament in the domain of defense, public order, and national security, Timofte and Roman emphasized the importance of Romania's military cooperation with NATO structures, each NATO country, and especially Germany. As a sign of the democratization of our country's defense structures, Timofte outlined the setting up of the National Defense Collegium.

The head of the German military delegation stressed the interest of his country in a good military cooperation with Romania, mentioning within that context that over the current year about 40 various cooperation projects are to be accomplished, four Romanian officers are currently studying in Germany, and that the [word indistinct] of the National Defense Ministry, as well as the needs of the Romanian Armed Forces will be satisfied to a great extent from the equipment of the army of the former German Democratic Republic.

In conclusion Wilz appreciated the fact that Romania is on the right track regarding the parliament's control over the defense, public order, and national security institutions. He added that on Wednesday [23 March] a delegation of the Bundestag Defense Commission is to arrive in Romania, reports our correspondent Dan Preda.

Melescanu Discusses Relations

AU2203123294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu has received Bernd Wilz, parliamentary state secretary in charge of defense in the Bundestag, accompanied by Klaus Franke, chairman of the German-Romanian Friendship Parliamentary Group.

In their discussion the two sides focused on continuing the political dialogue at various levels and on relations between the two armies. They also examined ways and means to put the Partnership for Peace plan into practice, as well as a number of international issues, including the situation in former Yugoslavia and in the Russian Federation.

The two sides also discussed the visits a number of German figures will pay to Romania this year: Minister of Defense Volker Ruehe, whose visit is scheduled to take place at the beginning of April; Foreign Minister Affairs Klaus Kinkel; Carl-Dieter Spranger, federal minister of economic cooperation; and Bundestag President Rita Suessmuth.

Romania's relations with Germany are of particular importance within the context in which Germany is broaching relations with the states in the (?Balkan) area pragmatically and indiscriminately, said the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mircea Geoana, to our reporter Eugen Baboi at the end of the talks.

Serb Mortar Shells Fall on Sarajevo Region

AU2303154494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] In the Sarajevo region, sniper fire was registered in the Brijesce district, which was hit from the direction of [Serb-occupied] Rajlovac. Mortar bombs launched from Nedzarici [Serb-occupied western suburb of Sarajevo] fell on Stup and the region of (Lise) was hit with hand grenades and mortars. This has been reported by the Information Service of the 1st Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

Serbs Hijack UN Aid Convoy Heading for Maglaj

AU2303190894 Paris AFP in English 1858 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 23 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb forces Wednesday [23 March] hijacked a 10-truck UN aid convoy headed for the northern town of Maglaj and briefly abducted the drivers, the United Nations said.

The trucks had left Zagreb in the morning with 90 tonnes of food and other relief material and were seized in the Tezlic region southwest of the Moslem city, officials said. The drivers were abducted and held for several hours, and turned up later in the town of Zepce, controlled by Bosnian Croat forces, said Kris Janowski, a spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

"It's a very serious incident," he said. One of the trucks was later recovered but it was empty, he added.

Maglaj received its first aid convoy in five months on Sunday after Serb forces that had been attacking it eased their siege. The town has a population of around 16,000.

Serb Sources Deny Report

LD2303214794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2122 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Banja Luka, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—A UN convoy bound for Maglaj was stopped today near the village of Crna Rijeka west of Novi Seher because the road was mined, we have learned from Srpska republic army sources.

The convoy was stopped and all personnel were warned that the road was mined. The drivers and crew left the vehicles, and the Srpska republic army provided safety for the convoy to avoid the possibility of theft and plunder.

According to Serb military sources, claims published by foreign media that the Srpska army plundered the convoy were incorrect. This is yet another attempt at vilifying and accusing the Serb side of a lack of cooperation, the Srpska republic army sources say.

Karadzic Admits Serbs Responsible

AU2403141594 Paris AFP in English 1345 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 24 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has promised his forces will return nine UN aid-convoy trucks stolen near the northern town of Maglaj, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said Thursday [24 March]. A meeting was scheduled later Thursday in the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale between the head of the UNHCR mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Karin Abu-Zayd, and the separatist republic's vice-president Nikola Koljevic, said UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski.

Karadzic had personally assured UN special representative to ex-Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi the trucks would be returned as soon as possible, Janowski said. Convoys would again start moving from the Croatian capital Zagreb to the Maglaj region once the United Nations obtained security guarantees, he said, adding that convoys however were still leaving from Zenica, in central Bosnia.

The stolen trucks were parked at a Bosnian Serb barracks in Tezlic, southwest of Maglaj, a mainly-Moslem enclave which received its first aid convoy in five months on Sunday after Serb forces eased their siege, the spokesman said.

Rogue Bosnian Serb forces hijacked a 10-truck UN aid convoy taking 94 tonnes of food and other aid to Maglaj on Wednesday near Teslic. Serb soldiers, led by a colonel whom Karadzic said would be punished, threatened the Danish drivers and forced them to abandon the trucks, Jankowski said. The Serbs starting loading the trucks' contents onto civilian trucks, but when it turned out to be a lengthy operation, they stole the trucks, the spokesman said, adding that Serb police guarding the convoy "evaporated." The Danish drivers were abducted, then found a few hours later at Zepce, about 30 kilometers (20 miles) to the south, in a Bosnian Croat-held area. One of the trucks was recovered later, he said.

Jankowski described the theft as a "very serious incident." He said Pale late Wednesday "declared itself quite upset and surprised" at what had happened.

Two UNHCR convoys have reached Maglaj from Zenica and two others from Tesanj, north of Maglaj, since British UN peacekeepers entered the town Sunday. Before that, the town of 16,000 had been supplied for the past five months mainly by air drops. No convoys had been sent in since October, when two Danish drivers of a UNHCR convoy were assassinated as they were entering Maglaj.

Army Responds to Serb Attack on Maglaj

AU2403094794

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 24 March

carries in its regular 7-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the republic.

Describing the situation in Bihac, Mirza Sadikovic says that "Karadzic's terrorists and Abdic's paramilitaries are continuing to cooperate in destroying this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All last night, particularly after midnight, they pounded the defense positions on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, Hasin Vrh, and Barakovac with artillery and tanks. They attempted an infantry breakthrough yesterday evening but our defenders managed to repel it with great effort." He says that "the members of the paramilitary formations of the so-called Kladusa autonomy have been using artillery since yesterday against the Cazin districts of Krivaja, (Liskovac), and (?Prle). They also used chemical agents, and Osa and Zolja portable rocket launchers. This is continuing this morning. They have massacred six members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] Army, and captured several others."

Viktor Boban reports from Maglaj from the theater of operations of the B-H Army Operative Group Bosna that "yesterday evening the Chetniks intensified their attacks on Rujnica, in the region of Zeleni Kamen, and combined it with an attempt at an infantry breakthrough. However, our defenders had no problems repelling this enemy attack." He says that "this morning after 0500 the Chetniks launched a savage artillery and infantry attack on several parts of the Rujnica defense lines. The B-H Army was ready for this attack, and responded with equal ferocity so the valley of the Bosna River is reverberating to heavy explosions. The general alarm has been sounded and the population is in shelters. At the moment of filing this report shells are pounding the town."

The B-H Army 4th Corps Information Service reports that "the cease-fire on the Mostar front over the last 24 hours has not been fully observed. Extremists from the Croatian Defense Council have been less active than over the last few days but they still fired a few grenades from a portable grenade launcher at the demarcation lines in the city. Elsewhere the cease-fire has held."

Croat-Muslim Truce Violated in Mostar

LD2303164794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Excerpt] After more than a month of almost complete calm, a state of general alert was sounded in Mostar at 1544 today. According to the information and monitoring center of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, Muslim snipers from east Mostar have shot one person dead and wounded another in the part of town controlled by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO].

The truce between the HVO and the Muslim army is being honored along all the other separation lines. [passage omitted]

EU Names Civil Administrator

AU2403113194 Paris AFP in English 1121 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Text] Bonn, March 24 (AFP)—Germany is to provide a civil administrator for the war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina town of Mostar on behalf of the European Union, a source close to the nominee confirmed Thursday [24 March].

The Social Democrat (SPD) former mayor of Bremen, Hans Kochnick, has been named by the European Union in agreement with the German government, SPD foreign affairs official Karsten Voigt told AFP.

Voigt said it had been envisaged for some time to send Kochnick to the town as its administrator, and this was set to materialise "as peace slowly comes to Bosnia-Herzegovina".

DER SPIEGEL magazine reported a month ago that a German civil administrator was to be sent to Mostar, and would be assisted in restoring public services by German police and civil servants.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl said Wednesday that he favoured Germany taking a role in reconstruction efforts in former Yugoslavia.

'Fierce' Inter-Muslim Clashes in Western Bosnia

LD2303180194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1754 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Petrovac, March 23 (TANJUG)—Fierce inter-Moslem battles in the Bihac-Cazin region (Moslem enclave in western Bosnia) continued on Wednesday and the command of troops loyal to the Sarajevo Moslem authorities admitted that the fighting so far left about 500 dead and 2,000 wounded Moslems. This is the first time that forces of radical Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic admitted to sustaining heavy losses both in manpower and weaponry in the battles with the Moslems of the autonomous province of western Bosnia. In western Bosnia the opponents of Izetbegovic clashed last September with the forces loyal to the Sarajevo authorities who were ordered to use all means to curb the new autonomy. The new province's media reports that the army of the province's president, Fikret Abdic, is slowly advancing towards Liskovac, Krivaja and Trsce without suffering any losses while Izetbegovic's troops are sustaining heavy losses. Moslem Sarajevo Radio confirmed these reports and added that the fighting is spreading to the other border area in the Cazin region and that all types of weapons are in use.

Over the past 24 hours, Izetbegovic's troops in the region of Bihac, western Bosnia, opened sporadic fire on Serb positions along the entire frontline, Bosnian Serb military sources said. According to them, the Serbs did not have any casualties and did not return fire. The Moslem

forces in the region of Doboj, northern Bosnia, continued offensive amd provocative actions on Serb positions and settlements, the Bosnian Serb military sources said.

The Moslem troops were especially agressive in the southwestern Trebava front (northeast of Doboj) where they attempted to penetrate Serb defence lines. Similar to the previous nine attacks in the past week, the latest one was unsuccessful.

Reopening of Sarajevo Roads 'Jeopardized'

AU2203212894 Paris AFP in English 2118 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] Sarajevo, March 22 (AFP)—Plans to ease the siege of Sarajevo further by opening roads out of the city have been jeopardized at the last minute by both the Serb and Moslem sides, the United Nations said Tuesday. It did not elaborate. Two roads leading out of Sarajevo are due to re-open Wednesday: one leading to central Bosnia, one to the south. The bridge linking the city to the Serb-held suburb of Grbavica is also due to open, as is a road between two Serb-held suburbs, Lukavica et Ilidza. The routes were to be opened for limited civilian traffic. But UN Protection Force [United Nations Protection Force] spokesman Major Simon MacDowell said unspecified problems were threatening the moves. The "difficulties are coming from both sides," he said, giving no further details.

The nearly two-year Serb siege of the city eased last month when the Serbs gave in to a NATO ultimatum and removed many heavy weapons that had been ringing Sarajevo. But on Monday, UN forces found Serb heavy weapons including tanks, anti-aircraft guns and mortars inside the NATO-imposed exclusion zone around Sarajevo. MacDowell said the find made by Canadian troops late Sunday was a "big violation" of the NATO demilitarization plan. MacDowell said Tuesday that civilian affairs representative Diyan Milov met Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic Tuesday evening, and subsequently travelled to Lukavica.

Muslims Continuing Attacks on Serb Positions

LD2403135794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1333 GMT 24 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Brcko, March 24 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslem units continued Thursday attacks from heavy infantry weapons on the Serb positions in the Brcko region, northeast Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian Serb military sources have reported.

There were stronger armed provocations during the night of Wednesday-Thursday by Moslem and Croat forces against the Serb defence lines on other war zones in the Sava River region. Provocations ceased after the Bosnian Serb army responded.

The Bosnian Serb military sources also reported that, besides infantry weapons, the Bosnian Moslem forces used mortars and anti-aircraft guns in their attacks on the Serb positions in the Teslic, Doboj and Mt Ozren war zones.

Moslem forces' attempt to infiltrate commando-reconnaissance teams behind the Serb positions in the Mt Ozren area was foiled by the Bosnian Serbs.

UN Decision To Send Turkish Troops Condemned

LD2403125094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1212 GMT 24 Mar 94

[By Dusan Zupan]

[Text] Belgrade, March 24 (TANJUG)—A report from the United Nations that the Security Council agrees to Turkey's sending its troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina unavoidably arouse associations on the stories about a goat which is supposed to watch over the cabbage and a wolf which is supposed to protect the sheep.

Such lack of sensitivity on the part of the U.N., which is sending to Bosnia-Herzegovina troops whose government has long since declared itself clearly on whose side it is, is simply amazing. Turkey has assisted Bosnian Moslems from the first day of their secession—politically, militarily, financially, morally. Turkish war correspondents, have publicly boasted in their papers of having shot at and killed "infidels". If this is so among reporters then what may one expect the Turkish troops might do.

By adopting the stand that Turkey may send troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.N. has broken its own vow that former occupying forces could not be among the U.N. peacekeeping force in a respective country. Turks have been occupiers on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina for full 500 years.

For the Bosnian Moslems, Turkey means incomparably more than Russia does to the Serbs. Even the family of Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic lives in Turkey. On the other side, Russia has never been an occupying force on these territories, nor has its troops impaled the Moslems here. However, as regards the Serbs and Turks—it is different story.

All in all, the U.N. decision, among many others which it took under pressure, testifies about further moral degradation of the world organization. Moral strength has always been its mightiest weapon, now this too is lost.

If the Turks, nevertheless, arrive to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only true balance might be achieved by calling on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to send its troops there too. Everything else looks as poorly veiled hypocrisy the objective of which is to threaten the lives of Serbs and their property, and this not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Strategic Importance of Brcko Front Stressed

AU2403103894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Hamid Deronjic report from Brcko]

[Text] The aggressor has intensified his attacks on the Brcko front, where—since the outbreak of the war—there has been fierce fighting against these Serbian-Montenegrin occupying forces. This morning at 0530 [0430 GMT] the Chetniks launched a fierce artillery and tank attack on the central part of the Brcko defense. From the direction of Cadjavac, the enemy has been firing from tanks and 120-mm mortars, and with antiaircraft guns and machine guns from several positions. This morning's attack on our positions has just been the continuation of what the aggressor was up to on the Brcko front overnight, when the defense lines were exposed to enemy attacks from recoilless guns, mortars, hand grenades, and antiaircraft guns and machine guns. Djukici and the central part of the Brcko defense were the main target of the aggressor's attacks.

The key part of the so-called northern corridor is the reason why the free Brcko territory has been under constant and fierce offensives by the Serbian aggressor ever since the outbreak of the war. That this is not going to end is confirmed by frequent reports on attacks by our forces that can be heard on Radio Bastille [radio bastilja, derogatory term for Belgrade Radio]. This, the central nervous system of Serbian fascism, has been spreading lies about alleged offensives of our units on the temporarily occupied Brcko, and thus calling for a new mobilization of Serbs in the so-called Yugoslavia for the Brcko front.

The alertness and combat readiness of our fighters, and the high morale of all the citizens of the free Brcko territory are in line with the seriousness and importance of the Brcko front.

Serb Convention Supports 'Sovereign' B-H

AU2303220094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] The consultative convention of the Serbian people was held in Tuzla today. The convention adopted the [word indistinct] declaration and elected delegates to the assembly of the Serbian Civic Council, which will be held in Sarajevo on 27 March. Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, attended the meeting. Our correspondent Enes Osmancevic reports on the meeting:

[Begin recording] [Osmancevic] With the genuine feeling of overall affiliation to Bosnia-Herzegovina as an irrefutable historical fact, we voice our reason and spirit against national-fascism expressed in the genocide, which was aimed not only at creating ethnically pure areas but also at destroying basic human values. This is the basic message of the consultative convention of the Serbian people held in Tuzla today, which was attended by Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The fact that we wanted to live on this territory and that we remain living here is the best proof that we did not succumb to Greater Serbia national hysteria. We voice our condemnation of the inspirers and perpetrators of war crimes, it is said in the joint statement of ethnic Serb citizens who attended today's convention.

Rejecting, as he put it, all forms of tribal loyalty to Karadzic, Koljevic, and Plavsic, (Miso) Bozic expressed the stand that was accepted as the basis for the statement by Tuzla delegates to the forthcoming Sarajevo convention. It reads as follows: We accept joint life in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent, sovereign, united state within its internationally recognized borders, which was for centuries adorned by a multinational and multicultural character.

Addressing the people present, Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, proposed the following:

[Pejanovic] [Words indistinct] halting of all military activities and offensives on the part of the Serbian side with the decisive pressure by the international community to control a cease-fire and peace in all points [words indistinct].

Second, we demand that the Serbian side be included in negotiations on an overall peaceful solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina under the auspices of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, other countries, and all other factors participating in determining our destiny.

Third, we think that the federal [word indistinct] setup based on cantons is a basis for reaching a global solution for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is really involved is a slight modification of the well-known Vance-Owen plan, which was not given full support (?then) in the given historical situation. In our opinion, that is one of the best solutions that keeps the wholeness of Bosnia-Herzegovina and enables equality of the peoples, as well as self-assurance [samobitnost] and cultural autonomy.

Fourth, we think that Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a joint state of equal peoples, in its wholeness within internationally recognized borders, according to the Republican Presidency's platform on the work under war conditions, has economic, cultural, and national interests of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.

Fifth, we propose that it is in the ultimate interest of all peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina join the union of European countries and thereby ensure its economic and cultural prosperity and restoration [words indistinct] interests in Europe. [applause]

Sixth, I propose to demand that the Serbian Civic Council take part in negotiations with the international

community on the political future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian Civic Council will be constituted in Sarajevo on Sunday [27 March] as the proponent of the interests of ethnic Serbian citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina who favor a just peace, the equality of peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, civil and human rights, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in its historical and internationally recognized borders. [applause]

[Osmancevic] Supporting the assembly of ethnic Serb citizens which, as was said, together with the Pan-Bosniak convention and the assembly of Croats, is striving toward a full respect for human and civil rights, which are a prerequisite of a modern democratic society in which national, cultural, religious, and other characteristics of all citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be respected, cherished, and admired, the Serb People's Convention held in Tuzla today has elected delegates to the Sarajevo assembly, where the Serbian Civic Council will be constituted. [end recording]

Assembly Deputies Discuss Washington Document

AU2303202794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Deputies of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly who are in Sarajevo held a meeting today that dealt with organizing an assembly meeting for Monday, 28 March, and issues connected to the Washington agreement regarding the work of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly. Senada Cumurovic has the details:

[Begin recording] [Cumurovic] At the beginning of today's meeting, Assembly Secretary Avdo Campara announced that the assembly meeting will be held on Monday, 28 March. Deputies of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliament will be able to express their views on the documents of the Washington agreement and adopt decisions on the future work of the assembly. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic will speak at the assembly meeting on the political elements of the Washington agreement, while the expert portion will be expounded upon by Kasim Trnka, minister of the judiciary.

In the second part of today's meeting, Dr. Trnka briefed the assembly deputies on the section of the Washington agreement that applies to the future work and setup of the assembly, pointing out that two significant (?aims) have been broached in the chapter on transient provisions: Bosnia-Herzegovina's international subjectivity and the internal continuity of institutions, especially the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since there is a possibility that the 28 March meeting could turn into a constitutional assembly, Minister Trnka expounded on this possibility:

[Trnka] This means that during the debate about the proffered documents, the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina may in fact turn into a constitutional assembly, which consists of deputies of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly elected in the 1990 elections whose term of office is still valid. This assembly would function as a constitutional assembly. One should take care not to [words indistinct] that the constitution is adopted in a way that the consensus of deputies who feel as Croats and the deputies who feel as Bosniaks be devalued. However, this national consensus is not sufficient. What is also needed is a two-thirds majority of the overall number of deputies. This in fact means that all other deputies have the same right to vote.

If this constitution, which is for the time being only a proposal [words indistinct] political agreement, is adopted, then the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly will continue its work having two functions—as the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which is going to continue to adopt decisions concerning the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its international relations and the Assembly of the Federation, whose competences encompass only the territory that is, by definition, populated by the majority Bosniak and Muslim population and, regarding its factual borders, (?when borders are definitely established) in the talks with the third side and in the talks about canonization of this federation.

[Cumurovic] After providing an explanation, Dr. Kasim Trnka answered several questions from the deputies. Questions focused on, for example, how the occupied part of Bosnia-Herzegovina is defined in the agreement and who is supposed to pay war reparations. Dr. Trnka said that the agreement used the term of the territory with the majority Serbian population and as for war reparations, they are to be reimbursed by the state. [Words indistinct] establish the ways how to obtain the funds.

The deputies today were informed that (Nazim Koledar) has been released from the camp, while Irfan Ajanovic is still (?detained). Concerning this, as well as some other cases, the Human Rights commission will meet and discuss the release of prisoners according to the already reached agreements.

Serbs Contemplate Joining Federation

AU2303212094 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Mar 94 p 10

[Report by Branka Mitrovic: "Softened, Calculating, or Maladjusted"]

[Text] *"The Srpska republic will endeavor to adjust its interests to the general situation."*

This short sentence, stated by Radovan Karadzic after his latest meeting with Vitaliy Churkin, with whom he exchanged opinions about the further course of the peace process, means that the latest initiative made by Washington and Moscow for finding a settlement of the Bosnian conflict without Serb participation will soon fail. Still, the initiative inevitably raises the question of

whether the Serbs will know how to make good use of that general situation, without losing much. That question is bothering Karadzic, who has been put under pressure, on one hand by flexible, ready-to-discuss-everything Milosevic, as Churkin describes him, and, on the other hand, by his own army, and for the greatest part by Ratko Mladic and the citizens of the Srpska republic themselves, who are unanimous in the attitude that the aforementioned flexibility is leading directly toward a defeat!

As the majority of Serbs believe, since the beginning of the war the Bosnian Serbs have not been asked for their opinion on any issue, particularly when the idea was born in Washington that Croats and Muslims should be forced to agree to a joint state. In the first moment, precisely for that reason, the Serbs refused any talks about possibly joining with the Croatian-Muslim federation, while the same attitude was held by the leadership of the Srpska republic.

Having decided that the whole story is about the establishment of a military alliance that will look forward to aiming its artillery at the other bank of Drina River, of course, supported by the foreign assistance, the leadership in Pale quickly started to contemplate how to protect itself, without once more provoking the superior force in the sky. Aleksa Buha [Srpska foreign minister] was happy to substantiate why their apprehensions are not merely a kind of phobia. He has noticed that, in Split, Generals Ante Roso and Rasim Kadic hurried to sign the agreement on the federal army, even though the Constitution of the new Muslim-Croatian state was far from having a definite shape. At the same time, Buha reminds us that the agreement on the military alliance signed by Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic still exists. Therefore he told Churkin, just as Karadzic and Nikola Koljevic had done, that he could feel free to inform Washington that the Srpska republic would not start solving any issue without having previously signed a peace agreement with the new federation, because, at the latest talks in Vienna it had been said that the federation of Croats and Muslims should take in as much as 60 percent of the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What Is the Next Step?

Nevertheless, the Bosnian Serbs still started to adjust themselves to the situation, thinking: What is the next step?

So that the first thing that Karadzic actually faced was the demand that the Serbs should make certain concessions. To the surprise of many people, Karadzic immediately said he was ready to cede around 16 percent of the territory under the control of the Bosnian Serbs. However, both Washington and Moscow made it clear to him that he is supposed to soften up his attitude even more, and in that respect, nothing is more successful than applying pressure.

After having resolutely refused to even discuss the possibility of the Srpska republic merging with the new Muslim-Croat federation, that is, with its enemies, the leadership from Pale quickly changed its mind. They decided that Serbs should get down to talks and negotiations, because the final legalization of the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina still has its good side: It opens the way for the Serbs toward the final union with Yugoslavia. However, this story will as well be paved with huge stumbling blocks. The U.S. officials quickly invented a new trick. They sent the message to Serbs that, if they were to keep the entire 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Washington might easily enforce the lifting of the arms embargo against the Croats and Muslims. As an additional means of pressure, Washington sent Churkin to the Srpska republic a couple of times, to make the Serbs even more pliable. On the other hand, although the Russian UN soldiers were given a euphoric welcome in Pale, Karadzic is more than aware that Churkin will not be pursuing exclusively pro-Serbian politics, although Moscow has been somewhat better disposed to their Orthodox brothers in recent times. With obvious interest, and perhaps even surprise, Karadzic listened to Momcilo Krajisnik telling him about Churkin's proposal, according to which all the peoples in former Yugoslavia should join in an association, whereas the association should involve various forms of association.

Encouraged by what they heard, as Buha puts it, the Bosnian Serbs have immediately made clear to Churkin that they cannot give up their rights, which have been allowed for the Croats and Muslims—the right to form their state from ethnic cantons, and also to enter confederation with Croatia. Because, if the Bosnian Croats want a connection with their mother-country, the same desires and rights must be observed and allowed to the other party, so nobody should oppose these arguments and this logic. According to the Pale officials, Churkin has expressed his support for this proposal, and if Washington were to do the same, then the negotiators would find themselves on the same wavelength.

World Against the Unification

Still, the international community is more inclined to add the Srpska republic to the new federation than to allow its union with Yugoslavia. It has been openly stated that Pale will be much better off if it sticks to the federal Bosnia. The Serbs will cede a percentage of territories under their control, otherwise, if they go for a union with Yugoslavia, all of Posavina [the Sava River basin] will be taken away from them (the Serbs would lose the corridor, while the connection with other Serbian countries would be cut), as well as the enclaves in eastern Bosnia. However, if the Serbs are flexible enough, that is to say, if they join the federation, a corridor connecting them with other Serb lands 10 kilometers wide (Karadzic demands 50 kilometers) would be given to them, and they would also be allowed to keep some predominantly Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia that are now under their control.

It is clear to Karadzic that it is impossible to return all the territories in northern and eastern Bosnia to the Croats and Muslims, for a simple reason: The land has been devastated and the people displaced. It is clear to him that he will have to agree to a corridor connecting the Muslim enclaves with the new, Vienna-made federation. It is also clear to him that Washington and Moscow will first require the Croats and Muslims to determine which territories they would accept as final, because they cannot have the desired 60 percent, and also that very soon, given the mixture of concessions and threats, he will be forced into negotiations and further compromises. As for the aforementioned adjustment to the general situation, which was made possible for Karadzic by a sort of timeout, which also included the consultations with Belgrade, a part of that process is also the announcement of the forthcoming meeting of the assembly of the Srpska republic. As we have discovered, at the meeting the possible territorial concessions will be discussed again, as well as certain staff changes. Well-informed sources claim that those changes apply even to the military top brass itself!

Whether that will mean that Karadzic has been softened enough remains to be seen. Besides, it will also become clearer how large a piece of Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serbs intend to keep for themselves. The only certain thing right now is that they would not mind joining the Muslim-Croatian federation (such comments were heard after the talks with Churkin), if they could also form a kind of confederation with Yugoslavia at the same time.

Aims, Problems of Washington Agreement

AU2103134594 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 18-25 Mar 94 p 1

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "The Grand Design"]

[Text] The political and media interpretations of the Washington agreement are going through a real turmoil. The agreement was initially presented as a triumph of U.S. diplomacy, then it was used as confirmation that peace in Bosnia was a fait accompli, and in the past few days the affair got an unusual epilogue. The majority of analysts now see in the U.S. plan for Bosnia a return to the old theme of division of spheres of interest, while some even see it as a return to the Cold War. The sequence of such different interpretations of one and the same fact shows what the capital sum and what the interest rate might be in this game.

The United States does not have a clear goal in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because if it had one, it would already have achieved it. The events surrounding the Washington agreement only confirm the continuity of its inconsistency and controversial actions. Clinton has come up with a winning combination, yet he is now behaving like a chess player who has overlooked an entire chess piece. The chess piece is called Russia. That is why the U.S. President is sending Warren Christopher to Vladivostok where an agreement on division of work in Bosnia should be reached. The West wants the war to end so that the two-year public pressure on its governments finally stops. On the other hand, correspondents from Moscow report on Russia's firm intention of actually reasserting its presence in the Balkans through Bosnia. This is not yet proof that history is repeating itself, but we should not forget that certain ideas often outlive history itself.

The Balkan peoples cannot seem to be able to grow up. The reason lies both in them and in those who are squabbling over them and their countries. For over a hundred years three or four superpowers have been regulating affairs in these areas, but all of their experiments and creations have failed, and have dragged them into catastrophe. It was always others who made Bosnia's past tragic, regardless of whether they came from its eastern or western borders. Nowadays we are witnessing an attempt to end the tragedy caused by the Serbian aggression with a plan that has probably never been implemented anywhere. The Washington agreement will perhaps bring peace between the Croats and the Muslims, but it in itself will not preserve the Bosnian state within the existing borders. For Bosnia to survive, someone needs to cool the nationalist blood in Belgrade and Zagreb.

Agreement on certain theoretical principles was reached swiftly and easily at the Vienna negotiations about the Muslim-Croat federation. This was proclaimed to be a great success, and was mathematically expressed with the claim that only 5 percent of concurrence was still needed in order for it to be a complete triumph. It became evident, however, that precisely this "5 percent" represents the essence of things and the essence of the conflict. Everything would probably be different had this project originated in Bosnia and not in Washington. Whenever others had designs on the Bosnians, the Bosnians ended up being beheaded. According to this historical experience, we must count on the temporary character of this latest sartorial model.

Croats Prepare for Constitutional Assembly

LD2303160594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Political representatives of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are making preparations for the forthcoming assembly sessions which will determine the future of this republic. Zdenko Vranjes reports from Mostar for Croatian Radio:

[Vranjes] The leadership of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and Croat deputies are carrying out preparations for two forthcoming sessions—important sessions indeed—of the chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna scheduled for Saturday and the historic constitutional [ustavotvoran] assembly of federal Bosnia-Herzegovina which is expected to take place in Sarajevo on Monday and Tuesday. Kresimir Zubak [president of the presidential council of Herceg-Bosna] has told Croatian Radio the following:

[begin recording] [Zubak] [words indistinct] this session of the constitutional assembly scheduled for Monday 28 March. We have scheduled, prior to this, a session of the chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna at which we should inform the deputies about the documents we adopted in Washington and prepared in Vienna.

All deputies to the chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna are also deputies to the constitutional assembly. This assembly of Herceg-Bosna is going to formulate final standpoints and instruct the deputies at the session of the constitutional assembly on Monday and Tuesday.

[Vranjes] Will all the deputies from the ranks of the Croat people take part in the constitutional assembly in Sarajevo on Monday? Has this been prepared and agreed yet?

[Zubak] All technical details relating to this have not been agreed yet. I believe that today or tomorrow we will agree on every technical detail. We are of the opinion that all the deputies from the ranks of the Croat people who were deputies to the former assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be present and vote. It is a known fact that a constitution may be adopted by a consensus of two peoples. [end recording] [passage omitted]

UNHCR Aid Convoy Leaves for Tuzla

LD2303184894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1807 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Zvornik, March 23 (TANJUG)—A convoy of the U.N. High Commessariat for Refugees (UNHCR) on Wednesday crossed the territory of the Bosnian Serb republic (RS) on its way for Moslem-held Tuzla, north-east Bosnia, Bosnian Serb military sources in Zvornik said.

The 13 truck convoy was carrying 104 tonnes of flour.

Another relief aid convoy was also scheduled to leave for Tuzla, but the UNHCR team failed to return from a previous humanitarian mission, the Zvornik authorities were told.

Bosnian Serb military sources said that the fact that since their very start the humanitarian land convoys for Tuzla have crossed Bosnian Serb territory safely and unhindered, gives rise for doubts in the humanitarian reasons for the opening of the Tuzla airport.

The sources said that the land routes enable the efficient ferrying of much bigger quantities of relif aid to Tuzla than via the air bridge.

Tudjman Stresses Extending UNPROFOR Mandate

LD2103222694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 21 Mar 94

[Press statement by President Franjo Tudjman following meetings and talks with ambassadors of UN Security Council members in New York on 21 March—recorded]

[Text] We have, understandably, discussed, both with the UN secretary general and the UN Security Council, above all the extension of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] mandate in the new climate created by the signing of the Washington agreement on the Croat-Muslim federation and a confederation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. We voiced some criticism, but it is important in these new circumstances to have UNPROFOR's mandate redefined so that it can start implementing the Vance plan and the UN Security Council resolutions.

In this context we drew attention to priority tasks such as border controls between Serbia and Croatia, the disarmament of those Serb paramilitary formations—since there is no peace without this—the return of refugees, and the restoration of communications. We have also pointed out the willingness of the Croatian Government to take the necessary confidence-building steps and to guarantee all human rights as well as territorial self-government to the Serb ethnic community in the Knin area, the Glina and Knin districts where before the war, according to the 1991 census, the Serb population was in the majority.

Let me add that I listened with a great deal of satisfaction to almost all the members of the UN Security Council who reiterated the support of their governments for the territorial integrity of the internationally recognized borders of Croatia and their readiness to define in future UNPROFOR's mandate so that, as I said, it can carry out its task. Without a solution of the UN-protected zones in Croatia, there can be no stable, no final peace in Bosnia- Herzegovina. By signing the Washington agreement we took a huge step toward peace, but this is also why the question of the UN-protected zones in Croatia should also be resolved. Thank you.

Sets Conditions

LD2103234694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2310 GMT 21 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] New York, March 21 (TANJUG)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman told the United Nations Security Council on Monday that Croatia would accept an extension of the UNPROFOR mandate provided the U.N.-protected area of the republic of Serb Krajina be incorporated into Croatia.

Next week, U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali is to ask the Security Council to extend the mandate of the U.N. protection force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), which is due to expire on March 31, for another year.

Speaking at a session held behind closed doors, Tudjman said that the argument that a framework for a comprehensive political solution to the problem of this UNPA [UN protected area] has yet to be found no longer stands. He said that the political framework had been precisely set through the international recognition of the Republic of Croatia and its outside borders.

The argument which no longer stands is one of the points of the plan made by international mediator Cyrus Vance, under which Krajina was proclaimed an UNPA in the spring of 1992 and according to which peace-keepers have been deployed there.

The republic of Serb Krajina was proclaimed by Serbs in their ethnic and historical territories in Croatia in answer to the forcible secession of this former Yugoslav Republic from the former Yugoslavia and the degradation of their civil and national rights by the Croatian authorities.

Despite the fact that Krajina is an UNPA, Croatia attacked it four times, as Butrus-Ghali himself said in a report for the Security Council, in attempts to reinstate its authority there by force.

Tudjman said that Croatia was suffering huge economic losses because of the current situation in the UNPA and that it could not tolerate the "inefficiency" of the UNPROFOR indefinitely.

Tudjman set out that the only matter that could be discussed was the degreee of autonomy for the Serb population in areas where they were the majority before 1992. He said that this meant only the districts of Knin and Glina.

The Krajina population has held two referendums so far and opted against reintegration into Croatia? Krajina President Milan Martic on Sunday said that Krajina Serbs would not yield their right to self-determination.

Tudjman urged the quick return of refugees to the UNPA and said, in threatening tones, that Croatia would not be able to prevent thousands of refugees from trying to return to their homes if they could no longer control their desperation.

Croatia fears that this could have undesired consequences on the peace process which is underway, Tudjman said, in an evident desire to find an alibi for possible future Croatian attacks on the republic of Serb Krajina.

RSK Foreign Minister Statement on Negotiations

LD2303145294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1340 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Knin, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—Following Serb-Croat talks in Zagreb, Slobodan Jarcevic, minister of foreign affairs of the republic of Serb Krajina, described in a statement to TANJUG the fact that both sides had given guarantees that they would not try to resolve their problems on the battlefield as the most important outcome of the talks.

Both Krajina and Croatia lodged guarantees to this effect with the mediators: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin; U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith; and Kai Aide and Geert Ahrens, cochairmen of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia.

Jarcevic said that there was a possibility that next Tuesday, 29 March, an agreement would be signed, but only on an end to clashes and hostilities. He described this as the main goal of the negotiations. All other issues of common interest will be put on the agenda later.

He said that no pressure was put on either of the sides during the negotiations and that the mediators were there to help, but with a clear message that the world had had enough of war and bloodshed.

The mediators stressed that it was up to the opposing sides to decide on how to regulate their future relations, but this is an issue for political negotiations and was not mentioned in Zagreb, Jarcevic said.

Reports 'Good Results'

AU2303192094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1545 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Interview with Slobodan Jarcevic, foreign minister of the republic of Serbian Krajina and head of the Krajina delegation at the negotiations in Zagreb, by Dragoljub Stankic in Knin on 23 March—recorded]

[Text] [Stankic] Good day, Mr. Jarcevic.

[Jarcevic] Good day.

[Stankic] How did the talks at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb go, and have any results been achieved?

[Jarcevic] The biggest result lies in the fact that the negotiations have begun and are being held in the building of the Russian Federation in Zagreb.

We have achieved several good results. The first is that the delegation of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] went to Zagreb and that the fear that is always hanging over us whenever we go somewhere has disappeared because the RSK delegation does not necessarily have to betray the interests of its people and its state, even if it travels to Zagreb. It can hold talks with the Croatian authorities on an equal footing.

Another important fact is that we heeded the demands of the two biggest powers—the Russian Federation and the United States—to meet with the Croatian representatives in the Russian Federation's building, because these two countries said that the world community is fed up with the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and that they are inviting us to come to the negotiating table because they want to see the end of hostilities, they want to see peace, and that after that relations between the RSK and Croatia normalize.

They guaranteed that in this way they would prejudice the political solution and that they are not interested at all in the kind of life the ethnic communities of the former Yugoslavia would establish in the future. They asked us to believe that they sincerely want to help us stop the suffering of all peoples. We accepted this message and went to Zagreb.

[Stankic] The end of hostilities and the cease-fire assume a clear demarcation line. Did you discuss this?

[Jarcevic] The line of demarcation was the main topic of our talks. You know we are talking about a border of some 1,600 kilometers. Because the border of such a length is varied, it was not easy to agree on one simple principle that could be applied on every kilometer of the border. This is so because in some places the border passes through populated areas, in other places it is near populated places, in some places it is near industrial plants, or goes over the fields rich with ore or oil. It is particularly interesting that the border passes near Jasenovac [World War II camp], which is a sacred place for the Serbian people. For these reasons, we could not apply a single principle.

The greatest part of the talks were spent looking for possibilities to meet the demands of the Croatian side in some areas, and the demands of the Serbian side in other places. I think that we have come to the conclusion that in withdrawing our armies, we should apply symmetry. This means that when we require their withdrawal for no more than 100-200 meters, we will give the same opportunity to the Croats to require our withdrawal where they need it. I think that this is one of the most important results of the talks held yesterday.

Furthermore, it is also important that the Croatian delegation has given us guarantees that they would no longer use the military means to accomplish the programs of their government, but that, regarding relations with the RSK, they will do it only through negotiations.

[Stankic] Since you are talking about the military means, we should also say something about the interpretation, about how the borders are set in the areas in which the Army of Croatia has invaded the territory of Krajina.

[Jarcevic] Of course, had it not been for the parts which the Croatian Army had occupied, there would be no problems and we would have most certainly signed an agreement yesterday on the cease-fire and the end of hostilities. It is in fact in these territories that we are

experiencing the greatest problems. We returned to Knin to consult the government and other authoritative bodies in the RSK. One of the reasons as to why the negotiations could not continue is the imprecisely drawn position of both armies on the maps provided by the United Nations Protection Forces [UNPROFOR]. Moreover, UNPROFOR showed these maps to both delegations only shortly before the meeting began. This is why we need seven days to study the maps and to mark the actual situation on the line separating the two armies.

[Stankic] It was also decided at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb to continue the talks.

[Jarcevic] The talks will continue and this is a good sign that the RSK has been accepted as an equal partner in talks with the Republic of Croatia, especially since we were brought to the negotiating table by the two biggest powers in the world—the United States and the Russian Federation. In addition, the talks were also attended by the deputies of the cochairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, top UNPROFOR officials, and representatives of the European observer mission.

Let me again repeat that no one exerted pressure on the RSK delegation. We held the talks in a relaxed atmosphere that was not disturbed by anything.

Talks To Resume 29 Mar

AU2303160694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] On his return to Knin, Slobodan Jarcevic, member of the delegation of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] at the negotiations in Zagreb and foreign minister, held a news conference. Jarcevic said that both sides agreed not to mention the possible political solutions during the talks and to discuss only a cease-fire and the end of hostilities. Dragoljuib Stankic reports from Knin:

[Stankic] The main reasons why the RSK delegation had accepted the invitation to take part in the negotiations is the desire of the Serbian side that peace be established and hostilities end. This was stated by Foreign Minister Slobodan Jarcevic at the beginning of the news conference, adding the following:

[Begin Jarcevic recording] Messrs. Vital Churkin and the U.S. ambassador guaranteed us that they would exert their influence on the Government of the Republic of Croatia so that it no longer resorts to arms and crosses the border that has been established between the RSK and Croatia with the agreement reached in Geneva on 23 November of 1991, and whose lines were confirmed by the agreement in Sarajevo on 3 January 1992. [end recording]

[Stankic] According to Jarcevic, the negotiations in Zagreb were not prepared in the best possible way, because both sides only acquainted themselves with the proposed maps on their arrival in the Russian Embassy. Considering that the border of some 1,600 kilometers is running through many villages and towns, and that there are many disputed facts, both delegations need to consult their governments so that the interests could be articulated in a much better way at the new negotiations.

Thus, the talks have not been broken, but will resume next Tuesday [29 March]. At this meeting, new maps will be presented. These, as Jarcevic said, will not deviate even one meter from the real situation on the ground.

Journalists' questions mainly referred to the possible political solutions. Slobodan Jarcevic said several times that this was not discussed. He mentioned the resolve to finally establish peace as the most important result of the talks yesterday.

Tudjman Appoints Adviser, Military Chiefs

LD2403143194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman today decided to appoint Professor Djordje Pribicevic as special adviser to the president of the republic. President Tudjman has also relieved Major General Slobodan Praljak, the head of the military office of the president of the republic, of his duties, because he is taking up the duties of head of the Croatian Information and Culture Center.

The president has appointed Maj. Gen. Zvonimir Cervenko, the hitherto deputy chief of general staff for the Home Guard, as head of the military office. President Tudjman has decided to relieve Brigadier Drago Krpina, head of the political department of the Ministry for Defense of his duties and demote him to reserve service. Brigadier Ivan Tolj has been appointed to this post.

Prime Minister on Economy, Refugees, War

PM2303161594 Madrid ABC in Spanish 17 Mar 94 p 46

[Interview with Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic by Jose Ramiro Villapadierna in Zagreb; date not given]

[Text] Zagreb—He has been working 18 hours per day since he took office. He insists that he is not a politician but a businessman, insists on his being allowed to work, and insists that "I never grant interviews," because the economy or the war "are very important matters to be summarized and then interpreted well." He has governed under the pressure from the lobby of the Croats of Herzegovina, and, despite his successes, he wants everything to be over soon so that he can return to the world of business.

[Villapadierna] Does the communist system still weigh heavily, with the streets full of people at 1100?

[Valentic] People are not only on the streets instead of working; we also have the highest percentage of pensioners in Europe. The change with respect to communism is that we make sure of our resources before spending them; previously, they used to spend and then look for somebody to pay. In situations of severe inflation of around 10,000 percent per year, everybody can be businessmen, but the burden falls on the people who are increasingly poor. It is always easier to make the currency rise artificially on the black market and thereby meet your losses than dismiss 20 percent of the workers, buy new technology, and be competitive. This process will take around 10 years; bear in mind that Germany has been investing in its eastern part for four years, and they have not resolved more than 20 percent [sentence as published].

[Villapadierna] How much are you spending on arms and on receiving refugees?

[Valentic] We have 600,000 refugees—that is, 15 percent of our population—in the free part of Croatia, since the other 25 percent remains occupied; even this part has also been largely ruined. Tourism, which was our economic mainstay (between 3 billion and 4 billion [currency unspecified]), has also been destroyed, as has the energy system. We have had to raise 6 billion German marks [DM] in foreign debt, because Belgrade took all the Yugoslav reserves. I will not conceal the expenditure from you, although it is before parliament. Out of a budget of DM5.2 billion, around 35 percent is for defense, which is not excessive for being at war, and 20 percent is taken up by caring for the hundreds of thousands of refugees. Just imagine: If these resources were earmarked for restructuring the economy, Croatia would be reborn in two years.

[Villapadierna] When can the former Yugoslavia's property held by Belgrade be shared out?

[Valentic] Some far-off day; Yugoslavia will not join the normal economic systems, and Serbia, for its part, will do all that it can to delay settlements. Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are involved, and some day Serbia will have to give in. We know very well each republic's share of the social product; Croatia's was 27 percent. The problem is that the Serbs will spend everything; they are spending even the part which is frozen.

[Villapadierna] With the Bosnian federation, have you not handed the plan's destruction to Karadzic on a platter? It is sufficient for the Serbs to say that they accept, only for the Croats then to withdraw, and it will all be over.

[Valentic] You are right to say that the Serbs have the decisive say. A federation with them or without them will not be the same thing. To be honest, the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most complex and crucial of the present-day world, but, indisputably, there is always a solution in politics; normally, it is the least bad.

[Villapadierna] Will Bosnia be divided?

[Valentic] This war is drawing to a close. At last, four forces—the United States, Russia, the Islamic world, and the European Union—are coming together for this to end. To be specific, there are two options: One is for the Serbs to agree to join the Bosnian federation; the other is for them to say "no," and in that event the Muslims and Croats would federate in order then to confederate with Croatia. There are many nuances, but there is only one thing clear: We will effect no kind of integration reminiscent of the former Yugoslavia, nor does any of the powers believe so now.

[Villapadierna] When will Croatia join the Council of Europe?

[Valentic] There are some terms which Croatia has had to fulfill: I believe that we have done so and that some criticisms are unfair; a country which is emerging from communism and at the same time is at war cannot resolve everything in two years. Despite the war, I believe that we have made considerable progress in the freedom of the press, as in other areas of the law; we have all the attributes for joining the Council of Europe.

[Villapadierna] Your monetary policy has ended the depreciation and inflation, but everybody believes that it is an artificial situation.

[Valentic] Monetary policy is conducted by the Bank of Croatia, although this forms part of a whole economic strategy. Over the past few months we have had a zero inflation rate. There is a coherent combination of wages, financial policy, and the restructuring of the entire communist economy. We have eliminated the price disparities inherited from communism and introduced the tax system which is standard in the West; this has increased the state budget by around 50 percent, and the latter has seen its deficit fall by DM1 billion. We have launched the restructuring of the economy, privatization has been accelerated, small stockholders have begun to receive their dividends, taxes have been cut, the average wage has risen from DM100-200 to around DM400 at present... When I opted for free convertibility, everybody deemed me a madman, but I knew the makeup of our exports and opted for opening up.

Martic: Assembly 'Leading State Into Chaos'

AU2303204394 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Statement by Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, on Knin Television on 23 March—recorded]

[Text] Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], today addressed RSK citizens and deputies of the RSK Assembly via Knin Television. Here is Milan Martic's statement that we received from Knin:

[Begin Martic recording] Citizens of the RSK, the current work of the republican parliament, which is primarily characterized by some political divisions and a

one-sided imposition of the coalitions' stands, is leading the state into total chaos and anarchy.

As president of the RSK, I will not allow this. In these exceptionally difficult times for our state, when, in addition to all the other pressures and difficulties, we are achieving significant results on the international political scene, we are encountering obstacles that are exclusively the consequence of such work by the assembly. As president of the republic and the supreme commander of the armed forces, I will not allow the RSK to become a (?battlefield) for political showdowns between political parties [word indistinct].

Citizens of the RSK, fighters, workers, and pensioners, I demand that you raise your voice to remove the obstacles caused by the work of the parliament, to reexamine the mandate you have loaned to some deputies, and to call them to account.

The respected deputies must know that they have been elected by you and that they are only accountable to you and not the political leaders whose dictates they are now implementing.

Political Maneuvering Seen in RSK Resignations

AU2303185694 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Mar 94

[Report by Milan Cetnik: "Bjegovic's Maneuver"]

[Text] Knin, 22 Mar—A few days ago, during the parliament session, the Krajina Government resigned. What the average television viewer in Knin and Belgrade was able to learn on the basis of news reports is that the assembly "does not like" its government and that Bjegovic's cabinet, insulted and "humiliated," "no longer wants to play the game." However, the fact is that by resigning, Djordje Bjegovic has actually strengthened the position of his government and cabinet, so that at the moment he is virtually irreplaceable.

First, according to the Constitution, once a new parliament is elected, the existing government automatically becomes the caretaker government. Meanwhile, until a new government is elected, the new parliament can remove any member of the government from office. However, when the prime minister resigns, something that prompts the resignation of the entire cabinet, the Constitution prescribes that all the ministers and the prime minister remain in their posts until a new government is elected. Therefore, the government remains in place, and the parliament—which did not elect this government—cannot remove the ministers from their posts.

Bjegovic executed this maneuver with the aid of his close associates, the Benkovac lawyers Radomir Kuzeta (justice minister) and Sava Strbac (secretary of the government). In a statement to TANJUG, Strbac confessed that by resigning, Bjegovic "protected" the members of the government. The government submitted a report on its activities to the parliament as part of the seventh item on the agenda. The eighth item on the agenda was the removal of the information minister. By this time, Bjegovic and his advisers had already come up with the life-saving maneuver—resignation. However, when it was time to tackle the seventh item on the agenda, the prime minister briefly left the assembly hall, the information minister was removed, and the resignation followed.

Therefore, the items on the agenda were switched, and government sources said that Bjegovic had actually sacrificed the unpopular lady (Tanjga was removed from power by a unanimous vote of the parliament), while protecting himself and the remaining ministers!

For three days, the deputies of the parliamentary position (from Babic's and Seselj's parties) and those of the parliamentary opposition (Martic's people and others) tried to outwit each other, certain important decisions were made despite the complaints of the minority that the majority was behaving as the majority, the ministers preached to and praised deputies, and the "position" monitored the procedures like the apple of its eye.... However, it was absolutely clear that the parliamentary session was overshadowed by two people who are not shadows, namely, the two Milans (Martic and Babic), who were watching the live television relay in some unidentified place, and who sporadically used couriers to summon their people (Bjegovic and Kovacevic) for new consultations and new instructions!

In the current distribution of power, it is clear that the president of the republic is far closer to the government than the parliament, and that the parliament is some kind of opposition on the Krajina political scene. Martic has nominated Mikelic, whom he describes as a "prominent political worker" as prime minister designate of the new government. However, the majority of 45 deputies have already rejected him. On the other hand, Babic's party has issued a public statement saying that Mikelic was the man whom, four years ago, Zagreb (Ivica Racan) dispatched to Knin, while today Belgrade is offering him as the savior (?).

Even in the area where accord is necessary and unavoidable (negotiations with the Croatian regime) there remains a distance between the, for the time being, irreconcilable opponents. The parliament has nothing against the Zagreb negotiations, but it has stressed that it is waiting for a report on the basis of which it will either reject or accept the possible decisions reached at the Russian Embassy.

On two occasions yesterday, the majority in the parliament "washed its hands" of the alleged bianco agreement for the Zagreb negotiations. This was first denied by Drago Kovacevic, head of Babic's deputy caucus, and late last night by the parliament chairman, Radical Branko Vojnica, who denied the claims of Knin Television.

Serb Leader Seeks Refugee Protection From Italy

LD2303230494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2248 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, March 23 (TANJUG)—President of the Serb municipality of Zadar Mladen Kalapac on Wednesday asked Italy to protect Serb refugees from this port-city on the Adriatic from the Croatian authorities who are terrorizing them.

In a letter to Italian Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi and Secretary of the National-Social Movement Gianfranco Fini, Kalapac said that he was addressing them on behalf of the 42,000 Serbs banished from Zadar who have met the same fate as Italians did after the Second World War, said the news agency ISKRA of the republic of Serb Krajina.

Zadar and a considerable part of the Dalmatian coast were part of Italy until September 1943.

Zadar is in close proximity to the republic of Serb Krajina which was formed by Serbs in their ethnic and historical lands in Croatia in 1991 in answer to its forcible secession from the former Yugoslavia and the downgrading of their national rights by the Zagreb authorities.

Since the beginning of Croatia's war for secession, 14,000 Serbs have been killed and more than 300,000 banished from this former Yugoslav republic.

Around 10,000 houses belonging to Serbs have been blown up all over Croatia in the past three years.

Special rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Commission Tadeusz Mazowiecki in late February this year accused Croatia of human rights violations and terror over Serbs, especially in the coastal region of Dalmatia.

The Helsinki human rights federation on Wednesday accused Croatia of forcibly evicting over 5,000 people from their flats and physical abuse of citizens, predominantly of Serb nationality.

RSK Accuses Croatia of Dumping Toxic Waste

LD2103161594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1530 GMT 21 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Knin, March 21 (TANJUG)—The republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) has information, detailed maps and documentation confirming that Croatia is depositing nuclear waste and toxic chemicals in western Slavonia, RSK Foreign Minister Slobodan Jarcevic told TANJUG Monday.

Jarcevic said that the deposits were being made on Mt Papuk in an area 35 times 50 kilometers, that is now ethnically cleansed from Serbs, in four locations identified so far: Straza, Tucak, Bilo and Lom.

The RSK was formed in 1991 in parts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia populated by Serbs in response to the Croatian forcible secession from the former Yugoslav Federation and has been a U.N. Protected Area (UNPA) since March 1992.

The RSK Foreign Ministry has conveyed this information to the co-chairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and U.N. member countries that have their troops within the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], Jarcevic said adding that they had not shown any particular interest.

Jarcevic said that the nuclear waste and the poisonous chemicals originate from Germany and are transported through Austria and Hungary.

According to further information Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic has also promised his patrons and the initiators of the new world order locations for depositing their nuclear waste and toxic chemicals on Serb territory stretching from Kupres to Drvar.

It is also reported in Knin that Greece fears that similar engagements were undertaken by the president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov and information about Germany's deposit of its toxic waste in Albania near the border with the F.R. of Yugoslavia has already been partly revealed.

Jansa Comments on Smolnikar Case, Gives Details

AU2303112494 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 22 Mar 94

[Text] We have asked the Slovene Defense Minister [Janez Jansa] to give an opinion about the case. From a longer interview that we broadcast less than an hour ago, here is an excerpt:

[Begin Jansa recording] This matter is not as one-sided as it appears at first sight. Regarding the opinion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one must wait to hear the other side of the story about the work of this ministry. However, there are few things that are definitely questionable in this process and I could express my regret in advance.

Today, yesterday, and indeed ever since the event took place, there has been an internal investigation in our ministry; that is, a chronological reconstruction of this event. I have the initial draft of this reconstruction here and it is perfectly clear to me now, minute by minute, how the events unfolded. There are some important new facts here.

Let me begin with those things that might be questionable. The inquiry will definitely have to determine whether the force used when the car was broken into and so forth was justified. The inquiry will also have to explain about the time that elapsed between the arrest of Mr. Smolnikar and when the information-communications center of the Ljubljana-City Interior Ministry was informed. I must say, however, that the whole affair is not as it was presented yesterday: The police were informed about the detention of this man, who refused to reveal any personal data and, therefore, refused to identify himself, having been arrested receiving certain documents from a military person, and they were asked to take him to a physician, as he had demanded, at 2045. The arrest itself took place at 2020. Therefore, only the time when the man was brought to the Security Headquarters of the Defense Ministry is controversial here.

As I have already said, no procedures were initiated against this man; that is to say, he was not questioned, as he would not even identify himself. He was informed of his rights under Article 50-A of the Internal Affairs Law. The man, in accordance with these rights, demanded to be examined by a physician and requested the presence of a lawyer, which were both complied with. During this time, according to the data from where this event took place, an approximate identification of the man was made; namely, what we knew in advance was confirmed, even though he did not reveal any information about himself. Immediately afterward we tried to hand him over to the civilian police.

Although we requested this twice, it did not happen and that is the only reason why it was the military police who transported him to the physician. [end recording]

Minister Jansa in an interview to our reporter Sandi Frelih expressed regret over the unfortunate event and gave assurances that Mr. Smolnikar was not viciously beaten but merely sustained light injuries in the course of resisting arrest. He said that the events imply the involvement of other state bodies and have a political background.

Interior Ministry Refutes Claims

AU2303170294 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Regarding claims and media reports about the Smolnikar case, the Ministry of Internal Affairs called a news conference today at which it refuted the defense minister's claims that the police did not want to take Milan Smolnikar into custody. The Ministry also shed light on some cases in which the investigation against Defense Ministry employees came to a halt precisely because of the blockade by the Defense Ministry. Gojko Bervar reports:

[Begin recording] [Bervar] Minister Bizjak, Mitja Klavora, the head of the Criminal Police, and State Secretary Borut Likar first armed themselves with a tape of the first contact between the Defense Ministry and the operational communication center of the interior minister in the Smolnikar case. From the tape, one really cannot conclude that it implies rejection. On the contrary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs constantly tried to convince the representatives of the Defense Ministry to take Smolnikar to a police station in Domzale. However, further discussion proved that, at the time of the contact, the members of VOMO [Defense Ministry Security Organ] already had Smolnikar in Kardeljeva Street in Ljubljana [VOMO headquarters] and that they were calling the police, I quote, to avoid a fuss. [no reference to close of quotation as heard]

Mr. Gasper, as a representative of the Defense Ministry identified himself, even said:

[Gasper] The thing is that we should have questioned him a little more.

[Bervar] At the news conference Minister Bizjak said that this was not the first case in connection with Defense Ministry employees. In all these cases, ranging from the suspicion of arms trafficking, some [word indistinct] thefts, suspected embezzlement in Orbis enterprise [manufacturing submachine guns] and even in the well-known cases of the public letter by the Civilian Initiative and the explosives placed under the car of Member of Parliament Jelincic—in all these cases the investigation came to a halt because of the lack of cooperativeness and, in some cases, the prevention of further investigation on the part of the Defense Ministry.

The Interior Ministry first warned the prime minister about all this at the end of last year. They also drafted a special report that, in its conclusion, points at (?ambiguities) in the legislation; however, a meeting that would clarifying everything did not materialize, also because the

acting VOMO director assured Mitja Klavora that he does not have any such instructions from the defense minister.

Ivo Bizjak also dismissed the possibility that any sort of subversive organization would be active within the Ministry and said that there is not the slightest proof for this. Milan Smolnikar is not an employee of the Interior Ministry and all hitherto investigations by the police were within the boundaries of legal procedures, they said at the news conference.

However, they have established the activity of a group of people within the Defense Ministry, consisting of various organizational units of this Ministry, which, besides illegally prescribed tasks on the field, also engages in special tasks that are not the responsibility of this Ministry, some of them precisely in Ljubljana. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Commentary Reviews Case

AU2303112694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Sandi Frelih commentary]

[Text] The balance of power in parliament is such that an interpellation is possible. It has been anticipated for a long time, and there is good reason for it. However, it will not be the arguments that will decide on this. This is how Defense Minister Janez Jansa assessed the rumors about an interpellation over the Smolnikar case. We can agree with everything except the minister's last statement.

In an interview with our radio station he himself admitted that the preliminary results of the internal investigation have shown that some things are controversial, namely the justification of the use of force and incursion into a personal vehicle by camouflaged special brigade soldiers, and the time that elapsed between the detention of a civilian, his transportation to the ministry, and the police being informed.

However, the essence of the problem lies elsewhere: in the army's interference in the civilian sphere and the understanding of a rule-of-law state, regardless of what the civilian in question might have done. This is another story to which there will be an epilogue, if the accusations are true.

According to information so far, there is no justification for the behavior of the Interior Ministry members. The minister himself made the biggest mistake here because he did not take steps against his subordinates by at least temporarily suspending them until the completion of the inquiry, particularly since this was not the first excess of this type and it puts the entire army in a bad light.

Had we lived in a normal country, he himself would have submitted his resignation and everybody would have viewed this as an honorable act. At the end of the day, the government might even have fallen because of Sunday's events. However, in the heated political atmosphere with political clashes and meetings constantly in the air, along with all sorts of mutual suspicions, imputations, and tactical games, one cannot hope for a rational approach. A normal political struggle has in Slovenia transformed itself into a battle for new and final victories. Everybody has now left the decision to the prime minister.

Conflict Between Government, President Examined

AU2203204994 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Mar 93 p 2

[Boris Jez commentary: "The King Is Naked, Where Is the Happy End?"]

[Text] There is no doubt that the president of the state [Milan Kucan] "was taught a lesson" at the Monday session of the prime minister's political coordinating group. He spoke of illegal structures, quasi-intelligence services, disqualifications, and physical liquidations in Nova Gorica—and now the government's leadership publicly tells him that, on the basis of the verified information, there is no proof for his claims. Therefore, the president is speaking without any basis, which in a normal democracy would already be enough to make one think.

The political coordinating group is a term from the past, but one cannot deny the competence of the team that met on Monday. In addition to the main ministers, the chiefs of both (legal) intelligence services were also present there, and who could judge about the state and its security matters more authoritatively! If this "security leadership" therefore agreed on all the most important issues, it would be difficult to object, and even more difficult to say that president's opinion is more "authoritative." Kucan thus remained isolated with his claims. This cannot be eased even by the fact that his main opponent, the defense minister [Janez Jansa], attended the Monday meeting. It was almost certainly the prime minister [Janez Drnovsek] who decided about "the outcome" of the meeting and who approved the final version of the statement.

Knowing Drnovsek well, along with his skill and tact when it comes to current dilemmas, last Monday could not qualify as one of Jansa's triumphant days. The prime minister could not "establish" that illegal secret services are rummaging around Slovenia and that the country is facing its disintegration; that is why the wording in the statement appears to be to the liking of Janez Jansa, but it was not necessarily put on the paper in this form because of him and his interests.

The fact that the defense minister cannot celebrate victory does not mean, however, that Kucan did not suffer (at least) a temporary defeat. In a way this was also confirmed by a letter that he addressed to the prime minister on the very same day and in which he allegedly again warned him of some of his meetings with senior police officers and the SOVA [the Slovene Information-Security Agency]. It was supposedly precisely these people who told him about the organized groups that engage unlawfully in intelligence activities and exceed their authority, all to the possible detriment of security. Kucan's letter in itself reflects the

highly unfavorable position in which he has found himself: Not only that he has been saying things in Nova Gorica that "the security leadership" subsequently coolly denied, but the senior state officials misinform him! Perhaps they are even doing this deliberately. How could one otherwise interpret the fact that they subsequently attended a meeting with the prime minister at which they concluded that the activity of which the president spoke did not take place! Or have they changed sides in the meantime?!

If Kucan wishes to retain authority, it probably will not be very good for him to tackle such and similar issues in front of the public tribunal—although he will, on the other hand, be forced to explain to this tribunal what he meant by everything he said in Nova Gorica. In other words, the Monday "ruling" of the political coordinating group literally stripped the president naked before the public; he will now find it hard to explain what sort of clothes he actually has.

The people can merely observe this mysterious political supergame—which appears increasingly less likely to have a happy ending, even if only a tiny one—with their jaws agape. The fact is that even after the "qualified ruling" put forward by Drnovsek's political coordinating group, very few people believe that nothing worth mentioning is happening in the country. The prime minister's sense of tact inspires hope that he will gradually neutralize all those antagonisms that are escalating matters dangerously through skillful maneuvering; despite this, the Slovene state has absolutely no guarantees for the future. If everything regarding Kucan and Jansa is merely a metaphor for some deeper ongoing thing, for example, the conquest of strategic economic and political positions in the future Slovene society, then any possible "disciplining" of the participating factors can only be short-lived. Either way, the processes will have to run their course deep down.

The question is, of course, whether the Slovene organism will survive these efforts. Are there sufficient economic, international, psychological, and other resources for this supergame, which chooses one metaphor today and an entirely different one tomorrow, to finally run to its end? Nobody any longer expects a happy ending, but we cannot leave the cinema either.

Ministry Allegedly Planned To Bug MLADINA

AU2403104994

[Editorial Report] Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene in its 22 March edition publishes several articles about the work of the military intelligence service VOMO—the Defense Ministry Security Organ—and the alleged overstepping of its authority.

On pages 2 and 3 the weekly publishes a report by Miha Dj. Stamcar and Jani Sever, which also includes photographs of Defense Ministry documents that support the claims made in the article. Even though the authors do not specify the manner in which they obtained the two documents, they claim that the documents are "originals, according to our research," and allegedly "connected to Operation Ljubljana, which the Defense Ministry initiated because of an increasing number of politicians and media in Slovenia who were pointing out the irregularities in the Defense Ministry, VOMO, and the special brigade Moris. However, the leadership of the Defense Ministry did not like this. In the opinion of the Defense Ministry these people should be supervised and information should be collected about them in order to act more effectively against them."

MLADINA continues: "It seems that VOMO was not directly engaged in this activity, but only its section connected to the special brigade Moris. The core of this parallel organization, which won the nickname 'Paravomo,' consists of former and present operatives in individual elite combat units under the leadership of Jansa's most faithful men from the time of the formation of the maneuver structure. Beside this, there is supposedly also a higher level of informers, which is mostly comprised of the minister's friends and sympathizers from all over Slovenia. In Operation Ljubljana, however, it was mostly the operatives who took part in it and who were subsequently joined by experts for telephone and other types of bugging and private detective agencies."

The article adds that "some information implies that the Slovene police already have proof about the buggings and surveillance" but doubt a speedy and smooth investigation of the case because, "as the well-informed sources claim, the VOMO supposedly holds information about some dubious business allegedly involving the police which it could use for blackmail."

The first document entitled "Report No. 2/1" is typed on a paper bearing the heading of the Defense Ministry and dated 16 June 1993. It is labeled State Secret, signed by Darko Njavro "for the special brigade Moris" and addressed "personally" to Mr. Andrej Lovsin, former VOMO chief, who resigned in January 1994. The document generally summarizes the results of the observation of persons suspected of being involved in illegal arms deals, but in the fourth paragraph says:

"It is evident from the reports of my informers that public opinion, thanks primarily to MLADINA reporters, is very negative toward the employees of the Defense Ministry and the minister himself. Because of this the minister is demanding control over the media, as it was agreed at the last meeting. I request the approval of the technical means for the realization of this task."

The second document of 16 October 1993, also labeled State Secret, signed by Darko Njavro and addressed to Andrej Lovsin personally, reports on purchase of arms in Villach and their transport. The last sentence of the article says: "I request the approval for the telephone bugging of the following numbers: 325-982, 321-954, 318-981 and 329-669" which according to MLADINA's footnote are all telephone numbers of MLADINA's editorial office.

Federal

Jovanovic on Accords, Foreign Involvement

BR2303151894 Groot-Bijgaarden DE STANDAARD in Dutch 23 Mar 94 p 5

[Report on interview with "Serbian" Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Axel Buyse in Brussels; date not given: "Officially Yugoslavia Sees Chances for Peace"]

[Text] Brussels—Yugoslavia is supporting "every effort aimed at bringing peace a step closer." Including, therefore, the rapprochement negotiated by the United States between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. At least, this is what Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic claims. "We give the initiative credit, and we give the United States credit for coming up with it. However, we would like to obtain more information from them. Guarantees that the initiative is based on genuine peace, and on a just, balanced solution."

"The absence of war between Bosnian Croats and Muslims, the fruit of U.S. mediation, already constitutes the beginning of a political solution between them. However, the third party, the Bosnian Serbs, were not consulted. That is the weak point of the initiative. The war involves all three factions, yet a solution is being sought through bilateral talks," Minister Jovanovic said.

"There is nothing unnatural in this rapprochement," according to the minister, who arrived in Brussels yesterday. Belgrade is giving the initiative the benefit of the doubt. "If the intention behind it is serious, then hats off to it; but if it is merely a prelude to an alliance against the third party, then it will not work," he said.

Jovanovic pointed out that peace has been on the horizon for a long time. The blueprint is enshrined in the preliminary agreements that were thrashed out by the European Union (EU) in negotiations in Geneva. "The third parties are calling for peace. They want a political solution. But which one? That remains up in the air, because the fate of the three communities in Bosnia does not lie entirely in their own hands. Foreign forces are becoming more and more in evidence in the Balkans," warned the minister.

The Muslims, in particular, are bending to such influence, he said a little later. Who did he mean by "foreign forces"? The United States, among others, it would seem, who have taken the initiative away from the EU. "But also the Turks, Iranians, Saudi Arabia, all those who finance the Muslims and back them in pursuing the idea of a unified Bosnia," he said.

The Bosnian Serbs have good intentions, emphasized Jovanovic. They are prepared to live in a loose union of three republics [losse Bosnische unie van drie republieken], but they cannot go any further than that. On top of this, they are demanding guarantees and clarity. For instance, what form will that confederation with Croatia take?

Link

Jovanovic replied negative when asked whether Bosnia might not become some form of link in the long term, the beginning of another new, loose, "Yugoslavia-type structure." "After everything that has happened, that is difficult to imagine," he said. Slovenians, Croats, and Muslims are afflicted with a kind of "anti-Yugoslavia" syndrome, stoked up by anti-Serbian propaganda from abroad. The problem lies with them, not Yugoslavia.

The minister also sees progress being made in Croatia concerning the problem affecting a part of the Serbian minority that declared its own independent state, the "Serbian republic of Krajina." The Croatian Serbs are due to start negotiations in Zagreb on Tuesday. "I expect them to come up with a positive result," Jovanovic said.

That solution will probably have to be approached in stages. "First of all, the hostilities must be brought to an end. Then, life must be allowed to return to normal again. Only when all that has been achieved can we proceed to the third, and most difficult, phase, i.e., embarking on political negotiations." The minister did not wish to speculate as to how the final outcome might look. "The result will have to be one achieved on the basis of a genuine consensus," he said.

Does the question of the Albanian majority in the Serbian province of Kosovo not threaten to rear its ugly head as soon as the situation in Croatia and Bosnia has stabilized? "That is a pipe dream of those who like fishing in troubled waters," Jovanovic said. "Kosovo is a different problem, one which has nothing to do with the Yugoslav crisis. Anyone who seeks to create an artificial link between that crisis and Kosovo is merely seeking to blackmail Yugoslavia and Serbia," he argued. "Kosovo is a classic problem of a national minority striving for separatism. The problem has to be solved accordingly.

A national minority has no right to its own state. Anyone who tolerates that is playing with fire. Because that would mean that the same principle could be applied in a number of other regions of Europe," he concluded.

EU's Role in Peace Process 'Marginal'

LD2403123094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1127 GMT 24 Mar 94

["Pool" item by Borislav Lalic]

[Text] Belgrade, March 24 (TANJUG)—Now that all the "peace plans" of the European Union (E.U.) have fallen through and when their peace-making role in the former Yugoslavia has become marginal, all the E.U. was left with was to stand aside and watch what the Americans and Russians were doing and analyze where it went astray and what all this meant to it.

The diplomatic and press circles were already conducting such analyses, although the "pax Americana" for Bosnia was not taken for granted, even less so as a definitive solution. These analyses evince an almost

undivided view that hardly any good could come from this for the E.U., providing the U.S.-Russian initiative brings peace to Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia.

The fact that it lacked the strength, unity and skill to resolve the problem of the former Yugoslavia, not only confirmed a lack of unified E.U. policy, but could well be the seed undermining the Maastricht creation, which aspired to well-nigh turn into a federal state by the turn of the century. As European Commission President Jacques Delors set out, the case of former Yugoslavia could "Balkanize" the E.U. itself.

This "seed" of different interests in the E.U. ranks went back to the time of the beginning of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Today, even some of the E.U. member-states admit that Germany forced the recognition of secessionist Yugoslav republics and that this led to eruption of war. Ironically, at this time, when this drama assumed tragic proportions, life seems to be squaring accounts also with the E.U.: As it played a significant role in breaking up of Yugoslavia, so now the E.U. was forced to watch from a distance someone else building peace.

Things were nevertheless not as simple to such a degree as to have us believe that the U.S.-sponsored peace process in Bosnia was unfolding completely without the E.U. It was quite possible that the Americans, aided by the Russians, were working in favor of one of the E.U. members, which at first wanted to place under its "umbrella" the entire Bosnia, and now were satisfied with what was possible and realistic, i.e., half of Bosnia.

The peace process, which was yet to be joined by the Serbs, would show where this U.S.-Russian peace was going and what links its strived to establish or sever on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. One thing was, however, rather clear: In the new world order too, if it in fact existed, the dominant role of the super powers remained. At this time and in this case markedly more prominently that of the U.S. than Russia, but undoubtedly of both. The European Union would have to by all means draw the conclusions from this.

Zagreb Envoy on Relations With Croatia

AU2303183094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Interview with Veljko Knezevic, head of the office of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Zagreb, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] *Prior to his departure to Zagreb tomorrow, Veljko Knezevic, head of the office of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Zagreb, was received by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic. After the talks, Mr. Knezevic made a statement for the Radio and Television of Serbia and TANJUG.*

[Correspondent] What did you discuss with Prime Minister Kontic?

[Knezevic] My trip to Zagreb tomorrow. Prime Minister Kontic spoke about the importance he and thus the Yugoslav Government attach to the beginning of the process normalizing relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia. He expressed a certain optimism that this normalization would occur even quicker than presently thought. I would like to see this happen.

I am also optimistic to some extent that the normalization will take off regardless of the delays and possible difficulties that will arise, as our relations are naturally very complex and very [word indistinct].

[Correspondent] In which segments [words indistinct] do you expect this normalization to be established first?

[Knezevic] I think that normalization will begin in the already designated, as you said, segments. As you can see, we are trying to establish PTT [post, telephone, and telegraph] links to start solving and resolving the complex humanitarian problems.

I think that the nature of things will be such that it will in fact be economic relations that will lay the foundations for everything, that these relations will perhaps move the fastest toward some kind of normalization, on the basis of mutual interests. When and how the complete political solutions will be found remains to be seen.

Arrests, Abuse of Muslims in Sandzak Condemned

LD2403095994 Tehran IRNA in English 0731 GMT 24 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, Mar. 24, IRNA—The gratuitous arrest of over 400 Muslims and the widespread use of torture in the Sandzak region of the former Yugoslavia is a source of grave concern, the Humanitarian Law Fund said in Belgrade Wednesday.

At a press conference in Belgrade, Chairwoman Natasha Kandich urged that all allegations of inhuman behaviour be impartially investigated by parliamentary bodies, and members of the police found responsible sent before the courts.

In particular, the responsibility of members of an investigatory commission of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs should be established for their participation in a cover-up of police misconduct, fund representatives said.

The situation in the Sandzak, a region covering parts of Serbia and Montenegro, is now dangerously similar to that in Kosovo, where almost 2 million Kosovo Albanians live in severe repression by the Serbian authorities, Kandich said.

The main difference is that Albanian Muslims frequently die in prison, whereas no deaths in detention have as yet taken place in the Sandzak, she added.

Between January 27 and February 22, the discriminatory arrest of members of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), which rallies Muslims was carried out by the Serbian-Montenegrin authorities.

Investigating individual cases of brutality, the fund established that torture of Muslims is systematically applied, in contravention of the constitution and international covenants.

Detainees were forced to testify against themselves by beatings, sometimes with heavy metal bars, electric shocks, beating on the palms of the hands and soles of the feet, the use of truncheons on the testicles, strangulation, strong light and deprivation of food and water.

Police make no effort to hide their Serbian extremist allegiance, Kandich said, and threaten prisoners with the names of Serbian terrorists such as Vladislav Seselj and Arkan, a well-known criminal. Both names are linked to atrocities against the non-Serb populations in Croatia and Bosnia.

Some of the prisoners were blind-folded and taken to places in Bosnia, the fund stated. Prisoners were kept in excess of the 72 hour legal limit and their families were not informed of their whereabouts.

The arrested were charged with illegal possession of arms, but charges were exaggerated in order to point to a conspiracy to secede from Serbia Montenegro, lawyers said. The true reason, in the fund's opinion, is twofold: One, to prevent the functioning of a legal political party (the SDA) and secondly to terrorize the Muslim population in order to carry out "ethnic cleansing" of the region.

No action has been taken against Serbs, Montenegrins or other nationalities in the area, who openly boast of being armed, representatives said.

According to the fund, most of the arms were acquired in a wave of fear in 1991 when war broke out between Croats and Serbs. "The only difference," a spokesman said, "is that Serbs acquire their weapons from their army in Bosnia, while Muslims buy them."

The present trial of 25 Muslims in Novi Pazar is a rigged political process, representatives said, where all legal rights of defence have been set aside. Admissions extracted under torture are being used in evidence against them, while the accused have already been condemned in the press without trial.

Serbia

Opposition Leader Views Milosevic, Greece

AU2303160394 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 17 Mar 94 p 10

[Interview with Milan Komnenic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), by Albena Shkodrova; place and date not given: "'It Is Possible That Milosevic Is Doing a Deal With Greece'"]

[Text] [Shkodrova] At the conference of the Helsinki Civic Assembly you said that Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia must get together and discuss the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] problem. Was this an invitation?

[Komnenic] Of course, the Macedonian issues are first of all issues of those who live in the republic and call themselves Macedonians. We can think whatever we like on this issue, but this is how they feel. We, Serbs, you, Bulgarians, and the Greeks must accept this as a reality.

Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, as neighboring states which are on their way to becoming democracies, are responsible for preventing Macedonia from becoming a second Bosnia. I list only our three countries, because I do not think that Albania will cooperate.

We must help Macedonia to find its place within a politically and economically stable framework in Europe. We all are related in this matter, and our interests depend on one another.

I am convinced that after the experience in Bosnia there will be no war in Macedonia or Kosovo. However, democratic Serbia is prepared to facilitate the solution of any problem in the Balkans, even the Macedonian one. This is a major issue for Bulgarian policy and you cannot ignore it. Naturally, we respect this. Simultaneously, however, Serbia should not get involved in the Macedonian issue.

Greece's decision to impose an embargo on the republic is not prudent at all. On the other hand, Bulgaria's immediate recognition of Macedonia—I think that this was proposed by your current ambassador to Rome, Stefan Tafrov—was a very prudent step.

The three states must do everything possible in order to preserve the balance in the Balkans and facilitate the withdrawal of the U.S. "Blue Helmets" from Macedonia. I think that we could ensure peace here much easier than U.S. soldiers.

[Shkodrova] Do you think that the three states could reach an agreement on Macedonia?

[Komnenic] It is not our business to resolve this issue. However, we must manage our relations with Macedonia very prudently—without any expansion claims. We must be exceptionally careful and restrained, rather than follow an aggressive policy like Papandreou's present

one. It is my personal conviction that Serbia will never enter a conflict because of Macedonia.

[Shkodrova] Do you really think that Yugoslavia will follow the policy that you outline?

[Komnenic] This is the policy of Serbia's democratic opposition. I am not describing to you Belgrade's official position.

[Shkodrova] Does Serbian public opinion coincide with yours?

[Komnenic] No. Perhaps only that of part of the people. In Serbia there are radical nationalists who consider Macedonia a southern Yugoslav province, precisely as there are Bulgarians who think that not only Pirin, but the entire Macedonia is part of the Bulgarian culture, nation, and territory. The same apples to Greece.

I support the idea of a united Europe, in which borders will not be important. We in the Balkans are still prisoners of factors that have already been overcome. I would like to see the day when at Kalotina [Bulgarian-Serbian border checkpoint] I will not have to show my passport, precisely as Frenchmen do not show their passports when they enter Germany.

Integrated in such a way the Balkans could join Europe. This is why the Yugoslav issue is so tragic. Yugoslavia should have entered Europe as one entity—then it would not have been important whether Serbia, Croatia, Serbian Krajina, and Bosnia were parts of it.

It does not appear to be important for 21st century Europe how many citizens Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece have.

For example, I am very proud of the fact that many young Bulgarian intellectuals from Bosilegrad and Dimitrovgrad are members of my party. Some of them were candidates at the last parliamentary elections.

[Shkodrova] Nevertheless, if Milosevic remains in power, which is very probable, do you think that Serbia will have any claims on Macedonia?

[Komnenic] No. I do not believe that Milosevic would like to fight on several fronts.

[Shkodrova] However, what will happen if the war in Bosnia somehow expands?

[Komnenic] The Kosovo issue will certainly emerge—not a conflict, but the issue. This is the greatest Serbian issue, greater even than the Bosnian one. As you know, Kosovo is not only a territory and its population, but that part of the country where Serbian culture was founded, and where most of our monasteries are. Thus, for us Macedonia is a secondary problem, if it is a problem at all. It only consists of respecting the human rights of the Serbian minority. However, we think that this issue should be resolved in accordance with the Helsinki Agreement.

Thus, I do not think that Milosevic has any claims. The only thing I do not know and I cannot say anything with great certainty is whether Milosevic is making a deal with the Greeks. Pure logic compels us to assume the existence of such a possibility.

Committee Opposes Serb Territorial Concessions

AU2303161094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] The Committee of the Patriotic League of Belgrade University at its session today discussed the general position of other countries, particularly the Serbian lands. It concluded, among other things, that it should address the Serbs in the republic of Serbian Krajina and the Srpska republic. The address, which was signed by student Bratislav Zarkovic on behalf of the committee, states the following:

In the negotiations on territorial demarcation currently under way, the representatives of the Serbian people must not and cannot make under any conditions territorial and other concessions that would in any way harm the interests of the [Serbian] lands. Regardless of the pressure that the Serbian people are being subjected to by the international community during these negotiations, territorial concessions cannot be allowed because the territories on which the Serbs live are historically theirs. Therefore, this generation of negotiators has no right to give up these territories under any condition.

The address also states that it is high time for all patriotic forces in the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina to unite because this is in the interest of all Serbs in all regions and in the interest of preserving their biological survival.

Montenegro

Liberals Urge Secession From FRY

AU2403123694 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 94 pp 38-39

[Interview with Slavko Perovic, leader of the Liberal Association of Montenegro, by Slobodan Rackovic; place and date not given: "Montenegro Is Occupied!"]

[Text] Slavko Perovic—founder and leader of the Liberal Association of Montenegro [LSCG], 38-year-old lawyer from Cetinje, 100 percent Montenegrin, one of the most frequently denounced politicians in former Yugoslavia, robust and courageous as a lion, eloquent as Demosthenes—is a man whom you do not have to like or agree with, but you have to respect him. The same is maintained by many of his political opponents, even enemies, who breathlessly listen to his debates in the Montenegrin Assembly and other state bodies. Journalists flock to his news conferences, while those who dare not do that are most happy to have the opportunity of interviewing him.... This is the first time he has given an interview to DANAS, which, to his regret, is not on sale

in Montenegro, but he manages to get hold of a copy through Slovenia from time to time.

[Rackovic] What is the argument the LSCG uses to justify the attitude that the LSCG is the strongest opposition party in the republic? The pro-Serbian National Party in the Montenegrin Assembly holds one seat more than your party (the liberals have 12 out of 85 seats).

[Perovic] We have 20,000 registered members, an enviable figure for a state with 630,000 inhabitants, and some 400,000 voters. Our membership is still growing, and that is a rather puzzling fact for us. Besides, at the latest undemocratic elections in December 1992, the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] literally arranged the votes in the way that best suited it—16 percent of votes to us, 17 percent of votes to the National Party—in order to build its central position on the unprecedented grounds—on the national [word illegible]. The LSCG now holds 26 to 30 percent of the Montenegrin political market, which is an extraordinary advancement. Besides, I remind you that in Montenegro it is only our party's members who have been facing the street barricades, it is only our rallies that have been undermined. The police and the press have been paying most attention to our party, which clearly speaks for our objective strength, rather than the advantage in the Montenegrin Assembly. However, if it comes to the extraordinary elections, like those that happened in Serbia, we do not expect a victory of the Montenegrin bloc. The DPS still has its secret police, spies, the media... through which it can easily control public opinion. However, the next time the DPS will have to agree to give more number seats in the Assembly to the LSCG, so that no government can be formed without the liberals.

We would not go for forming any coalitions in the elections, we simply want to contribute to the stratification of the so-called Montenegrin opposition bloc. All of us who belong to that bloc see Montenegro as a Mediterranean, European country, as an open society with unlimited private ownership, which is to say, we see it as a modern, liberal capitalist country. Our allies in the Assembly—the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro—vary in their orientations, ranging from the model of confederation up to the model of sovereign Montenegro with the social-democratic system, by which they are hopelessly trying to manipulate the feelings of the Montenegrin citizens, who are still pining for the former, socialist Yugoslavia, not realizing that the former Yugoslav leadership actually planned and brought about the bloody disintegration of the union of the south Slavs.

[Rackovic] If you attain power, what will be your attitude toward the former Yugoslav republics?

[Perovic] We will recognize all the states that have developed from the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], within their AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders. The principle of the unchangeability of borders is undisputable for us, and if that principle happens to be annulled, the region of former Yugoslavia will be open for war and catastrophe. As for the reintegration of Yugoslavia in terms of as it used to be, we do not even think about that, because we think it is hypocritical even to use that word. Simply, former Yugoslavia cannot be restored upon hundreds of thousands of graves. We think that each former Yugoslav state should be recognized, international recognition should be made possible for them, and we should leave it to time and the will of each of those states to decide whether they will go for the reintegration following their interests, or not. I would like to stress once more that I refer to the reintegration in terms of joint interests, rather than reintegration into a joint state.

[Rackovic] Belgrade simply does not allow Montenegro to cooperate with Croatia, Italy, and Albania. Some incidents have even been fabricated, like the one near Debeli Brijeg, by the border with Croatia.

[Perovic] Well, it is well-known that Montenegro is an occupied state in which there are 60,000 Serbian soldiers, while the lovely Montenegrin coast has been the place with the greatest concentration of naval forces and equipment.... Which is to say, we have been definitely under occupation. However, within that occupying force there is a lot of people who in their hearts support the policy of the LSCG. That trend in the Yugoslav Army is still active. That is not so great a surprise, because it is obvious that the entire state mechanism is falling apart, that is, a metastasis of the idea of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Nobody can halt that process, not even Slobodan Milosevic, and his tanks and aircraft. In the entire situation Montenegro has a great chance to accomplish its historic goal in a peaceful way—the independence that Montenegro enjoyed for centuries.

[Rackovic] Jevrem Brkovic [Montenegrin poet, opponent of the Montenegrin regime] claims that Montenegro cannot accomplish that goal without bloodshed.

[Perovic] Using the opportunity to express my sincere regards to my friend Brkovic, I pray to God that he is not right. I think that weapons should be put aside. We must not allow bloodshed in Montenegro, because in the first place it would be directed against the interest of the Montenegrin people, regardless of who would eventually win. That victory would do to us much more harm than good, so we are doing everything we can to convince our members and supporters that the way to the sovereign and independent state of Montenegro leads only through a referendum. We are absolutely convinced of our success.

[Rackovic] Belgrade, however, is constantly putting pressure on Montenegro by inciting the chauvinist Serb circles in Boka, Zeta, and Vasojevici, which reminds one very much of the prewar situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Perovic] In Montenegro there are no such tensions as were in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The great Serbian design

has been politically defeated in Montenegro. Simply, it takes time for that defeat to reflect itself among the people. It is precisely those pitiful rallies in Boka, Zeta, and Vasojevici, having amassed a miserable number of troublemakers, that best speak for my being right. These are desperate moves, a consequence of the fact that the supporters of the great Serbian policy are losing their hold on Montenegro. Those rallies are organized by people whom the locals call Montenegrins from Terazije [a district of Belgrade]. Those are Belgrade's hirelings, and the interest of Belgrade is much more important for them than their own interest.

[Rackovic] Your old theory is: Not an inch more of Montenegro, not an inch less.

[Perovic] That is right. We accept Montenegro within the existing borders, with which we are completely satisfied. For us the issue of Prevlaka has never been a problem. It is a fictitious problem that was supposed to justify the shameful raid on Dubrovnik. The issue of our borders with Croatia can be settled only through negotiations between the sovereign states of Croatia and Montenegro, provided, of course, that both states are interested in that. As early as at the beginning of the war in Dubrovnik, a delegation of the Croatian Parliament came to Podgorica, and proposed the settlement of the Prevlaka issue through bilateral talks, but the Montenegrin officials, being Milosevic's marionette, went for the option that was supposed to settle some mythical relations of theirs, rather than some real Montenegrin relations, because of which Montenegro is still in such a difficult position. I repeat, the issue of Prevlaka was invented as a justification of the great Serbian territorial claims. However, that does not justify those Montenegrins who set so many houses on fire in the region, and killed the people there. Behind every single crime there stands a concrete person. And one day they will have to take the consequences for what they did. For a long time Montenegro will be paying for its thoughtlessness, for its having attacked Dubrovnik and its people, who were our friends for centuries. When the Montenegrin borders were proclaimed administrative, we protested against that, because we understood that is the introduction to a war. We did not manage to influence the course of events, but we still did a lot to make the Montenegrin citizens understand in time what a ploy it all was, and to diminish in this way the immense tragedy of Dubrovnik.

[Perovic] We are now making efforts to improve relations with Croatia, and to make the border crossing at Debeli Brijeg completely open, which also applies to all the border crossings to the neighboring countries. Being occupied in such a way, fettered, driven into this quasi-state, we have no chance. We have to find a way to apologize to Dubrovnik and Croatia for what we did there. After all, even before the war started we had established excellent relations with the Croatian Social-Liberal Party [HSLS], then with the Slovene liberals, with the Muslim Bosniak Organization and the liberals led by Rasim Kadic in Bosnia- Herzegovina, with the liberals led by Stojan Andov in Macedonia, and in Serbia with the parties of Nenad Canko, Vesna Pesic, while we still cooperate with Vuk Draskovic, regardless of his nationalism.... Despite the war, we have managed to maintain those relations, to my great pleasure, while with Drazen Budisa's HSLS we have even managed to improve those relations.

[Rackovic] You do not recognize the FRY, and you call it the so-called FRY.

[Perovic] I feel about the FRY that it is a result of a great deceit, and war-mongering policy. From the point of view of law and politics, it is a farce, which is best shown by the fact that even last year we celebrated the Day of the Republic on 29 November [the day when AVNOJ Yugoslavia was established in the Bosnian town of Jajce], a holiday of the republic that does not exist any more! Jajce is not to be found in that state any more, it is devastated and burnt down. That is an example of hypocrisy unprecedented in the history of mankind. The authorities in Montenegro announced a referendum (which was boycotted by the democratic opposition), at which the citizens had to state their opinion about the future of their fatherland. Let me not remind of the fact that only seven days passed from the day when the decision on the referendum was made, to the day when the referendum eventually took place. The question was so ambiguously formulated that the government could not but win. Or, for instance, one man voted for entire families, or even for his entire village. It was an incredible farce, so today many people come up to me and apologize for having voted for the federation of Montenegro with Serbia, that is, for the FRY.

We do not want to live in that state, because when we look at Belgrade, we understand that Serbia is politically contaminated, that it will take decades for it to be politically decontaminated. For a long time it will be impossible to establish Serbia as a lawful, democratic state with a European orientation. We want to leave the union, because Montenegro still has a considerable chance to get away, and to win international support. Of course, we do not demand the life of a single soldier for Montenegro, we do not demand intervention by either NATO or anyone else. We also do not want our people to get killed for Montenegro, but we have to clearly express our political will, and to bring Milosevic to a halt: either he will send tanks to kill us, or he will eliminate the most distinguished Montenegrins with the help of his secret police. Yet, tyranny will solve nothing here, and I am happy to assess that the movement for independent Montenegro has grown so strong and huge that nobody can halt it any more. The situation is exactly the opposite: The greater the pressure that Belgrade puts on us, the stronger the people's awareness of the need for the Montenegrin state to become independent.

We are proposing to the authorities that they examine public opinion now, precisely two years after the referendum, but they persistently refuse to do that, fabricating with the help of the media a monstrous lie that, in the case of the liberals' victory, a civil war will break out.

We say that there will be no war, because for a war two parties are needed, whereas for carnage a single one will do.

Kosovo

Serbs 'Torture' Former Albanian Army Officers

AU2403083394 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 23 Mar 94 p 16

[Unattributed report: "Serbian Interrogators Even Use Chemical Substances"]

[Text] Ismet Veliqi, Avdi Behrami, and Azem Gashi, former military officers and members of the former people's defense forces of Skenderaj [Srbica], whom the Serbian police arrested a few days ago, are being brutally maltreated in Mitrovice Prison, the Information Committee of the Kosova Democratic Alliance's Mitrovice branch reports.

It is reported that they are being tortured at night by employees of the Serbian security services, who come specially from Prishtina. It is reported that the Serbian interrogators are using chemical substances, electric prods, and other methods to torture the former Albanian officers. The detainees' condition is very serious. Torture during the investigation process suggests the preparation of another political show trial, this time of former Albanian Army officers in Kosova.

Vojvodina

Lack of Fuel Hampers Sowing Operations

LD2303150994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1428 GMT 23 Mar 94

[Text] Novi Sad, Mar 23 (TANJUG)—Spring field work is in full swing in the Yugoslav granary Vojvodina but the shortages of diesel fuel represent the main problem due to the oil and overall embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

"Besides seeds, there are not enough necessary raw materials for sowing," Miroslav Sandzakov, Vojvodina assistant secretary for agriculture, told TANJUG.

A record 1.35 million tonnes of oil were produced in Vojvodina last year, sufficient to cover one-quarter of the country's overall needs. According to the energy balance made by the government, agriculture has absolute priority.

Around 800,000 hectares of the 1,080,000 hectares in Vojvodina have been plowed so far. Agricultural producers expect the state to ensure the necessary fuel for the plowing of the remaining 280,000 hectares.

Due to the ban on imports of natural gas, factories for the production of artificial fertilizers are working at reduced capacity. It is estimated that around 60 percent of this year's needs will be met and this will consequently lower the output.

Experts estimate that the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina could under normal conditions provide food for four times the number of inhabitants of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Besides its 10.4 million inhabitants, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cares for refugees from the former Yugoslav republics torn by war. There are around 500,000 registered refugees but the total number of refugees is estimated at 700,000.

According to data of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is currently in the group of countries which cannot feed their own population. Until the introduction of the international blockade in May 1992, Yugoslavia not only satisfied its needs in foodstuffs but also exported significant surpluses.